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THE UKRAINE—A RUSSIAN LAND

p 1

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THE UKRAINE— A RUSSIAN LAND

PIERRE BRÉGY
AND
PRINCE SERGE OBOLENSKY

TRANSLATED BY
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SELWYN & BLOUNT
PUBLISHERS LONDON

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

000 THIS book was written before the war, in the summer of 1939. Nothing need be changed in the text. It describes all the aspects of the historical, geographical, economic, and religious background of that part of Eastern Europe which has been a battle-field for centuries.

This year's manifestation of the German *Drang nach Osten*, which has led to such world-wide repercussions, is seen, on reading this book, to be only a phase in an ancient struggle.

The role of Russia as the only factor which can ultimately bring balance and peace will be realized. Light is shed on the Russian annexations of the districts of Eastern Poland. They are seen to be not just wanton aggression, but in tune with centuries of history. So much has Russia changed already, and the process is by no means complete, that the one-time internationalist regime is also in some respects carrying out a national policy.

Russia has wisely left all purely Polish districts to Germany. A Poland that has repeatedly risen after so many disasters will rise again and will, with a strong new Russia of to-morrow behind her, be a bulwark against German aggression.

The Ukraine, that rich land which was the ultimate object of Hitler's struggle, should be safely protected.

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CHAPTER I

WHAT IS THE UKRAINE?

THE transformation of Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement into a federal state has placed a poor and mountainous country formerly known under the name of 'Sub-Carpathian Russia,' later baptized 'The Autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' into the front rank of European events.[1]

It is thus that the Ukrainian problem appears in Europe, made important by the number of the population which it concerns, by the extent of the territories which are affected, and by political and economic complications of immediate interest to four different States: the U.S.S.R., Poland, Rumania, and Hungary.

The importance of this problem is furthermore underlined by the role which it seems destined to play in the dynamic development of the German nation, in possibly guiding its future manifestation after that of the *Anschluss*, the annexation of Sudetenland, of Bohemia, of Moravia, and of Slovakia. In this the problem clearly has an international character.

. . . . .

121 The aim of this book is to explain the Ukrainian problem to British readers both in its entirety and in all its particular aspects; geographical, historical, ethnographical, economic, and political.

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[1] Reannexed on 20 March 1939 by Hungary, this country has readopted the name of Sub-Carpathian Russia or Ruthenia.

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000 Usually when undertaking any study whatever, one has at least the advantage of dealing with a well-defined subject.

This is not the case with regard to the Ukraine.

101 Actually, from a purely political point of view, no independent state ever bore this name except during a very short period in 1918–1919, a period which coincided almost entirely with an occupation of Ukrainian territory by Austro-German military forces.

To-day, too, no independent state bears this name, as the 'Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine' is an integral part of the Soviet Union.

Consequently it will be necessary that we should first define our subject in order to indicate to our readers the significance of the word 'Ukraine' as used in this book.

It will, therefore, be well first to give some information about this term itself and about its philological origins. The word Ukraine (*Oukraina* or *Okraina*) means 'March,' 'Borderland,' 'Outskirts,' and 'Landsend.'

Formerly it had been applied by the Russians to the southern borders of the old Muscovite State, which now include the eastern districts of the present Soviet Ukraine. One of the articles of the *Sobornoie Oulojenie*, the Russian code of laws of the twelfth century, provides for condemnation to deportation to the 'Ukrainian Lands' (*Oukrainya Zemli*) giving this name to all far-away lands, not necessarily Ukrainian. The Poles used the same name for their south-eastern frontiers. The hypothesis that the name 'Ukraine' comes from a Slavonic tribe of Pomerania, the so-called *Ukres* or *Ukranes*, cannot be accepted.

It is the warriors of those frontier regions, the Cossacks (Horsemen, in the Tartar language), who, in the sixteenth century, have brought this name with them to the right bank of the Dnieper. Some French documents of the epoch which mention the name Ukraine confirm this, as for example: 'The description of the Ukraine, which are several provinces of the Polish Kingdom,' by Le Sieur de Beauplan (Rouen, 1660). Other, more ancient documents used the terms 'Russia,' 'Land of the Cossacks,' or 'Tartary' for these regions. 101

If one keeps to the word 'Ukraine' in its strictly philological sense, this name could not be applied to the western part of the country, and especially to Galicia, and never to Sub-Carpathian Russia, which has for centuries and in all languages used the name of Russia. In Czech and Polish it was *Rus Podkrpatska*, in Hungarian *Ruska Krajna*, in Old Russian *Ougorskaia Rous* (Hungarian Russia).

Nevertheless it is in Galicia, while existing among foreign peoples and differing religions and cultures which were politically dominant (Germans, Poles, and Hungarians), that the intellectual movement and the Ukrainian language had most developed in resisting denationalization.

One could not, impartially, take advantage of this confusion of terms in order to deny the existence of the Ukraine as a political entity, as we have other examples such as another Slavonic country, Jugoslavia, where such a situation does not allow one to deny the existence of a nation and a State.

From a strictly official point of view there exists a frontier, more administrative than political, which separates the Soviet Ukraine from the rest of Russia. The term 'administrative' seems to us quite correct, as one cannot apply the description of 'political' to this frontier since it has been determined unilaterally by the central government of Moscow in accordance with 000

000 vaguely ethnographical and linguistic data and, especially, by taking into account the economic considerations which decided the division of the U.S.S.R. into 'industrial regions' and which accord with the general plan of organization of the Union.

This purely administrative and arbitrary character of the factors which determined the internal frontiers of the U.S.S.R. is confirmed by the creation, in the interior of the Ukraine, of an 'Autonomous Moldavian Republic.'

This territory includes the regions of Tiraspol, Ananiev, and Balta on the left bank of the Dniester, opposite Rumania.

It is of a demagogic character and serves only to menace the unity of Rumania by creating a national base of an important branch of her population outside her frontiers.

As for the Moldaves, this new republic only has an insignificant minority of them, which are almost entirely assimilated, especially in the two last-named regions, where their numerical importance does not exceed that of the German colonists.

101 The administrative frontier of the Soviet Ukraine begins on the shore of the Sea of Azov between Marioupol and Taganrog, runs along the Donietz, the tributary of the Don, turns towards the north-west, follows the border of the Central Russian plain, then points to the west and reaches the Polish boundary at about latitude fifty-one degrees north, about one hundred kilometres south of the Pripet, a tributary of the Dnieper.

The political frontier which separates the western parts of Polish Volynia and Galicia from the Soviet Ukraine are the direct result of the defeat of Russia during the Russo-Polish War of 1920, and have no geographic, ethnographic, strategic, or other justification, a fact which also applies to the rest of the frontier

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
NOTE:
State Boundaries
Boundaries of the Great Ukraine
THE GREAT UKRAINE
CHAPTER I
BALTIC SEA
LITHUANIA
Kaunas
Vilna
Minsk
Danzig
Berlin
Warsaw
POLAND
SOVIET RUSSIA
R. PRIPET
Novgorod Seversky
Putivl
Chernigov
GERMANY
Lublin
Vladimir Volynsky
VOLYNIA
Pereiaslavl
Poltava
Kharkov
R. DON
R. DONETZ
Prague
Cracow
BOHEMIA
Lvov
Tarnopol
MORAVIA
GALICIA
Halich
PODOLIA
Vinnitsa
R. DNIEPER
Lugansk
R. Danube
SLOVAKIA
Munich
Zurich
Vienna
AUSTRIA
Uzhorod
Czernowitz
BUKOVINA
R. DNIESTER
R. BUG
Ananiev
Dniepropetrovsk (Ekaterinoslav)
Zaporozhe (Alexandrovsk)
Taganrog
Rostov-on-Don
Mariupol
Budapest
HUNGARY
Tiraspol
Odessa
Nikolaiev
NORTH TAURIDA
Kherson
SEA OF AZOV
Ovidiopol
BESSARABIA
RUMANIA
CRIMEA
CAUCASUS
Sevastopol
YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade
Bucharest
R. DANUBE
BLACK SEA
ITALY
ADRIATIC SEA
Rome
ALBANIA
Sofia
BULGARIA
GREECE
Constantinople
TURKEY

MAP No. 1

between these two countries right up to its northern extremity.

Officially the Ukraine is limited to-day to the territory of 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' which corresponds in some districts to the territory of 'Little Russia' or 'Russia Minor' of the time of the Tsars and to New Russia, conquered by the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century (the districts of Odessa, Kherson, and of Northern Taurida).

But from the historical and linguistic point of view this territory stretches a considerable way towards the west and includes the departments (*voievodstva*) of Volynia, Lvov, Stanislavov, Tarnopol, and some districts of the departments of Polesia (the districts of Stolin, Kamien-Koszynski), and of Lioublin (the districts of Kholm, Bialgoraj, Hrubeiszov, Tomaszov, and of Zamoscie) of the Polish Republic, as constituted before the present war.

To this territory one must add Rumanian Bucovina ('Black Russia') and the northern section of Bessarabia up to the banks of the Dniester—the actual frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania—down to its mouth on the Black Sea. As for Sub-Carpathian Russia, we also include it in the 'great Ukraine' solely *because of the name which it has been given by the Government of Prague after the Munich agreement, while insisting on the complete absence of the existence of any linguistic or other reason for doing so.*

The frontier thus determined has, as we have said, only a linguistic and administrative basis, for within that line the greater part of the population speak the various Ukrainian dialects, and the territory which is enclosed by it bears to-day the name of the Ukraine.

From this Polish-Soviet frontier this line roughly follows the River Pripet, and then descends towards the town of Kholm, then to follow the Rivers Wieprz, San,

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the Vistula, Wislok, Poprad, the latter in Sub-Carpathian /01
Russia, and finally in Hungary the High Tissa, a tributary of the Danube right up to the former Czecho-Rumanian border. Then this line cuts across Rumanian territory to the south of Tchemovitz (Cernauti) and follows the little river Reout, a tributary of the Dniester, right up to the latter.

Speaking geographically, that which we will decide [/31]
to call the 'Ukraine' in this book has only one natural frontier: the southern inclines of the western part of the Carpathians. We do not speak of the coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov which officially forms its southern frontier, as this is above all the boundary of the Russian continent in its entirety.

Actually, in the north-eastern basin of the Danube /33
rises the immense semicircle of the Carpathians, dominating the Hungarian Plain.

The summits of these mountains reach to more than two thousand metres and are covered by beech, oaks, ash, and some fir trees—typical European forests. They have changed much less than those of the Alps or the Sudeten ranges. Here, in the western part of the Carpathians, in Sub-Carpathian Russia, the forests are still in an almost virgin state. They are still inhabited by bears and wild boar, and are but authentic vestiges—even because of the fact of their primitive state—of the great forests of Central Europe.

The Uzok Range, which has seen the passage of so many invaders in the course of the centuries, has all the characteristics of the high mountains of Central Europe.

From the geo-physical point of view Sub-Carpathian Russia, which stretches along the southern slopes of the Carpathians, is still part of the hilly country, divided by ranges of mountains, with a temperate climate typical of the whole of Central Europe, which has

133 always favoured the formation of national groups, distinct from one another, and of States of relatively restricted size more or less dependent on their neighbours. Their development fills the whole history of Central Europe and they are only menaced by the German drive.

If we proceed in a north-easterly direction into Eastern Galicia, to the old 'Red Russia,' to-day *Malopolska* ('Little Poland' or 'Poland Minor'), we enter imperceptibly into the plains as the mountains become, little by little, hills which in turn are slowly obliterated. The hilly country becomes flat. Only the rivers, winding in the plain, interrupt here and there the monotony of the landscape. Advancing more and more towards the east, we always see the same plain without anything which resembles a natural limit, a plain which extends for hundreds and thousands of miles. We notice nothing at the frontier which separates Polish Galicia from the plain of Southern Russia (the Soviet Ukraine), but we also do not notice anything, when going towards the north, between the Ukraine and Russia proper.

Here we can go towards the ocean in the north and meet but rarely some chains of hills whose height is seldom more than three hundred metres.

Beyond the Carpathians, in the Ukraine, we enter the great plain which stretches, with only one interruption, the Urals, to Eastern Siberia.

132 The climate, too, changes almost imperceptibly and becomes a little colder and more continental towards the north and the east. However, the shroud of snow which covers the soil remains intact during three to five months in the whole of this immense part of the Continent, except, perhaps, along the shore of the Black Sea, where the climate is a little softer and where winter snow is rarer.

Apart from the severer climate of the Carpathian /32
summits, that of the whole Ukrainian territory is nearly the same and can be characterized by the average temperature at Kiev, which is almost in the centre of the Ukraine, and which is an average of 7·3 degrees C., with an average minimum of –4·5 degrees C. and an average maximum of 20 degrees C.

This solid carpet of snow and these frozen rivers during long months are unknown in Western Europe.

The length of uninterrupted winter increases as one advances towards the north and the east. But on the whole extent of the Russian plain the average temperature in January does not rise above –4 degrees C. Human existence has to adapt itself to this fact. All the civilizations which have developed on the Russian plain have necessarily been influenced by it.

This aspect of the winter already tells us that from a climatic point of view the Ukraine belongs to a world quite different from the West and is connected with the great Russian continent. In the summer torrid and endless heat, broken by rare thunderstorms, such as are unknown in the West, confirms this statement. This very high summer temperature is not typical of the Ukraine alone but of the whole of Russia.

Beyond the frontier of the 'Soviet Republic of the Ukraine,' in the direction of the Volga and the Caspian Sea, the periods of heat are so long and intense that vegetation, which is progressively poorer, becomes almost non-existent. We enter a zone of semi-desert. But again we do so almost without noticing it, as the change of flora takes place slowly and imperceptibly from the Carpathians to the Caspian Sea.

In the greater part of the Ukraine the heat and dryness /37
are sufficiently pronounced to hinder the growth of trees,/ 32
but nevertheless insufficiently so as to kill all vegetation.

137 Between the zone of the forests and that of the deserts, a geographical zone which enjoys a rich vegetation of corns and grasses stretches across the Russian plain. It is the Steppe, which begins on the shores of the Black Sea and almost immediately behind the Carpathians, a little to the east of Lvov, in Polish Galicia, along longitude 22 degrees east, and which continues from west to east, growing gradually wider beyond the frontiers of the Ukraine, and passing the official and conventional limit of Europe without interruption into Siberia.

134 Treeless since time immemorial, the plain is here exceptionally fertile. The grasses which grow here since prehistoric times have formed a thick layer of humus by their organic remains, which particularly favours the growth of all cereals, close relations of the wild species of the Steppe, the *pyrei*. The fertility of the soil is not only due to its organic composition but also to its porous structure whose capillary qualities facilitate irrigation.

This famous ‘ black earth,’ the *tchernoziom*, is nowhere so rich as in the Ukraine. It forms, while becoming somewhat poorer towards the east, the typical soil of the whole Steppe both in the Ukraine and in Siberia.

137 The transition between the region of the forests and the Steppe is also not sudden. Before disappearing definitely in the ocean of corn and grass, the forests become lighter and sparser and here and there, especially along the rivers, they advance into the Steppes.

131 Yet the frontier between the zone of the forests and that of the Steppe is the only natural border which one can find in the immensity of the Russian plain. Formerly a stable political boundary—as we shall see when studying the history of the Ukraine[1]—it represents nothing to-day either from the ethnical or the political point of view.

[1] [see category 116, PP. 27-106---Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

This frontier runs in an almost straight line first towards the east to the Dnieper, which it reaches near the old City of Perejaslävl, then it runs towards the north-east and cuts through the present frontier of the Soviet Ukraine in the neighbourhood of Poutivl (approximately fifty degrees latitude north).

The forest reigns to the north of this line, which cuts the territory of the Ukraine into two unequal parts. The bigger part of Western Ukraine, Polish Galicia and the north-western part of Soviet Ukraine, lie in the forest zone and it is there, in about a quarter of the total territory, that the historic cradle of the Ukraine is to be found, as well as that of the whole of Russia, with the ancient towns of Halitch, Vladimir-Volynsk, Kiev, and Tchernigov.

The other and greater part of the actual Ukrainian territory includes the Steppes, now almost entirely under the plough, which reach down to the Black Sea. This is a country of relatively recent colonization.

In the Ukraine, as in the whole of Russia, the two principal zones are always present.

To sum up, if there is a geographic line between the Ukraine and Europe in the Carpathians, it is impossible to trace a geographic frontier between the Ukraine and the rest of Russia.

Geographically, Ukrainian territory is part of the great Russian Plain and has all the essential characteristics of the latter, and we can do no better than to refer to the dictionary of Larousse which gives the following excellent definition: 'Vast country of the south-west of the Russian Plain.'

Historic evolution alone, directed by the will of 000
men, could, when encountering natural factors, give a distinctive character to this territory.

It is therefore this evolution of the Ukraine which

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000 will occupy us particularly in order that we should be able to disentangle the historical factors which oppose her union with Russia, as well as those which tend to maintain this unity.

But before coming to this, let us try to consider one more geographical circumstance which underlines the unity of the Ukraine and Russia. This is the system of rivers. Here, too, the principles which apply to the
133 Ukraine also apply to the whole of Russia. The whole
[487] plain is a region of great rivers, which flow from south to north, or from north to south. It is in the latter direction that the rivers of the Ukraine flow. Their waters are emptied into the Black Sea. Chief among them is the Dnieper, which, owing to its length of 2500 kilometres, occupies third place in Europe, after the Volga and the Danube. It crosses Ukrainian territory from north to south, dividing it into two almost equal parts, while its sources lie in the north, in Great Russia, beyond Ukrainian territory. Thus it forms a natural link between the north and the border regions of the Black Sea. And it is to this great mercantile route, represented by this river, that the Ukrainian territory owes in great measure the role it has played in Europe since the tenth century of our era.

The river, too, was a great route of colonization. The first agriculturalists followed the routes which nature herself had provided in the Ukraine as well as in the whole Russian Plain.

000 As we have seen, it is impossible, geographically speaking, to fix the frontiers of the Ukraine. But we have also said, that to determine the subject and to reach the aim of this book, we have to establish approximately the territory which we will call by this name. Having also accepted the Carpathians as the only geographical frontier, we shall keep to this with regard to the whole

western part of the Ukraine, and we shall confine ourselves 000 to the boundaries as determined on pages 16–19.[1]

We will accept the administrative Soviet frontier as 131 being the northern and eastern boundaries. The coast 101 of the Black Sea and of the Sea of Azov completes the boundary.

Thus the Ukraine, as determined by us, forms a territory whose extreme points are:

In the west longtitude 19 degrees east: the town of Uzhgorod in Hungarian Sub-Carpathian Russia;

In the east longtitude 37.5 degrees east: the town of Lougansk, in the oil-basin of the Donietz;

In the north latitude 52 degrees north: the town of Novgorod-Severski;

In the south latitude 48 degrees north: the town of Ovidiopol, at the mouth of the Dniester. This is within latitudes which are familiar to us, as those of Kiev and of Calais, of Odessa and of Nantes, of Poltava and of Paris correspond with each other.[2]

The maximum extent of Ukrainian territory in a west to east direction, from Uzhgorod to Lougansk, is, as the crow flies, a distance of 1375 kilometres, while in the north to south direction, from Novgorod-Severski to Ovidiopol it is 675 kilometres.

This territory occupies a space of 588,000 square kilometres (about 25,000 square kilometres more than France) of which

Soviet Ukraine has . . .	452,000 sq. km.
Poland (Volynia, Podolia, Galicia)	107,000 sq. km.
Rumanian Bucovina and Bessarabia	17,000 sq. km.
Sub-Carpathian Russia (Hungary)	12,000 sq. km.

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[1] See Map No. 1.

[2] See Map No. 2: the map of France superimposed on that of the Ukraine.

162 The population on the whole of this territory[1] reaches about 43,000,000 inhabitants of which there are:

In the Soviet Ukraine . . .	33,500,000
In the Polish part . . .	8,000,000
In the Rumanian part . . .	900,000
In the Hungarian part . . .	600,000

The average density of this population is about the same as that of France, being 70·6 inhabitants per square kilometre and varying between 45 and 100 inhabitants per square kilometre in different regions, the density being a little less than that of Poland (85) and a little greater than that of Rumania and Jugoslavia (48).

If one accepts the figures of official Polish and Soviet statistics, one can estimate that of this population of 43,000,000, 36,000,000 are Ukrainians and the rest Polish, Great-Russian, White-Russian, Jewish, Moldavian, German, Hungarian, and other minorities and small groups scattered throughout the territory.

These figures are, moreover, almost exactly confirmed by the religion of the population: 85 per cent are Orthodox or Catholics of the Eastern rite, of which all without exception are Ukrainians.

000 It is obvious that, owing to its size and its population, the Soviet Ukraine is far more important than the other parts of the Ukraine. Its economic potential is proportionately still greater, which forces us to allot it a predominant place in that part of the book which will deal with the economic geography of the Ukraine.

[1] [see category 116, p.25--- Analyst]

CHAPTER II

THE UKRAINE OR 'RUSSIA MINOR'?

(An historical explanation)

FROM time immemorial and until it was finally conquered by the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, the Steppe has been the stage of most extensive migrations. 175x

From the borders of China to the Carpathians, nomadic peoples wandered freely without encountering natural obstacles and brought traces of Far Eastern civilization, 'barbaric' but not unrecognizable, to the Danube. These elements of the most ancient civilizations of Eastern Asia were mixed with those of the Middle East and of classical Greece, and penetrated into the Steppe, the forest by the Black Sea, and its border countries: the Balkans and the Caucasus.

What has been the first ethnical foundation of that which is to-day called the Ukraine? According to the researches of the academician Marr, the well-known Russian linguist, who has created an entirely new classification of languages and whose work was continued and completed in Paris by the eminent Russian paleontologist, M. Alexander Bashmakoff, one can be certain, from the point of view of language, civilization, and race, that this primitive foundation dates back to the 'Japhetic' or 'Aloroge' peoples of outer Asia, who have created the most ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Elam and that of the Hittites of Asia

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x/175 Minor. The Iranian Scythians succeeded this Cymmerian ethnical element and created on the shores of the Black Sea, in assimilating the influences of classical Greece, a ' barbarian ' civilization, already rather brilliant, which had been grafted on to the primitive Aloroge foundation. Then, at the beginning of the Christian era, the pressure of the Germanic Goths, coming from the west, met in the Steppes of the Black Sea with that of the Alans, probably Caucasians and Aloroge, before being crushed by the assault of the Huns who came from the borders of China. After this, during many centuries other Asiatic hordes of Turkish or Ugro-Finnish origin, such as the Bulgarians, the Avars, the Hungarians, swept all the settled populations which had tried to take root there from the Steppes.

Is it possible to believe that all these elements have disappeared without leaving any traces? Certainly not, as, to mention only one example, the name of Kiev, the ' mother of Russian towns,' the historical capital of the Ukraine, seems to be derived from an Aloroge root and thus dates back to the most ancient layer of the populations which have passed to the north of the Black Sea.

We need not lose further time over the details of all the migrations of the prehistoric period of the Eastern Slav peoples. That which is important is to note how intense the mixture of the races was and to observe the mutual penetration of different civilizations, at all times, to the north of the Black Sea.

Yet the conquerors of the Steppe did not stop at its borders. They penetrated far towards the north, into the zone of the forests. One has only very vague data about the happenings in this zone. The different peoples of the Steppe seem to have possessed the country of the far north and to have exercised a direct influence upon the Finnish populations whom the Slavs were to 175x encounter in the northern part of Russia.

It is at the beginning of the sixth century of our era that the Byzantine historians discover a group of Slavs, distinct from others, whom they call the 'Ants,' in the extreme south-west corner of the Steppes near the Black Sea, a little beyond the mouth of the Danube, on the lower course of the Dniester and the Boug. It seems that this was a confederation of some already settled Slavonic tribes who had advanced into the Steppe. In a perpetual struggle with the nomads, as well as with peoples of their own race, the Southern Slavs of the Balkans, the 'Ants,' were able to maintain their existence on the territory they had occupied for a considerable time.

In the middle of the seventh century they were conquered by new people, the Khazars, who founded, for almost three centuries, a powerful empire on the lower Volga and Don, controlling almost the whole territory of present-day Ukraine.

The existence of this great State, which was relatively civilized and guarded all the East to West routes and maintained close relations with Byzantium and the Near East, deeply influenced the destiny of the 'Ants,' who became themselves a part of this empire. Enjoying relative peace and security, they were able to assimilate the various elements which had intermingled in the Steppes of the Black Sea, and at the same time they were able to undertake a vast movement of colonization which, finally, changed the face of this part of the world.

If one admits, as did the Ukrainian historian Hrouchevsky, that the 'Ants' were the direct ancestors of the Ukrainians, which is probably true, one also has to consider them as the ancestors of the Russians

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x175 generally; the White Russians, the Great Russians as well as of the Ukrainians.

Having separated from their kinsmen of the west and south, the eastern branch of the Slavs settled first, as we have seen, a little to the east of the mouth of the Danube. And it is from there that the whole Slavonic colonization in Eastern Europe started, favoured, at first, by the Khazar domination.

This colonization quite naturally developed along the great rivers which crossed the western part of the Steppe. In again moving upwards along the Dniester and the Boug, the Eastern Slavs first penetrated into Galicia and Volynia. One of their groups even crossed the Carpathians into Sub-Carpathian Russia, this strange little country of Central Europe which, though it never participated in the political destiny of Russia, retained, during a thousand years, the psychological bonds which tie it to the great world of the Eastern Slavs.

To the east of the Dniester and the Boug the great route of the Dnieper became the principal axis of Slavonic colonization.

In again moving up this river towards the north, the 'Ants' occupied the centre of present-day Ukraine, where they founded the town of Kiev, to spread next along all the tributaries of the Dnieper without stopping at the borders of modern Ukraine, which do not form a geographical obstacle.

In always following the course of this great river, they came to its source and reached the ancient mercantile route which united it with the rivers of the north-west, and thus penetrated into the Dvina Basin as well as into that of the Ilmen, where they founded the town of Novgorod. They only stopped when they reached the shores of the Gulf of Finland.

It is possible that on their way they might have encountered and assimilated other Slavonic tribes on the territory of present-day Poland. But these were only local details of small importance which did little to change the fact that the whole Russian world was born of the great current of Slavonic colonization which, from the seventh to the ninth centuries, crossed through Eastern Europe, starting from the extreme south-west of the territory of modern Ukraine. 175x

During the ninth century, when the Slav-Norse State of Kiev was formed, the colonization of the north-eastern territory enclosed between the Volga and the Oka (destined to become the nucleus of Great Russia) is already well advanced. The towns of Rostov and Mourom already exist under the princes of the Norse dynasty. It is irrelevant whether the colonization of this territory developed exclusively starting from the upper reaches of the Dnieper or if it met there another current of Eastern Slavs who had first made the detour up to the upper reaches of the Don before entering this territory from the south. In one as in the other case it was the Eastern Slavs which moved towards the north and the north-east.

Spread over this immense territory, they divided into many tribes, each having their own customs, their laws, and their ancestral traditions. 'Each according to his own custom,' said the most ancient Russian chronicler of the ninth century. The vastness of the occupied country and the distances between the sites chosen by the different tribes were to favour the development of their particular traits. But the same chronicler explicitly speaks of all these tribes as being of one single 'Slavonic people.'

The Union was especially influenced by the geographical form of the country. The colonists inhabited the banks of a river which served them as a means of x/175 communication quite naturally adapted to the defence of their common interests. It is thus that the Volynians held the upper reaches of the Boug and a part of the basin of the Pripet, the Drevlians the course of the Teterev, the Dregovitches that of the Pripet, the Polianes the central part of the course of the Dnieper, and the Severianes the basin of the Desna. Farther to the north were the Krivitches, the Radimitches, the Viatiches, and the Slovenes of the Ilmen, and other Slavonic tribes as near to but as distinct from one another as those of the south.

Having been forced by the nomads to leave the Steppe, all these populations had to crowd into 'the forest.' During many centuries the history of the Eastern, Southern, and North-Eastern Slavs developed almost exclusively in the zone of the forests. The Steppe of the Black Sea, the greater part of present-day Ukraine, remained closed to them.

In the north, in Great Russia, the Slavonic element mixed strongly with the Finnish element, so much, in fact, that one is sometimes apt to believe that a new nation was formed which was quite different from the 'Ukrainians' of the south who, therefore, had better preserved the purity of the race.

Nevertheless we have seen that since their advent in Eastern Europe, the Slavs had made contact with the most varied elements of the peoples and civilizations that had come to the Steppes of the Black Sea. In assimilating these, the current of Slavonic colonization had carried them towards the north and had incorporated them into the whole Russian world, including Great Russia. On the other hand it seems very likely that there were some still Finnish tribes whom the Slavs found in the forest part of the Ukraine of to-day. Otherwise it is impossible to explain certain peculiarities of the Finnish language which show that during very /75ˣ remote epochs they were already in contact with the Western Slavonic populations on the one hand and the peoples of the Steppe on the other. Thus the Slavs are supposed to have found an ethnically Finnish foundation on the middle reaches of the Dnieper and its tributaries, perfectly similar to that which later contributed to the formation of North-Eastern Russia.

In summing up, one has to believe that the contribution of the Finnish elements was probably greater in the north than in the Steppe. But this is only a question of percentage which varies slowly without break, as one moves along the old routes of Slavonic colonization on the territory of modern Russia.

. . . . .

The formation of the first larger political unit could only be effected according to the same geographical laws which had determined the Slavonic colonization in Eastern Europe. The principal axis of this unit again had to be the main route which connected the Black Sea with the Baltic by the Dnieper and the Ilmen basins in a north-to-south direction, from the Gulf of Finland to the lower Dnieper, cutting perpendicularly across the northern frontier of present-day Ukraine. This great waterway alone was able to overrule all the local centres of crystallization and to unite the various Slavonic tribes for the first time into a single State.

The immediate political impetus nevertheless came from the other side of the Baltic, from Scandinavia. The Norsemen, near relations of those who founded modern England, Portugal, and the kingdom of the two Sicilies, greedy of domination, had first seized Novgorod and the whole basin of the Ilmen. From there they were able to follow the great water-route in x 175 a direction opposite to that of the Slavonic colonization. In descending towards the south, they took Kiev at the end of the ninth century and occupied the great central Ilmen-Dnieper route.

Having installed themselves there, the Norsemen (or Varengians, as they are called in Western Europe) easily extended their domination towards the west and the east in using all the secondary water-routes which flowed towards the main central route. At the two extremities Novgorod, in the north, which looked towards Scandinavia and, in a broader sense, towards Western Europe, and in the south Kiev, which looked towards the Black Sea, Byzantium, and the Near East, were clearly discernible.

These two poles derived all their importance from the great merchant route which united them. From the tenth to the twelfth centuries the masters of the country had to give it their constant attention. Their power depended on the control which they exercised directly over the whole route from Novgorod to Kiev. But one difference existed, however, between the two extremities; the west, towards which Novgorod is turned, is a poor country, still semi-barbarian. It could supply valuable military forces. But this advantage could not be compared with those of Constantinople, the centre of the world's most powerful empire, immensely rich, cultured, and in full literary and artistic bloom.

And it is thus that Kiev, situated on the southern section of the axis and looking towards Byzantium, began to play a role which surpassed in importance that of any other Slavonic city in Eastern Europe, including Novgorod. It is there, on the 'Amber route,' that the Varengian princes definitely installed themselves, attracted by the commercial advantages and particularly

by the sale of amber, which they were transporting /175x
from the region of Königsberg, on the Baltic, to Byzantium. It is there that the great metropolis developed, whose influence will be felt throughout the Slavonic lands dominated by the Norse dynasty. The new Slav-Norse State is known in history under the name of 'the State of Kiev,' although it never officially bore this name.

Another name has certainly, from the eleventh /101
century, been applied to the whole of the territories and /175x
populations which were grouped round Kiev under the power of the Norse dynasty, which had already become entirely assimilated by the Slavs and one with the subjects it dominated. This name is 'Rouss,' the same which continued, throughout the centuries, to apply to the whole of Russia and her people.

We will not concern ourselves here with the extremely difficult controversy which exists concerning the origins of this term. It may have been Scandinavian or, on the contrary, Aloroge, it may originally have served to describe the Norse conquerors (the Finns called them *Rouotsi*) or it may have been used before them to name the country surrounding Kiev (as the name 'France' was originally applied only to the 'Ile de France'). We only have to remember that during the most flourishing epoch of the 'Kiev State' it was already applied to the basin of the Dnieper as well as to Novgorod, to Galicia and to the north-eastern territory in which Great Russia was formed. One said 'Russian Land,' *Roussk Zemlia*, to describe the whole of the country. The Metropolitan of Kiev, whose jurisdiction extended to the north and to the south, was designated as 'Metropolitan of all Russia' (*Vseia Roussi*). All the members of the dynasty were called Russian princes, *kniazi rousski*, both in the south and in the north. The territory of

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X/175 Novgorod disputed the title of 'the most ancient of
101 Russian lands' with that of Kiev. The chronicler says that the language of the Eastern Slavs is the 'Russian language.' The most ancient code of law and customs, which applied to the whole land, is called 'Russian justice' (*Roussk Pravda*), etc. Prince A. Wolkonsky has estimated how many times the word '*Rouss*' and its derivatives is met with in the Lavrentievsky code of the original Russian chronicles. Up to the year 1110 one meets it no less than two hundred and fifty-one times. There is no other word to describe the whole of the territory and the new, developing nation.

The inhabitants of the country call themselves like this, in using the substantive in '*Roussin*' or the adjective '*Roussky*.' It is this latter form which prevails, like the adjective '*Français*' has supplanted the substantive '*Franc*.' It remains no less true that the substantive form '*Roussin*,' still used to-day in the West of the Ukraine, in Galicia, and in Sub-Carpathian Russia, is the somewhat archaic synonym of the current expression '*Roussky*' (Russian). It is precisely this antique form, '*Roussin*,' which has given birth to the Latin form of '*Ruthenus*' or '*Ruthenian*' which one still sometimes meets to-day. In the Middle Ages the west vaguely used the expression 'Russia' or 'Ruthenia' ('*rex russorum*' or '*ruthenorum*') in speaking of all parts of Russia, and it is still the form '*Imperator ruthenorum*,' which, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, was the Latin title of the pseudo-Dimitrius, who reigned only in Great Russia. Later, in the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian authorities used the word 'Ruthene' to describe only the population of Western Ukraine and of Sub-Carpathian Russia, which were under their domination.

In speaking also of the 'State of Kiev,' of its territory and its people, we cannot, historically, call them otherwise but 'Russia,' 'Russian land,' 'Russian people,' as these are the expressions used by them, to the exclusion of any other, to describe themselves. 175x [101]

Hemmed in by the forest zone, the Russia of Kiev was condemned to a perpetual struggle with the nomads of the Steppes.

First she had to protect the Slavonic agriculturalists against these enemies. She was, moreover, obliged to control the commercial routes which, after emerging from the forest, crossed the Steppe before reaching Byzantium and the markets of the Near East. These were the essential functions of the political power which had established itself in Russia at the end of the tenth century.

While taking advantage of the final disintegration of the Khazar Empire, the Russian princes tried to occupy the whole course both of the Don and the Volga by military force. But this conquest, the work of Sviatoslav, about 964–71, remained nominal, as the lasting occupation of such vast and remote territories surpassed the means of Russia at that time.

On the other hand the State of Kiev, though it had never succeeded in permanently occupying the course of the lower Dnieper, did succeed, in the eleventh century, in assuring this route the necessary security to make it usable. From the time they established themselves at Kiev, the Varengian princes used this route for the commerce with Byzantium.

Towards the month of November, when the snow tracks could be used, the Prince, accompanied by his *drouzhina*, left the capital to make a tour of the towns and villages in order to receive tribute in kind. This lasted almost the whole winter and only ended in March. During the same time it was the period at which trees

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X/75 were felled in the wooded parts of the country. The clearing finished towards the month of January and the timber was then transported to the centre of the country, where the construction of boats took place. Towards the middle of March a sort of boat fair took place at Kiev and the months of April and May were given to the organization of caravans destined to take the route to Byzantium. At the same time, thanks to the opening of the river traffic on the Northern Dnieper, other already loaded ships arrived from Novgorod, Smolensk, and Tchernigov. In June this enormous flotilla, loaded with furs, skins, honey, amber, and, in the years of good harvest, even with grain, began their voyage in going down the Dnieper under the vigilant protection of the soldiers of the Prince. The horsemen of the Prince dispersed the nomads that menaced the priceless cargo and, a few days later, the caravans reached the rapids, a granite plateau on which seven rapids obstructed the passage. By means of the *volok*, or dragging, the ships were brought to the other end of the rapids where the voyage continued under the same conditions as before up to the island of Beresan at the mouth of the Dnieper, where there was a stop of several days. There religious ceremonies took place to thank the numerous gods for their protection.

Then began the crossing of the Black Sea, often accompanied by many dangers, which ended at the Bosphorus, on the shores of which the quarter of St. Mamo was reserved for the Russians. After a stop of several weeks the caravans, loaded with gold, fruit or wine, and silk, returned by the same way to Kiev. It is curious to note that nearly two-thirds of the ships were abandoned at Constantinople, as the small volume of the merchandise taken in exchange only required a limited space and the price of construction did not enter

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175x into account. The vision of the great riches of Byzantium fired the imagination of the pagan princes and the occasions were not rare when the peaceful merchants became pirates who even tried to seize the imperial city. Nevertheless peaceful relations between the two countries were always again established, thus facilitating commerce. Several treaties were concluded in the ninth and tenth centuries. From the ninth century Christianity began to penetrate among the Russians. This penetration contributed a great deal to the improvement of these relations and removed more and more amongst the Russians the taste for piracy and their aims of conquests of the capital which had become the source of their new religion.

From the beginning of the tenth century a bishop of 779
the Byzantine rite was installed at Kiev. From this /75x
moment the influence of Constantinople on Russia continued to grow, and with it the rise of Christianity. In becoming converted to the Greek religion in 988, St. Vladimir laid the permanent foundations of Russian civilization, in the Ukraine as in Great Russia.

The princely power, inspired by Christianity, felt obliged to make the new religion accepted by the whole country. It is the Christian spirit which inspired the 'testament' of Vladimir Monomachus to his sons (at the dawn of the twelfth century). When, while engaged in internal quarrels, such a prince offended this spirit, the Church felt compelled to remind him of his duties of loyalty and of Christian charity. In facing the 'pagans' of the Steppe, the Russians are conscious of being a Christian people and this adds considerable strength to their national solidarity. "Let us henceforth be of one heart and let us defend the Russian lands . . . and if anyone recommences the quarrels he will have all of us against him as well as the Holy Cross," said the princes summoned by Vladimir Monomachus to organize the common defence against the Polovets nomads.

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x175 princes summoned by Vladimir Monomachus to organize
the common defence against the Polovets nomads.

177 With Christianity the letters and the arts of Byzantium
x175 make their appearance in Russia. From the eleventh
century Kiev adorns itself with magnificent churches.
Soon afterwards great monasteries were founded and
became the centres of learning in Russia. During the
twelfth century the splendours of Kiev astonished the
travellers coming from the west who, at this time, had
not yet a town culture in the full sense of the word.
The princely court became transformed by contact with
Constantinople. The princes themselves spoke Greek
and many other foreign languages, indulged in literary
studies and encouraged the development of civilization
197 in their country. In introducing the Slavonic language
177 to Russia as the language of the liturgy, the Eastern
x175 Church laid the first foundations of a literary Russian
language, common to the whole country. Slavonic
(originally the language of the Slavs of Bulgaria) is still
very nearly related to the language of the Slavs of
Eastern Europe. In Russia it changes slightly by contact
with local dialects, but the written language remains, in
its essential features, the same in the whole country.
During the centuries to come the Slavonic liturgy and
the fundamental similarity of the written language
helped the different parts of Russia to preserve their
national character and the consciousness of their unity.

177 Although the Russia of the eleventh and twelfth
x175 centuries took the essential elements of her civilization
from Byzantium and recognized, in ecclesiastical matters,
the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople, she
nevertheless remained in permanent and very close
relationship with the West. The breach between Rome
and the Eastern Church was not quite completed at the
time of the conversion of St. Vladimir, and when it

became a *fait accompli* (in 1054) its repercussions in 175x
Russia were at first very small. 177

Before as after, the Russian princes maintained the most intimate relations with the Western courts to which they are bound by marriages. One cannot detect any trace of enmity towards the Western Christians. Quite on the contrary the Igumen Daniel, who goes from Kiev to Jerusalem to pray on the tomb of our Saviour, feels himself fraternally connected with the Francian crusaders who are fighting in the Holy Land. In Kiev itself there are Latin monasteries and the Russian princes make donations to them. The hour has not yet arrived when the aggressive attitude of the western neighbours of Russia will arouse her enmity.

The relations which, at this epoch, existed between Russia and the West were all the more natural as their way of living had many features in common. The princely courts of Russia, with their *drouzhina* (their retainers), their military character cemented by the personal loyalty towards their overlord, their love of feasts, the songs, accompanied by the sound of the *gouslis* and by characteristic gestures, and their chivalrous idealism, all this brought them near to those of the West.

On the other hand, also like the mediæval kingdoms of the West, the Russia of Kiev, although united under St. Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise, is still far from being a fully united State, such as had existed in Byzantium and as we know it to-day.

Under the protecting power of a prince, who kept 175x
outside enemies at bay and maintained order in the 631
interior, the country is composed of a federation of 643
lands and cities who have their rights and privileges and are ruled by their elders and by their popular assemblies, the *vetchi*, which deal directly with the

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x175 prince or with his lieutenant, the *possadnik*, giving this
631 or that assistance in return for various protections.

643 These autonomous territories, *zemli* and *volosti*, are related to the ancient Slavonic federations which existed before the creation of the State of Kiev. The local dynasties which made their appearance here and there have all disappeared at the moment of the coming of the Varengians. There is not, in the whole of Russia of Kiev, another princely house but that of St. Vladimir. But the regional peculiarities could not be eliminated so easily. And it is thus that the territory of the Polianes becomes the 'Land of Kiev' as such, that of the Severianes the 'Great Land of Tchernigov,' in the west the 'Land of Volynia' retains its own characteristics, while at the foot of the Carpathians, in 'Galicia,' the elements of several tribes are fused. In the north the *volosti* correspond roughly to the old territories of the tribes. Blood relationship definitely ceased to play a role. Instead of the ties of relationship, common interests alone, resulting from being territorial neighbours, are the only ties between the inhabitants of a 'Land.'[1]

On the other hand the economic development of the towns has increased their political importance. It is they who are now at the head of the 'Lands.' The largest city of each of these territories becomes the spokesman of the whole *volost*, although all the inhabitants of the latter can, if they have the means, participate with equal rights in the deliberations of the chief city.

x175 The princely power in Russia is therefore in no way
643 absolute. The conception of a monarchical, unitarian, and hereditary power is not yet born.

The dynastic position is attuned to the customs which

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[1] See Map No. 2.


RUSSIAN STATE OF XII-XIII c.
NOTES:
1 Land of Galich (Galicia)
2 Volynia
Lands: 3 of Polotzk
4 of Pinsk
5 of Kiev
6 of Novgorod
Lands: 7 of Smolensk
8 of Chernigov
9 of Seversk
10 of Pereiaslavl
11 of Rostov-Suzdal
12 of Riazan-Murom
Towns
Modern towns shown for the purpose of orientation
Rapids
Rivers
Amber Way
Approximate Boundaries of the Russian State of XIIc
Boundaries of Lands
Boundaries of the Ukraine as described in Chapter I
Boundaries of the Russian Empire in 1914
Boundaries of the USSR in 1938.
ESTHONIANS
St Petersburg (Leningrad)
Novgorod
LAKE ILMEN
Vologda
Rostov
Suzdal
Moscow
Murom
Riazan
Riga
TEUTONIC ORDER
LITHUANIAN TRIBES
Vilna
R. DVINA
Smolensk
Minsk
Pinsk
Novgorod Seversky
Warsaw
Vladimir Volynsky
Kiev
Pereiaslavl
Kharkov
Lvov
Galich
R. DNIESTER
R. BUG
NOMADS
PECHENEGS
OF THE STEPPE
POLOVETZ
R. DONETZ
R. DON
NOMADS
UNCOLONISED COUNTRY - FINNISH TRIBES
HUNGARY
BYZANTINE EMPIRE
Greek colony
Odessa
R. DNIEPER
CRIMEA
CAUCASUS
Rostov on Don

MAP No. 2

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X/175
643

rule the private life of the Slavonic populations in Eastern Europe. The *whole* land of Russia is the property of the *entire* princely house descended from St. Vladimir, as every Slavonic family which occupies and cultivates a plot of land owns it in common.

The senior of St. Vladimir's descendants will occupy the throne of Kiev and will be, in some ways, the first amongst equals of this family community of princes, as the eldest of a family presides at its discussions and represents it generally. Not the hereditary right, descending to the eldest son, but solely the age of the individual counts, one brother succeeds another, to make room for the oldest among the nephews.

This system, which was established in Russia in the middle of the eleventh century, after the death of Yaroslav the Wise, foresees the breaking up of the country among the members of the reigning house and an almost continuous redistribution of domains, just as in the Slavonic agricultural communities, where redistribution of individual lots took place almost every year. The change of management will be general if the oldest member of the family, the Grand Prince of Kiev, dies. His place will be taken by any prince, even of younger lines, who is the oldest at that moment. In going to Kiev, he cedes the domain which he possessed to the one who is next to him in age, etc.

This typically Slavonic method of government maintained the idea of the unity of the 'Russian Land.' While it was applied, no one branch of the princely house could take root in any given territory and so become the local dynasty of any single part of Russia. That prince who had first received a domain in the far north-east, exchanged it after some years for a richer territory in the south, finally to reach the throne of Kiev, bringing with him his *drouzhina* (retainers), his

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boyars (nobles), and his armed men, who also moved from one end of the country to the other. A town, on the contrary, which was dissatisfied with its present master, called on a prince whose domains were at the farthest confines of Russia, but whose father, formerly having been in their country, was well remembered there. 175x 643

As long as the old centre of the Russian Land, Kiev, remained prosperous, no princely branch was anxious to enclose itself on its territory and to prefer its interests, except a few more distant branches, who were already for some time localized in far-away territories which had been granted them as permanent domains. All the other princes hoped one day to obtain possession of the best parts of the country and even to reach the throne of Kiev.

This system had the drawback of fomenting various 175x dynastic discords. The princes fought without respite against each other in order to enforce their rights. The ruin of the southern part of Russia, which began in the territory of Kiev, was the inevitable result of these discords. It was this that was understood by the unknown author of the 'Tale of the Companions of Igor'[1] when he implored all the Russian princes to unite their forces against the pagans. In order to keep the commercial routes across the Steppe open and to drive back the nomads, always ready to invade the Russian lands situated in the forest zone, the united forces of the whole of Russia were indispensable. It is thus that St. Vladimir assembled his troops in the north to resist the incursions of the formidable Petcheneges, fierce warriors of the Steppe.

During the twelfth century the routes of the Steppe became more and more dangerous and the incursions x/175 of the nomads more frequent. The commerce of Kiev dies down and its territory, as well as those of Perejaslavl and of Tchernigov, become depopulated. The inhabitants, left undefended on the side of the Steppe, escaped farther into the forest and looked for refuge either in the north-east, in the land of Souzdal, in Great Russia, or in the west, in the lands of Galicia and Volynia.

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[1] Famous epic poem of the twelfth century which inspired the Opera, *Prince Igor*, of Borodin.

It is only then, when the old centre, Kiev, is already in full decline, that the princes who reign in the more far-away parts of Russia begin to notice the advantages which they could gain by the possession of these territories if they made it hereditary in the senior line.

In Galicia the heredity of the princely powers through the senior male line existed in early times, these princes having been excluded from the throne of Kiev and having been permanently given these domains in the extreme south-west of the Russian Land. The result was that in the second half of the twelfth century Galicia, being left outside the continuous divisions and dynastic wars, became one of the most prosperous and the most envied lands.

During the same epoch the senior branch of the descendants of Vladimir Monomachus, which had employed this country in order to mobilize the forces necessary for the struggle for Kiev, had entrenched itself in neighbouring Volynia.

The descendants of Sviatoslav also fight for Kiev, while entrenching themselves in the land of Tchernigov, already completely ruined.

But suddenly a new territorial power appears in the north-east of Russia, in the land between the Volga and the Oka, into which the refugees from the devastated centre are flocking. The junior branch of the house of Monomachus, which reigns here, begins to take less interest in Kiev and to prefer this northern country which is becoming inhabited and is developing. It aspires to convert the 'Land of Souzdal' into a new centre of political power which will now assure it the domination of the whole of Russia. In 1169 a coalition of almost all the princes of the south is entangled with the powerful Mstislav of Volynia, who has seized Kiev. The allies are obliged to rely in this struggle upon the support of power of the the Prince of Souzdal, Andrew Bogoliubsky. The army which he sends to their assistance effectively changes the balance. Kiev is taken and plundered for the first time. Mstislav is driven back into Volynia, while the Prince of Souzdal is acclaimed by his allies as Prince of Kiev. But, although claiming this pre-eminence in the house of Russian princes, Bogoliubsky does not go to Kiev. He remains where he is, engaged in consolidating the land of Souzdal, the Great Russia, the new base of her power.

From this moment Kiev remains in a dangerous position. In 1203 the 'mother of Russian towns' is conquered for the second time and terribly plundered by a coalition of several southern princes, with the assistance of the nomads. The banks of the Dnieper become more and more depopulated.

Meanwhile, after the defeat of Mstislav, the princes of Volynia, following the example of the Prince of Souzdal, begin to install themselves more securely in their territory and to take progressively less interest in the affairs of Kiev. Under Roman, the son of Mstislav, this new territorial power is definitely established in Volynia. In 1198 he finally unites the two largest 'Lands' of the south-west, Galicia and Volynia, under his domination.

Henceforth two great political organisms exist in Russia: the principality of Souzdal-Vladimir in the north-east, in Great Russia, and the principality of

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7/75 Galicia-Volynia in the south-west, in that part which is now Western Ukraine. Kiev is now governed by powerless princes, vaguely dependent on one or the other of these principalities.

But the consolidation of the dynastic power was more difficult to bring about in the south-western region than in that of the north-east.

Under the influence of Polish and Hungarian neighbours and their example, the political role of the boyar aristocracy was greater in Galicia than in any other part of Russia. The suzerain prince was constantly obliged to struggle against this spirit of excessive independence, and in this he was not always successful. Bloody plots were frequent and the boyars had no scruples in calling foreign neighbours to assist them by their intervention in their quarrels with the princes, of whom many were overthrown and put to death. Such a situation was inconceivable in the principality of Souzdal.

The Galician prince Daniel, son of Roman, came, however, in 1232 to reconstitute the heritage of his father.

But five years before this, in 1227, all the armies of the princes of Southern Russia, including those of Galicia, had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of a new enemy who had lately appeared in the Steppe—the Mongols.

Eight years after the accession of Daniel the whole of Russia, the south as well as the north, the land of Souzdal like that of Galicia, was conquered by the Tartars.

. . . . .

The agony of the Russia of Kiev was terrible.

In the lands of Kiev, as in those of Tchernigov, in Great Russia as in Galicia, the populations and their princes fought heroically against the 'pagans,' preferring

175x

death to slavery with that chivalrous spirit that distinguished the old mediæval Russia.

But until the last moment the princely quarrels continued. When the Mongolian advance guards were already investing Kiev, Daniel of Galicia still disputed the possession of the ancient capital with the princes of Tchernigov. Having obtained it, he only had enough time to leave a lieutenant there who, aided by the whole population, defended the city to the last.

Plano Carpini, who visited the country of the Dnieper in 1245, five years after the disaster, tells that it was nearly a desert. The population had been massacred, taken as slaves, or was in flight. In Kiev itself there did not remain more than two hundred inhabited houses. All around the town one found human skeletons. The downfall is such that the second half of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century have left almost no documents about this country. So little is known of this period that it is often impossible to establish which princely lines were then in power.

The north-east, Great Russia, was also devastated by the Tartars but continued to absorb a part of the fleeing population. Even the Metropolitan of all Russia ceased to reside in the devastated Kiev and established himself farther north-east in Moscow, the new capital of the land of Souzdal. But the greater part of the population withdraws towards the north-west into the principality of Galicia-Volynia which, although conquered, remains more sheltered and enjoys a stable and wise government.

In the vast space which now remains between the land of Galicia-Volynia and Great Russia a new external enemy appears—the Lithuanians, who penetrate here from the north-west.

Henceforth the great historical question is whether the State of Galicia-Volynia can maintain itself between

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the Tartars, the Hungarians, the Poles, and the Lithuanians, and continue the Great Russian tradition in the south-west.

Daniel of Galicia, ambitious, educated, courageous, and chivalrous, brilliantly continues the tradition of the senior branch of the House of Monomachus. After the departure of the Asiatic conqueror, who had not spared his hereditary land and had forced him to seek temporary refuge in the west, he rapidly regains lost ground and becomes a very powerful prince who is respected by all. Galicia-Volynia is, under him, at the peak of its power.

But there are great differences of conception between the princes of the south-west and those who, under the yoke of the Tartars, laboriously watch over the patrimony of St. Vladimir in the Great Russian north-east.

From the twelfth century the princes who begin to lose their roots in the south are more interested in their honour, the success of their arms, and their personal prestige than their kinsmen of the north-east.

They are more civilized and humanly more likeable than the latter. Nevertheless their qualities are historically a source of weakness, especially in the extremely difficult position in which they find themselves.

The great Russian historian, Sergei Soloviev, has shown the difference which existed between the popular reactions to the Tartar yoke in the south-west and in the north-east; having been obliged to be the vassals of Batou, the Tartar Khan,[1] Daniel is received by him with honours, as were all the princes who declared themselves ready to recognize the supremacy of the conqueror. But Soloviev reveals that the chronicles o Northern Russia give an impression of satisfaction regarding this relatively respectful treatment, while those of the south bitterly complain: " Worse than the

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[1] Grandson of Ghengis Khan.

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evil is the honour that comes from the Tartars!" 175x Daniel cannot bear the shame to be, notwithstanding his power, the vassal of the Mongol Khan. The princes of Moscow in the north-east, on the contrary, eager to derive direct advantages from their condition of vassals, bow, during a century and a half, before the 'Golden Horde.'

Daniel of Galicia works without respite to free himself. He invites foreign colonists to the country which has been devastated by the Mongols. Poles, Hungarians, Jews, and Germans are settled. He seeks Western alliances and hopes for a crusade as a result of negotiations with Pope Innocent IV. This is the first attempt at a union of the churches in Southern Russia. In return for the aid against the Tartars the Russian Church would recognize the papal supremacy but would maintain its Eastern rite and its Slavonic language. Nothing concrete came of this. In spite of the promise of the Pope, the crusade was not organized. Daniel consoled himself by accepting the crown of *Rex Russiae* (King of Russia) from the hands of Innocent IV. Meanwhile, however, the Tartars, on the alert, once again devastated his lands and definitely prevented the enlargement of his domination over the other Russian lands. All these attempts led only to the interference of the West in the affairs of South-Western Russia, whose national characteristics had already become changed by the influx of foreign colonists.

Exactly at the same period the Prince of Novgorod, St. Alexander Nevsky, is fighting in the north with the Swedes and the German knights who had themselves started an effective crusade . . . against the Russians.[1]

While Prince Daniel looked for support in Western

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[1] The brilliant victory of the Russians over the Knights of the Sword, in 1242, took place on the frozen Lake of Tchoudov.

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775 Europe, Prince Alexander Nevsky realized that, notwithstanding their great military force, the Mongols were less to fear than the West. The cultural level of the Tartars being actually much lower than that of the Russians, the denationalization of Russia was absolutely excluded. On the contrary the danger of the West was very great because, by its civilizing evolution and by the assistance given by Roman Catholicism, it presented a real menace to the national existence of Russia.

In thus rejecting these enemies, capable of permanently subduing the country and therefore in politically consolidating the Tartar domination, the Russia of the north created the elements of a new evolution which will make it a great power and the nucleus of an empire.

This unifying role remains beyond the possibilities of the south which, on the contrary, prepares the elements of the drama which is destined to make the Russia of the south-west the plaything of powerful foreign neighbours.

The might of the kingdom of Galicia-Volynia lasts for about a century after the first Tartar invasion. It continued to play a certain role between Poland and Hungary. During the first years of the fourteenth century its princes were granted a metropolitan by the Patriarch of Constantinople to replace the one of Kiev who had escaped to the north-east. This prelate takes the name of the Metropolitan of 'Russia Minor.' Thus the term appears which will be later applied to all the old Russian lands of present-day Ukraine. But the unifying role which the State of Galicia seemed to be destined to play in the whole of Russia is definitely excluded. The endeavours of Daniel to submit Lithuania to his influence, a country still quite barbarous and pagan, ended in failure. During the last years of the thirteenth century a new dynasty arose in Lithuania and unified all the tribes into one State. The Lithuanian

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drive into the old Russian territories immediately became irresistible. In 1307 Polotsk fell and in 1318 Vibetsk. Eight years later Minsk was taken. The old land of the Krivitches, the White Russia of to-day, then the lands of Brest and of Dorokhytchin, which were dependent on Volynia, are conquered one after the other by the Lithuanians. In 1324 the first direct descendant of Daniel dies. A few years later, thanks to the quarrel fomented by the always turbulent boyars, the State of Galicia ceases to exist, having been transformed into the battle-ground between Lithuania and Poland (1340). Kiev is finally annexed in 1362. At the same time the Lithuanian domination extends to the old land of Tchernigov, thus reaching the north-eastern frontier of modern Ukraine and then passing it a considerable distance in the direction of Great Russia.[1] 175x

The whole east and south of the old State of Kiev is swallowed up by a great State whose political origin is no longer Russian.

. . . . .

From this moment the White Russian and Ukrainian national groups will develop under a foreign domination, though during the first half of the fourteenth century it was not felt very strongly.

The Lithuanian princes were neither sufficiently civilized nor powerful enough to change the Russian character of the country which had become theirs. Quite on the contrary, Lithuania herself became more and more influenced by the Russian elements, and it was in fact a Great Russian State which developed under the domination of the 'Princes (or Kings) of the Lithuanians and the Russians,' as they called themselves.

Nothing changed after the conquest. Somehow it is

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[1] See Map No. 3

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X775 even difficult to talk about a conquest; the Russian population and their princes, tired of the Tartar domination and of internal disorders, sometimes co-operated liberally with Lithuania in exchange for her protection.

A number of old Russian domains were left to the princes who had formerly possessed them and who were willing to recognize Lithuanian suzerainty. The administration, laws, and customs remained such as they had formerly been. The Lithuanian princes would not have been anxious to change anything here. At that time a written Lithuanian language did not even exist!

Later, mostly married to Russian princesses, they assimilated this civilization. Many amongst them were converted to Russian Orthodoxy. The others, while remaining pagans, protected the faith of their subjects.

The political equality between Russians and Lithuanians, confirmed by all the princely 'privileges,' became transformed into a clear and, so to say, inevitable predominance of the Russians, who were more numerous, more civilized, and more conscious of their nationality.

One can say that at the end of the fourteenth century two great Russian States are about to be formed; the Russo-Lithuanian State, which had re-united all the actually White Russian and Ukrainian lands, with the exception of Galicia, which had fallen into the hands of Poland, and the State of Moscow, which is about to unify Great Russia.

The struggle between them for the leadership of the whole of Russia already seems inevitable and nothing seems to indicate that the chances of the south-west should be less than those of Moscow.

But at this moment an event takes place which will result in the elimination of the Russian character of the young Lithuanian State and the transformation of

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

RUSSO-LITHUANIAN STATE OF XIV-XVc.

NOTES:
Boundaries of Russo-Lithuanian State under Vitovt (end of XIVc.)
Provinces of Russo-Lithuanian State in which boundaries were not definitely established.
Boundaries of Russo-Lithuanian State (Gt Duchy of Lithuania) after the Union with Poland (treaty of Lublin in 1569)
Boundaries of Lithuanian State to-day.
Boundaries between Moscow State and the Great Duchy of Lithuania under Ivan III (end of XV)
Boundaries of the Ukraine as described in Chapter I
REPUBLIC OF GREAT NOVGOROD
Novgorod
Riga
Moscow
MOSCOW STATE
Memel
LITHUANIA
Kovno (Kaunas)
Vilno
Smolensk
Gdansk (Danzig)
TEUTONIC ORDER
Minsk
RUSSO-LITHUANIAN STATE
Warsaw
Chernigov
HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE
KINGDOM OF POLAND
Lublin
Vladimir Volynsky
Kiev
Pereiaslavl
R. DNIEPER
Galich
Rapids
CRIMEAN TARTARS
HUNGARY
MOLDAVIA
CRIMEA

MAP No. 3

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7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

X175 South-Western Russia into a nation oppressed on its own territory.

The Lithuanian Grand Prince Yagaylo succeeds to the throne of Poland by his marriage with Queen Hedwiga, daughter and heiress of Louis II of Anjou. By the Act signed in 1385 at Krev he promises, in return for this marriage and the crown of Poland, to 'incorporate' the Russo-Lithuanian State in the kingdom of Poland and to become a convert to Catholicism with his whole family.

The immediate political effect of the Act of Krev was almost nil. The 'incorporation' was not recognized by the Russo-Lithuanian State as, moreover, the Russians had the eloquent example of Galicia before them, where the Polish domination had already taken on the character of an oppressive colonization.

Some years after the Act of Krev, the personal union between Poland and the Russo-Lithuanian State was dissolved. The latter elected a prince of its own in the person of Vitovt, a cousin of Yagaylo, who continued the Russian mission, which seemed to be one of his State, with the greatest energy.

Under Vitovt the struggle between Lithuania and Moscow for leadership is at its fiercest. Vitovt goes far beyond the confines of modern Ukrainian and White Russian territories. He seizes Smolensk in 1405, encroaches, far to the north, on the territories of Pskov and Novgorod and intervenes everywhere in the affairs of Northern Russia whenever the occasion arises.

But new historic factors are working against Lithuanian leadership at this time.

Lithuanian power no longer appears as a liberator from the Tartar yoke in the eyes of the Russian population whom it tries to subject, whereas Moscow, already

175x

sufficiently strong, unites the whole of Great Russia for the first struggles of liberation. Less than twenty years after the first brilliant victory of Moscow over the Tartars,[1] the armies of Vitovt sustain a veritable disaster at the hands of the same Tartars at Vorskla in 1399. The national prestige of Moscow grows while that of Lithuania diminishes.

Another essential fact favours Moscow: the Grand Princes of the north-east have kept the 'Russian faith,' the Orthodox religion, common to all the lands of ancient Russia, intact. Vitovt himself had been baptized as a Catholic at the same time as Yagaylo. He is, therefore, a prince of a foreign faith, of the religion of the *liakh* (Poles) which now tries to subdue the whole of Russia under its domination.

At the last moment all the disputing lands—Pskov, Novgorod, and Ryazan—come to their senses. Rather than submit to the 'Latin' Vitovt, they call the Grand Prince of Moscow to their aid. Some princes of Tchernigov, vassals of Lithuania, cross the frontier, preferring to serve a genuinely Russian sovereign.

This is all the more so as within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which is struggling for the leadership of the whole of Russia, the forces are far from being balanced. The once dominant Russian majority, which still furnishes the State with the greatest part of its troops and which pays with its blood for the debacle of Vorskla and the triumph of Tannenberg (a Polish-Lithuanian-Russian victory which stopped the German advance for centuries), is at present menaced by the Lithuanians, who had developed and become more independent as a result of the infiltration of Western elements.

From the end of the fourteenth century, Catholicism, which had become the religion of the princes and of the

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[1] The battle of Koulikovo Polie in 1380.

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x/175 Lithuanian aristocracy, is more privileged than Orthodoxy. The children born of mixed marriages must become Catholics. The nobles adopt this religion in order to gain more influence at the Court.

After the death of Vitovt the national antagonism became apparent. The Russian party raises the brother of Yagaylo, Svidrigaylo, considered as being in favour of the Russians and the traditional Orthodox Church, to the dignity of Grand Prince. Expelled from Lithuania as such, Svidrigaylo maintains his power at Kiev until his death, as well as generally in the greater part of the Russian territories of the Grand Duchy. After this a union of the Russo-Lithuanian States is re-established under the son of Yagaylo, Casimir, who also inherits some years later, in 1444, the crown of Poland, thus re-establishing the personal union between her and the Russo-Lithuanian State.

But although disputing the leading role in their common State, Lithuanians and Russians are together opposing any attempt to incorporate their State into Poland. Here they all agree. They jealously watch the maintenance of the integrity and the independence of the Grand Duchy. Notwithstanding the existence of a common sovereign, they cling, as in the past, to the use of the Russian language as the sole language of the State and they seize every opportunity to break the personal union with Poland which, in order to maintain that union with the Grand Duchy, is each time obliged to take the reigning Prince of Lithuania as her king.

The actual Ukrainian and White Russian lands always form a single national entity, which always bears the same name. All the official Acts speak of Russia (*Rouss*), the Russian Land, the Russian people, and the Russian religion. From the southern borders of the Ukraine to the Dvina a single Russian people struggles within the

175x

Grand Duchy of Lithuania for the maintenance of its national character, of its faith and of its language.

Are we to think that, in the thoughts of these populations, 'Russia' is no more than the lands of the Grand Duchy and that they no longer consider 'Muscovy' a 'Russian land'?

The contrary is true; the Russo-Lithuanian chronicle tells us that in 1401 a 'great terror reigned in *the Russian land: Moscow and Smolensk have been burnt.*'

Conversely also the Grand Prince of Moscow makes it clearly understood that the Russia of the north-east and that which is under the Lithuanian domination, are in reality one whole. 'There can be no durable peace between the Grand Prince (of Moscow) and that of Lithuania,' said an instruction to the ambassadors sent by Moscow to the Crimea at the end of the fifteenth century; 'the Grand Prince wishes to have his whole patrimony, the whole Russian land.'

In 1493 Ivan III began to call himself 'Sovereign of all Russia.' The Grand Princes of Lithuania refused for a long time to recognize this title, which tended to acquire a singularly realistic meaning in view of the growing tension in the Grand Duchy.

Putting aside the historical memories, the universality of the 'Russian religion' was entirely to the advantage of the Grand Prince of Moscow. Ivan III wrote to the Grand Prince of Lithuania: 'You employ violence towards the Russian princes and towards all Russia which is of the Greek faith, in forcing them to accept the Roman faith. Under your forefathers there was never such affliction. How can I view the fate of Orthodoxy with indifference?'

The movement which drew the neighbouring princes, vassals of Lithuania, towards Moscow became more and more acute. The principality of Tchernigov, x175 fearing the persecution of the Russian faith during the last years of the fifteenth century, went over to Moscow. The loyalty, too, of the Russian princes and population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Greek Orthodoxy determined the destiny of the Ukraine and linked her to Russia, making her a refuge of the Russian faith.

Here it is necessary to insist on the very important role which the religious question has played in the struggle between the two Grand Duchies.

In 1437 the Metropolitan Isidor, an extremely educated man and much esteemed by Pope Eugene IV, arrived in Moscow from Constantinople. After having visited Moscow he left Russia, in the same year, to go to Ferrara in order to participate in the Œcumenical Council which was to arrange the union of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. On 6 July 1439 at Florence, despite the resistance of the Byzantine clergy, the union of the two Churches took place. Isidor became one of the most fervent partisans of this union and received the dignity of Cardinal for his pro-Catholic actions. Immediately after this he went to Kiev, where he was received as the Metropolitan of all Russia. From there he went to Moscow as the bearer of a message from the Pope to the Grand Prince Vassili. The Grand Prince did not receive Isidor, but proclaimed him the 'killer of souls' and a 'heretic,' and imprisoned him. He escaped to die in Rome in 1463. Thus the attempt to submit the Russian Church to papal domination failed.

While Moscow appointed the Bishop of Riazan, Ioannes (a prelate of Russian origin), a Metropolitan, Rome appointed another Metropolitan to Kiev—Gregory the Bulgarian, a disciple of Isidor and a partisan of the Union of Florence. Certain documents indicate that the Grand Prince of Moscow was again pressed to recognize the Bishop of Kiev as Metropolitan of all Russia. But he maintained the independence of the Church of Moscow and refused submission. At Kiev itself the resistance of the lower clergy to Gregory was so strong that he was obliged to leave the capital in 1472 and to establish himself at Vilna, where he was invested with the title of Bishop of Lithuania.

After the death of Ioannes (1461), the Metropolitan See of all Russia, having remained independent of Rome, officially divided itself into two Sees, that of 'the Metropolitan Church of Moscow and all Russia,' whose Metropolitans, resident in Moscow, were elected from the Russian clergy, and 'the Metropolitan Church of Kiev and all Russia,' whose Metropolitans were appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, and who resided at Kiev while being consecrated at Vilna.

The Metropolitan See of Kiev is a direct successor of the Byzantine Church and of all its priceless theological heritage, both scientific and cultural, which serves it as a redoubtable weapon against Catholicism, with which it is in a state of permanent struggle.

On the contrary the Church of Moscow, left to itself and still semi-barbarian, with its austere and monastic but ignorant clergy, leans entirely upon the powerful authority of the Grand Princes of Moscow. It is only later, being strengthened by the power of the Muscovite State, that it succeeds in attracting the scholarly theologians of Kiev and thus raising its spiritual level by degrees. The growing influence of Kiev will determine in future the radical transformations which the Orthodox Church will undergo during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The parallel existence did not continue after the fall of Constantinople (1453), which became the culminating point in the development of the Orthodox Church on a purely Russian base. The Orthodox Grand Prince of x/175 Moscow resolutely took up the role of protector of the Russian faith in the Russo-Lithuanian lands, which were menaced more and more by the Latin penetration, which grew as the dynasty of the Jagellons became more and more Polish.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century a determined attempt was made to reverse the state of affairs in the Russo-Lithuanian Grand Duchy and to make the Russian element again preponderant. In 1507, on the death of the Grand Prince Alexander of Lithuania, Prince Glinsky attempted to snatch all the Russian lands from Lithuania. According to Polish sources, the insurrection, certainly supported by Moscow, was aiming at the restoration of the 'old Monarchy of Kiev.' This attempt failed and Glinsky was obliged to seek refuge in Moscow.

But from this epoch dates the idea of breaking the ties with Poland by giving the throne of the Russo-Lithuanian State to the Grand Prince of Moscow.

During the sixteenth century Polish pressure increases. On every favourable occasion the Poles wanted to realize the old promise of Yagaylo, the 'incorporation' pure and simple of the Russo-Lithuanian State into Poland.

But the opponents held fast. The Diet of the Grand Duchy solemnly protested against the Polish propaganda which tended to deride the sovereign character of the Russo-Lithuanian State. In 1566 the 'second Lithuanian statute,' to which Sigismund II had sworn loyalty, once more recognized this sovereignty and promised to safeguard all the customs of the Grand Duchy. Nevertheless the nuncio of the Holy See in Poland, Commendone, wrote in 1564 that the entire population of Kiev hoped, because of their religion, that after the death of Sigismund II, the throne of the Russo-Lithuanian State would pass to the Tsar of Moscow, the guardian of the Russian faith.

Incited by Polish noblemen, the last Jagellon (descendant of Yagaylo) strikes the great blow in 1569. The common Diet of the kingdom of Poland and the Russo-Lithuanian State, convoked at Liublin, had at last to pronounce the 'incorporation'! 175x

Lithuania tried to resist. Engaged in an extremely difficult war with Moscow and ravaged in the south by the Tartars of the Crimea, she did not agree to be intimidated. The Diet of the Grand Duchy even left Liublin.

Sigismund II then declared the separation of all the Southern Russian territories from Lithuania and their attachment to Poland.

The Russo-Lithuanian State prepared to go to war with Poland. But it did not have the means to do so. And so the Diet finally had to yield.

Although deprived of half her territories, Lithuania retained a certain autonomy within the new unified State and maintained White Russia within this autonomous frame.[1]

The lands of Dorokhitchin, of Volynia, of Podolia, of Kiev, and the Lithuanian parts of the land of Tchernigov rejoined Galicia under direct Polish domination. This took place under the name of 'Principality of Kiev' according to the terms of the Royal Decree.

The whole of these Russian lands which came under Polish domination after the Act of 1569 is, however, the Ukraine who, at this epoch, continued to call herself Russia.

The decree itself proclaimed by the King regarding the adherence of the Russian lands to Poland declares: 'The *Russian* lands and the principality of Kiev with all their inhabitants and all their lands, are liberated by us for eternity from all dependence on the Grand duchy of

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[1] See Map No. 3.

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x175 Lithuania, and we rejoin them to the kingdom of Poland as equals to equals, as the faithful and inseparable members of our own body, and we solemnly promise to give advancements and the dignity of senators to all men of Roman as well as of *Russian* faith.'

It is not without interest to note that after this tolerant proclamation the rivalry between the two Churches seemed to weaken provisionally, especially under Stephan Batory, the successor of Sigismund II.

But this situation did not last long. From the end of the sixteenth century Poland became transformed into an aristocratic republic. Besides the great noblemen, whose power had been long since established, there appeared the *shlachta* (petty nobility), which soon enjoyed a political influence which was growing daily. These two elements alone formed the *Rzecz Pospolita*,[1] that strange 'Polish Republic' in which all the other classes were excluded from the direction of the State.

This gives rise to two consequences of importance to the Russian lands annexed by Poland. Firstly the denationalization of their native aristocracy, which tried to resemble the Poles in order to be able to enjoy all the political privileges, and secondly the subjection of the lower people, deprived of their higher national supports, who were left absolutely undefended in this State which existed solely by the nobles and for the nobles.

In Galicia, united with Poland for nearly two centuries, the Russian aristocracy had long since been supplanted by a Polish nobility and its remainders had been absorbed by the latter. Beside the Polish laws and the Russian serfs there only remain, in the old land of King Daniel, some towns which, with a very mixed population from a national point of view, still preserved a certain independence and a somewhat privileged position. But even this autonomy of the towns, endowed with the German law called that 'of Magdeburg,' treated the non-Catholics, that is to say the Russians, as citizens of the second order, not enjoying full civil rights.

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[1] A Polish translation of *Res publica*—republic.

Presently this rule was established in the whole vast Russian land annexed in 1569. First it appeared in all the already long prosperous and inhabited territories of Volynia and the land of Southern Kiev. The nobles spread in great numbers and are invested with lands by the royal power, whose authority depends on the favours which are accorded to the nobility. These nobles, Poles, or Russians, small or great, become unlimited masters of their subjects and the property of the latter.

The first reaction of the peasant was to leave in search of new territories which were not under the arbitrary power of the *pans*.[1]

The second half of the sixteenth century is an epoch of intense colonizing activity. There is a return of the populations to the old lands of the south-east of the State of Kiev, which had remained more or less deserted since the Tartar debacle in the thirteenth century. Rather than endure slavery, the Russian peasant, immigrated to Galicia and Volynia about three hundred years ago, again goes to find the ancient eastern route, to face the Tartar danger which still exists and to re-inhabit the lands which of old were the cradle of the whole of Russia.

Vaguely protected by the military cordons of the Polish State, this country, which commences at the gates of Kiev and extends towards the south and east, appears at this epoch as very remote, scarcely pacified, and situated on the borders, the extreme limits of

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[1] 'Lord,' in Polish; is used to-day in the sense of 'Mister.'

*/175 Christianity. It was again given the Russian name which, from the eleventh century, one applied to the whole frontier province: 'edge land,' 'march,' '*Oukraina*,' 'Ukraine' as one will call it later in the West. Neither Galicia nor Volynia nor the north of the Kiev territory are the 'Ukraine' in the real sense of the word. From the end of the sixteenth century one uses this name exclusively for the frontier-land which, on the middle Dnieper and farther towards the east, include the Tartar Steppe, the 'savage Steppe,' the 'Dikoie Pole.'[1]

But as the Russian colonist advances towards the east, into the territories belonging to the Polish domains of Bratzlav, of Kiev, and of Tchernigov, the noble follows him. Serfdom also moves towards the east, extending throughout the whole territory subjected to the sovereignty of the Polish State.

Then the Russian colonization ventures beyond the Polish 'cordons,' beyond the last protecting forests, into the open Steppe right up to the domain of the nomads.

There no ordered life is yet possible. The Russians who ventured there ceased to be peaceful agriculturalists. They also begin to live by war and booty. They entrench themselves on the small islands which are formed by the branches of the Dnieper, beyond the rapids, especially on the island of Khortitza. (According to certain documents, the fugitives found small communities of warriors on these islands, who had come from the north of the Caucasus, from the land of the Tcherkesses or Circassians—a small mountain people who had embraced Christianity and who had themselves fled from the persecutions of the Mohammedans. Moscow gave these Caucasians the name of '*Tcherkasses*,' from which

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[1] Literally the savage field, the savage steppe, as one said at Moscow.

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the name of the town of Tcherkassy, on the middle Dnieper at the mouth of the Don, derives. It is curious to note that among many descendants of the Zaporoge Cossacks one still finds the clearly Caucasian type.) /175x

The fugitives live there as a community of warriors without any other laws or other discipline than that of war. They set out to pillage the Mohammedan coasts and those of the Turks or Tartars on the Black Sea, always ready for any adventures and dangers. They give themselves a borrowed name—Cossacks—taken from the Tartars.

In this coarse existence, full of violence and battle, one sentiment dominates: the consciousness of being Christians, a consciousness of crusaders who defend without respite the peace of Christianity against the unbelievers.

It is true that the Christians will sometimes have to complain of the Cossacks as much as of the Tartars. It is almost a devilish deception which induces men to sin. The reason for being members of the 'army of the Cossacks' is the defence of the Christian religion. Therein lies its ideology. (It is interesting to note that the first organizers of the Cossacks as military communities were two lords, the first of Russian and the second of Polish origin: Dashkovitch and Lanckoronski. These two adventurers found among the Cossacks, in exploiting their hate of the unbelievers, a sure means of realizing their personal ambitions.) The life of war and independence of the Cossack army gave it a consciousness of caste and chivalry which made it always extremely rebellious towards its masters, the Poles, the Muscovites, or the Tartars.

All the Cossack communities were named according to the geographical position of their principal entrenchments. In Great Russia, on the borders of the Moscow

×175 State, there was, for example, a powerful military community, that of the Don Cossacks, which closely resembled the Ukrainian Cossacks and lived with them as 'brothers and sisters,' according to the expression of that period. The last named founded their assizes, the *Zaporojska Sitch*, behind the rapids (in Russian '*za porogami*'), whence their name of Zaporoge Cossacks.

The Cossacks are a constant preoccupation of the Polish State. Extremely turbulent subjects, they have shunned the normal duties of the *khlopy* (serfs). They deserve, however, some consideration as a military force, very useful as auxiliaries in the difficult struggles against the Grand Turk and his vassals, the Tartars of the Crimea. It is in Poland's interest to agree with these merciless warriors, sometimes troublesome (as in the case when the kingdom made peace with the unbelievers, because they did not recognize either peace or a truce), but good to have in reserve in case of need. The Poles also try to discipline them and to bring them ~~into~~ the service of the State, while according them in return a certain autonomy and certain privileges.

The number of Zaporogs, as such, is not very great—some tens of thousands at the most. But there is an enormous mass of peasants who inhabit the Ukraine beyond the official limits of the Polish State. Half agriculturalists, half soldiers, always on the alert, they do not settle fully in the 'savage Steppe,' but unite voluntarily from time to time with the Zaporogs for an incursion which might bring profit, only to return again to their homes to await the next occasion.

In this borderland, too, without well-defined frontiers, the distinction between the peasant who inhabits the territory of the State and the free man, the Cossack, who goes off to Tartary, remains all the more confused, as, in order to evade the obligatory work, it is in the interest of the peasant to call himself a Cossack. Therefore the Polish Government has continually to fight this tendency without ever being able to suppress it. 175x

The Government of Moscow is in an almost similar position with regard to its Cossacks. It also tries to utilize them as a military force, at the same time keeping them at a distance from the internal affairs of the State. But finally it is always able to direct these excessive energies, as, between it and the Cossacks, there will never be another but a social opposition. In the Polish kingdom, on the contrary, the Cossack question becomes very acute as it represents the mortal struggle of two great peoples: the Russians against the Poles, and of two great religions, Orthodoxy against Catholicism.

After the interregnum which followed the extinction of the house of the Jagellons and the short intermezzo of King Henry of Valois (Henry III of France), the reign of Stephan Batory (1575–86), the first elected king of Poland, seemed to promise a good future, as we have already shown, for the cohabitation of the two peoples, based primarily on religious tolerance.

Being engaged in the difficult war with Moscow, Batory had great need of the loyalty of all his subjects, whoever they were. Therefore a certain equality of rights between Russians and Poles, Orthodox and Catholics, became forcibly the essential principle of his policy. Although the Roman clergy were more favoured, the Russian national element was not generally the victim of any exceptional measures.

But this comprehensive and tolerant policy was not continued. Beginning with the accession of Sigismund III (1587) less than twenty years after the attachment of Southern Russia to the Crown, the counter-reform became definitely victorious in Poland. Henceforth the Russian lands had to suffer the assault

475 of a militant Polonism which identified itself with the Latin Church. The excesses which the local authorities permitted themselves before that, now became the policy of the King himself.

From 1585 the Russian nobles, assembled at the Diet of Warsaw, wrote to the Metropolitan of Kiev: 'A great misfortune has befallen our faith: the closing of Holy Churches, the prohibition of the ringing of church bells, the dragging of the priests from the altars as evildoers, and the prohibition of prayers by laymen in the churches are taking place. A similar violence did not even take place under the pagan kings. . . . Still worse, one breaks up holy crosses, one carries away church bells and gives them to the Jews. . . . One transforms our churches into those of Jesuits, the property of the Church of God passes to the Catholics.'

Nevertheless the existing law did not permit an open attack of the Russian element as such, well organized in its church and enjoying guarantees by charter.

The aim of the Polish counter-reforms was to latinize the Russian population which lived in Poland and Lithuania by degrees, which would lead to its gradual absorption by the Polish element. The famous Polish Jesuit, Peter Skarga, rector of the College of Vilna, published in 1577 at Vilna his work, *O Jednosci Kosciola Bozego* (*Of the Unity of the Church*), in which he declared that to benefit from the good of the instruction the Russians should forsake their national language. 'It never was and never will be possible in the world of the Academies or Colleges, that theology, philosophy, and the other sciences could be taught and understood in any other language than Latin or Greek.' But he recognized at the same time the difficulty of converting the Russians 'who are so concerned about their forefathers and their past.' Skarga was the first to have the idea that, before approaching a possible latinization of the Russians, it would be wiser to make them accept the supremacy of Rome while leaving them their national rite. He may be considered as the inspirer of the so-called Uniat Church.

During this epoch the sustained struggle to safeguard the National Church was almost exclusively maintained by the Russian laity, the clergy and ecclesiastic discipline in the ancient lands of the Russo-Lithuanian State having fallen into decadence.

Prince Constantine Ostrojsky, the most powerful of the Russian lords and considered the 'chief of Orthodoxy and of the Russian people,' spent his whole life in extending education among the people, founding schools, and editing books in ordinary Russian and in Slavonic. It is in his land, at Ostrog, that the first printing press in South-Western Russia was founded. It was destined to play an important role in the struggles which followed.

On the other hand the Russian citizens organized themselves into 'brotherhoods' which expected their members to practise the Christian virtues, to found and maintain charitable institutions, and to spread knowledge and instruction. These brotherhoods soon had their own schools and they even gave themselves the right of controlling questions of ecclesiastical discipline, which gave rise to conflicts with the episcopate.

Despite these efforts, the difficulties became such that the Russian episcopate, in order to escape the Polish persecutions and to re-establish order in the affairs of the Church, considered the idea of recognizing the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff while maintaining the national rite within the framework of Catholic unity.

In 1590 the work of Skarga, *Of the Unity of the Church*, was translated into Russian. Its first part discussed the causes of the decadence of the Orthodox Church in

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x 175

Western Russia. Skarga cites in the first instance the marriage of priests, the use of old Slavonic, which he considers undesirable as being a ‘ barbarian ’ language, and, above all, the interference of the lay authorities in the affairs of the Church, thus aiming at the brotherhoods. To remedy this and to prepare the ground for a union, Skarga puts forward, in the second part of his work, propositions concerning the first measures to be taken, such as the acceptance by the Russians of the Latin Credo, the transfer of the investiture of the Metropolitan of Kiev from Constantinople to Rome, and, of course, the recognition of the supremacy of the Pope. It is curious to note that in the Polish edition he foresees the progressive abandonment of the national rite and its replacement by the Latin rite. This suggestion is abandoned in the Russian edition of 1590 in view, undoubtedly, of the attachment of the people to the national rite.

This work had an enormous influence on the Orthodox clergy of Western Russia and strengthened its tendency towards the establishment of a union with Rome.

The effort of Skarga was supported by strong diplomatic activity of the Apostolic Nuncio, Antonio Possevino, also a Jesuit and a politician of note, who published in Venice, nearly at the same time, the works *Bibliothecha selecta de ratione studiorum* and *Moscovia et olia opera*, translated into Polish and Russian, which discuss the union of the Churches. He succeeded in converting the Metropolitan of Kiev, Michael Ragoza, the Bishop of Luck, Cyril Terletsky, and the Bishop Hypatius Potiy to the idea of union. They signed an Act of adhesion to the Holy See and deposited an address of submission at the feet of Pope Clement VIII in December 1595. A commemorative medal was struck on this occasion. It was Antonio Possevino who persuaded

King Sigismund to put this into practice, in demonstrating to him the political advantages of the realization of the union of his Russian subjects with the Roman Church. 175x

The union of the two Churches was proclaimed in Rome in 1596 and at the local council of Brest-Litovsk in the following year.

Nevertheless this union met with the resolute opposition of the Russian people in Poland and Lithuania. Prince Ostrojsky, who was himself a partisan of the reconciliation of the Churches, became a pillar of this resistance.

According to the ideas of the Prince, as explained in his letter of 21 June 1593 to Bishop Potiy, saying: 'I am prepared to give my support to the union of the Churches,' this union ought to have been a definite reconciliation between Rome and the entire Eastern Church, a return to the primitive state of the indivisible Church. He insisted particularly on the necessity of agreeing first of all with the Grand Prince of Moscow and the clergy of his land—with, as he said, 'our co-religionists.'

But the union, as realized in 1596 (as it only affected Polish-Lithuanian Russia), severed the ties of the Russian people with those of the rest of the Orthodox world and, in isolating them, it placed them fatally at the mercy of the Poles and of the Latin clergy. It was nothing but a scholarly political combination of some eminent members of the high Orthodox clergy who had acted without the knowledge of the people and decidedly against them.

Therefore this union was never recognized by the majority of the Faithful.

But from the point of view of the Polish authorities, the union was reached and confirmed. On the whole

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territory of the Polish-Lithuanian State the Government no longer recognized the existence of the non-uniat Russian Church, opposed the nomination of bishops other than uniats, and had resource to administrative force to destroy the 'schism.'

Henceforth the struggle became an open one; it was extremely violent from the beginning.

The non-uniat Russians redoubled their efforts to teach the people their own language. Polemical literature flourished in the common language, more easily understood by the popular masses than the old Slavonic. As the nobility succumbed more and more to Polonization, the brotherhoods became the real centres of resistance.

The authorities, on the contrary, closed the Orthodox churches and suppressed the schools and the printing presses if they did not happen [illegible] be under the protection of a powerful lord.

The worst excesses were perpetrated. On 12 March 1622, after twenty-five years of political experience, the great Polish statesman Sapieha writes to the uniat Bishop Kuncewicz:

'It is certain that I worked for the union and I still think that it is unreasonable to abandon it. But I never had an idea that you would try to realize it by such a display of violence. . . . At the Diets there is no want of complaints from the whole Ukraine and the whole Russia. . . . You say that you are permitted to drown, and to massacre the non-uniats. No! Because the commandments of God condemn vengeance and you are not exempt from them. You write that at the Diets one not only discourages the union, but the whole Roman Catholic clergy. But who is to blame for this? When you violate the human conscience, when you close the churches and allow people to perish without Christian rites, without the holy prayer, as unbelievers,

175x

you do this over our heads (the public authorities). But when the people become agitated as a result of these atrocities and one has to subdue them, then it is we who have to close the breach. . . .

'You have transformed the sheep into goats, you are endangering the State and possibly even bringing ruin to us, the Catholics. . . . If the Holy Father knew what disorders occur in our State as a result of your union, he would certainly have ordered the opposite of that which you are doing.'

The national and religious struggles were intimately bound up with the social dissatisfaction of the popular Russian masses, doubly oppressed both as peasants and as schismatics. For this reason the compact and armed force at the further limits of the Ukraine, the Cossacks, began to acquire such importance. Drawn from the lower people, the Zaporogs are quite naturally in favour of the popular faith and are opposed to the religion and the social oppression which made them flee to the wild Steppe. Having always considered themselves a type of crusaders, who fight for their faith, they now thought it their duty to defend their oppressed Church.

A first Cossack insurrection, supported by the Ukrainian peasants, already broke out during the same years when the union was brought about. It ended in disaster and in the death of its principal leaders.

But the revolt persisted. The Cossacks support the non-uniat ecclesiastic hierarchy and protect it with all their power. It is reinstated, at first secretly, at Kiev. The King, Ladislas IV, son and successor of Sigismund III, who has much broader views than his father, tries to normalize the situation by legalizing the non-uniat clergy. But things have already gone too far. The more so since the royal power has become almost an illusion and is unable to prevent the excesses of the

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

x/175 officials, the nobility, and the Polish clergy. Thus the troubles continue. An ever growing number of Ukrainian peasants wants to free itself by having its status of Cossacks recognized.

In 1628 it is the great insurrection of Taras Triasilo which forces the Poles to make big concessions. Then, in 1637, 1638, and 1639 the Zaporogs and the peasants again revolt. After a desperate struggle the insurrection was suppressed, this time with the greatest severity. The leaders sought refuge in Moscow.

The more the Polish persecution asserted itself, the more the people of Western and Southern Russia looked to Moscow, especially when she had succeeded in maintaining her national existence, so menaced at the beginning of the seventeenth century by the Polish invasion and the great *Smouta—Smoutnoie vremia*—'the times of trouble,'[1] preceding the establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613. In 1625 the new non-uniat Metropolitan of Kiev, Job Borestsky, sent the Bishop of Luck, Isaac, to Moscow with the message: 'We wish to be under the power of the Tsar. If the Poles march against us, we shall have no other refuge but the mercy of the Tsar,' but Moscow was still too weak to intervene in Western Russia.

After the defeat of the insurrection of 1639 the Zaporog army was submitted to a commission appointed by the Polish Government. 'The Poles cooked Cossack children in boiling water and cut off the breasts of their women,' says a Cossack chronicler of that epoch.

But ten years after the defeat of 1639 the Zaporogs and the whole Ukraine again rose, having Bogdan Khmelnitsky at their head.

The situation in the Ukraine was such that, beginning

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[1] The period between the death of Boris Godounov and the election of the Tsar Michael Romanov (1605–13).


POLAND OF XVII CENTURY
NOTES:
Boundaries of Poland at the beginning of XVII century
Provinces ceded by Poland at the end of XVII century
Boundaries of the Ukraine as described in Chapter I
Boundaries of Polish State in 1938
Regions of Poland where the Poles represent less than 25% of the population
Regions of Poland where the Poles represent from 25% to 50% of the population
Mixed Regions where Ukrainians represent more than 25% of the population
RUSSIAN STATE
SWEDES
GRAND DUCHY OF CURLAND
Riga
Novgorod
Moscow
Kovno
Vilno
Smolensk
Andrussovo (Treaty of)
LITHUANIA
Minsk
Gdansk (Danzig)
Poznan
Warsaw
WHITE RUSSIA
VOLYNIA
Vladimir Volynsky
Lublin
Chernigov
Putivl
SLOBODSKAIA UKRAINA (FREE UKRAINE)
Kiev
Pereiaslavl
Kharkov
Poltava
Cracow
PODOLIA
GALICIA
Chigirin
Bratzlav
DIKOIE POLIE
ZAPOROGS
Khortitza (Sitch)
DON COSSACKS
CRIMEAN TARTARS
HUNGARY
TRANSILVANIA
DNIESTR
MOLDAVIA
OTTOMAN EMPIRE

MAP No. 4

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X/175 from February 1648, the commander-in-chief of the Polish troops, Potocky, considered the insurrection imminent. The Polish troops had penetrated into the Ukraine so as to maintain order. But in vain. The Zaporogs first annihilated their advance guard at Joltye-Vody and then the main Polish army at Korsoun. This was the signal for a general uprising of the whole Ukraine. Everywhere the people massacred the Polish lords and the Jews, principal beneficiaries of the economic regime, and putting the Latin and uniat priests to flight, while burning the Catholic churches. The peasants joined the ranks of the army of Khmelnitsky in large numbers. According to the stories of contemporaries, there were no peasant families a member of which was not serving in the army. Often men took up arms, 'with the exception of a single one who remained to guard the house.' The debacle of a new Polish army at Pilavtsi gave Volynia and Podolia to Khmelnitsky, which opened the road to Galicia and to the land of Kholm. Kiev received him in triumph. He found himself at the head of a great land—'unexpectedly,' as he said himself—of all the Russian lands of the Polish crown, which had just broken away from her in overthrowing the whole political, social, and religious order.

As the results had by far exceeded the objectives which one originally had in mind, the Cossack chiefs found themselves face to face with an absolutely new situation which they found it somewhat difficult to conceive and to master.

Let us briefly summarize the principal factors which made the brilliant success of the insurrection possible and which were to influence the further development of the country.

At first the Zaporogs were concerned to re-establish their rights and liberties abolished after the suppression

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of the preceding insurrections, and to augment them if possible.

They struggled to obtain the right which had been enjoyed by the *szlachta* (petty nobility). Khmelnitsky, who was himself linked to the aristocracy by his origin, started the whole affair as the result of a simple quarrel with a Polish nobleman who had robbed him by profiting by his privileged position as compared with that of a Cossack. Generally the Cossack chiefs, while fighting for their own privileges, essentially shared the Polish point of view: 'The Cossacks should be Cossacks and the peasants should be peasants.'

The insurrection triumphed, thanks to the rising of the whole mass of the peasants. They swelled the Cossack army and for them there was no question of returning to the ancient serfdom. Henceforth the Cossack chiefs had to reckon with their own troops and consequently also with the mass of the lower people. "I shall not betray the lower people," said Khmelnitsky to the Polish commissioners sent to negotiate after the battle of Pilavtsi; "after having crushed the peasants you will march against the Cossacks."

The bond between the Cossack chiefs and the popular masses was traditionally the same: 'The Russian Faith of the Greek obedience.' As in all the preceding insurrections, the aim of war was the deliverance of the non-uniat Russian Church. And the chiefs, leaving aside their specifically Cossack interests and speaking for the 'whole Russian people,' required the total abolition of the union, the equality of rights for the Orthodox clergy, and the exclusion of non-Orthodox officials from all the Russian lands.

The rising had, therefore, a national character. Being effectively the leader of the Russian lands, Khmelnitsky could no longer be the chief of only a fraction of the

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x/175 Russian people, as whose master (*vlastelin*[1]) he was already described. Almost in spite of himself he began to play the role of a sovereign and to envisage something like a Russian State, consisting of all the 'Russian lands' formerly Polish-Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and, perhaps, White Russian. He was able to say: "I shall deliver the whole Russian people from the Polish yoke. I began by making war after having been personally offended. Now I shall continue for our Orthodox Faith. Right up to Liublin and to Cracow all the lower classes of this religion will support me. . . . I have sufficient means in the Ukraine, in Podolia, in Volynia, and in my own land, as in the principality which will extend to Lvov, Kholm, and Halytch." The insurrection of Khmelnitsky had great repercussions in Europe. Cromwell invited him to join in a holy war against Catholicism. On his part a French diplomat, a contemporary of Khmelnitsky, Pierre Chevalier, called him the 'Russian Cromwell.'

In any case the Polish domination of the Ukraine had outlived itself. The old order of things could no longer be restored. That was plainly shown by the Treaty of Zborov, which, for the time being, put an end to hostilities. The Poles had agreed to all the demands of the victors: the increase of the number of 'registered' Cossacks up to 40,000, the prohibition of the penetration of Polish troops into the territories assigned to the Cossacks, the nomination exclusively of Orthodox officials in the domains of Kiev, Tchernigov, and Bratzlav, and the recognition of all the political rights of the Orthodox clergy.

Notwithstanding these concessions the treaty was not long lived. The hostilities recommenced and this time to the disadvantage of Khmelnitsky.

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[1] Literally translated as 'potentate,' he who exercises power.

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In this merciless struggle, accompanied by massacres and terrible atrocities on both sides, there was only one help on which the Russian people of the Orthodox faith could clearly rely in advance: it could only be Moscow. 'Moscow and the Cossacks—one blood and one religion,' wrote the Polish Commissioner, Adam Kissel, a Russian and an Orthodox himself but a vassal of the Poles at the very beginning of the insurrection.

In fact Khmelnitsky had, from the start of the troubles, made the Muscovite authorities aware of their border territories. Then, immediately after his first victories, he wrote on 8 June 1648 directly to the Tsar: 'We should like to have an autocratic sovereign in our land such as your Tsarist Might, oh Christian and Orthodox Tsar!'

Following this, the appeals to the 'Russian Light' did not cease. For a long time Moscow retained a reserve. Khmelnitsky even threatened to join the Grand Turk and to go to war with Moscow, if the Tsar 'whom he was ready to serve' would not receive him. He was particularly insistent after the defeat of his first ally, the Tartar Khan of the Crimea. When the Poles took the initiative, Khmelnitsky persuaded the envoys of the Tsar that, if Moscow should intervene, all the Russian lands, including White Russia, would range themselves on her side. Moscow accepted, and the Union of the Ukraine with Great Russia was proclaimed at Pereiaslavl on 8 January 1654.

The Act of Pereiaslavl stipulated that the Hetman,[1] Bogdan Khmelnitsky, and the whole Zaporog army 'with its lands and its towns' would submit for all times to the power of the Tsar and would swear loyalty to him and to his successors.

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[1] The word 'Hetman' means the chief, or general, and is derived from the German '*Hauptman*'—colonel.

x/175

The representatives of the Tsar definitely refused to swear to the maintenance of the ancient rights and liberties which the Cossacks demanded. But they said that the Hetman and his Cossacks ought to trust the grace of the Tsar, who would not fail to do justice to their demands. And that actually took place. After the submission to the Tsar had been proclaimed by the *Rada*[1] (Cossack assembly), and the Hetman and his people had sworn allegiance, they sent a petition to Moscow which contained their principal requests. Most of these were agreed to by Moscow, some with certain restrictions.

These demands (a recent work by Professor D. M. Odinetz explains them very well) primarily aimed at the confirmation of the ancient privileges, given to the Cossacks by the kings of Poland. Did not the sovereign of Moscow appear in the Ukraine as the successor of these kings, with this difference, however, that the religious question would not exist as such in an empire in which Orthodoxy was the religion of the State?

But all these old privileges in the Ukraine always applied to a social class (the nobility, clergy, Cossacks, and the middle class), but never to a territory which had a national language or an autonomous status.

Therefore Moscow did not have to deal with an autonomous State which wanted her protection, but with various social classes, previously endowed with certain privileges and eager to retain them. The Hetman of the Zaporoge army spoke in the name of the 'State,' the social class of the Cossacks, while Moscow had direct dealings with the clergy, the confirmation of whose rights and possessions it demanded.

The question of territorial autonomy had not been raised and it was understood that the sovereignty of the

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[1] '*Rada*' means 'council,' 'Soviet' in Ukrainian.

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1757

Tsar extended over the whole territory. It was understood that the Tsar would send his *voievodes*[1] to the Ukraine, that all the public revenues of the country belonged to him, and that he could distribute the land. For this reason, all the more, the Cossack chiefs were the first to ask for them as a reward for their services.

The Cossack army, as a military caste placed on the borders of the State, succeeded in maintaining their privilege of negotiating directly with foreign powers. But Moscow insisted on important restrictions. The Zaporoge army was not allowed to negotiate either with Poland or with Turkey, its most powerful neighbours. Professor Odinetz notes, with good reason, that the *voievode* of Novgorod, who had the right to maintain direct relations with such an important State as Sweden, had more extensive powers than the Hetman of the Ukraine and that, according to Muscovite customs, this so-called autonomy in matters of foreign policy was in no sense a proof of the recognition by Moscow of the existence of a Ukrainian State as such.

In short, from a judicial point of view and according to the letter of the Act of Pereislavl and the supplementary documents which followed it, the Ukraine became an integral part of the Russian State, placed under the sovereignty of a single Tsar.

On the other hand Moscow understood that her position changed from the moment that the 'Great Russian' State, such as it had hitherto been, was transformed into the State of all the Russians in general.

This was the aim which she had in view when engaging in the war with Poland over the question of the Zaporoge army. The *Rouss* which had formerly been Polish and the Muscovite *Rouss* united under a single sceptre. The old expression, already employed by the princes of

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[1] Military chief, civil or military governor.

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x/175 Galicia and by the Church, Russia Minor, or 'Little Russia,' to describe the Russian lands which had been taken from Poland, was used.

And, to underline the now imperial and complex character of this State, the Tsar of Moscow now took the titles 'Tsar of all the Russias, Great, Little, and White.'

This was not an empty formula. When the theological scholars of Kiev appeared at the beginning of the seventeenth century, drawn by the power of the Tsars, Moscow was literally flooded, in the years which followed the Act of 1654, by elements originating in Russia Minor. The State printing press of Moscow (the only one that existed) soon passed into the hands of these scholars. The ecclesiastic and lay *élite* began to acquire books edited at Kiev. A new, more Western, spirit began to appear in the old capital of the Tsars.

Undoubtedly the Southern Russians were more advanced than those of Moscow from a cultural point of view, especially in the matter of religious instruction. The merciless struggle of the non-uniat Orthodox Church against Catholicism, which was supported by the Polish royal power, had not only forged an Orthodox consciousness in the upper layers of the Russian population of the south, but it had also drawn them into the orbit of the philosophical and social movements of the west. The brotherhoods took over the direction of religious affairs, of instruction, and of the spiritual formation of the clergy. The Theological Academy of Kiev, founded early in the seventeenth century, was reorganized a short time before the Act of Pereiaslavl by the great Metropolitan of Kiev, Peter Mohila. Apart from some Greek contributions, the instruction which was given there was modelled on that of the Jesuit schools of that epoch. Nothing similar could exist at

Moscow, influenced as it was by a fierce nationalism. 175X In taking the place of the Byzantine institutions, the Academy of Kiev became the centre of high theological and philosophical studies, and took the role of the only light of Orthodoxy. Only a few years were required after the union of the Ukraine with Moscow to bring the Church of Moscow under the direct influence of the learned and cultured theologians of Kiev, which soon brought about the reforms of the Patriarch Nikon (the correction of the Holy Scriptures, the liturgical books, and the revision of the rites according to the original Greek sources). This resulted in a psychological crisis among the Great Russian people, perhaps the most acute in their history, which not only led to an upheaval in Russian religious life, but led to a long period of struggle between the Government of Moscow, which supported the reforming clergy, and the traditionalist party of Moscow, violently nationalist, which actively opposed the innovations and refused to recognize them. This was the *raskol*, the schism of the Russian Church, or rather the insurrection of the people against the clergy who accepted the new spirit and the new methods. The partisans of the pure traditions of Moscow struggled with heroic abnegation in defying the anathema and the stake. Extraordinary in its literary setting, *The Life of the Arch Priest Avvakum*, written by himself,[1] gives us an idea of the depth of this religious crisis.

But victory remained on the side of reform and of the spirit which came from Kiev. At the end of the seventeenth century the scholars of Kiev founded the first schools in Moscow, which were a replica of the Kiev Academy. A little later, under Peter the Great, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the whole Russian x/175 Church is directed by people from Russia Minor such as Stephan Yavorsky and Theophan Prokopovitch.

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[1] An excellent French translation of which has been made by M. Pierre Pascal.

The embryo of Muscovite literature and art, as well as of the written language, became inspired by Kiev models. The Polish novel, the polyphonous song, and the new iconography, all strongly Western, triumphed over the special Great Russian particularism. An imperial civilization arose which was a synthesis of the national and *etatist* spirit of Moscow and the supple South Russian culture, itself the product of the influence of the old Slavonic civilization with its Byzantine spiritual traditions and those of the Western Renaissance.

But while the spirit of Kiev began to influence Moscow and laid the civilizing foundations of the Russian Empire, the Ukraine herself was in the throes of many troubles.

In concluding the Act of Pereiaslavl, the Cossack chiefs had not been able to rise to a clear understanding of an autonomous Ukrainian entity within the framework of the Russian State.

Nevertheless this autonomy did exist in fact. The Hetman who had negotiated with the Government of the Tsar solely by virtue of being the chief of a social class (the Cossacks) was in reality the Regent of a vast territory. All sorts of clashes were to result from this fact.

The right of the Tsar to nominate *voievods* (military governors) in the Ukraine had been legally recognized in the course of the negotiations at Pereiaslavl. But on the day when Moscow actually appointed officials in 'Russia Minor,' this naturally irritated the Hetman.

Another cause for conflict was the incompatibility of the political principles of Moscow with the regime of social privileges so dear to the Cossacks. The so to say democratic despotic egalitarianism which had been the

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foundation of the Muscovite monarchy could not easily 175x be reconciled with the Polish idea of an aristocratic oligarchy, an idea which the Cossack chiefs wanted, at present, to exploit to their advantage. In this the policy of Moscow naturally found much support among the popular Ukrainian masses, who generally preferred the Government of the Tsar to the oligarchy of the *starchina* (the leading class among the Cossacks). An agent of the Government of Moscow, Ragosine, reported the opinions expressed to him by members of the lower masses: "We are happy to be under the Great Sovereign, but unfortunately our chiefs are restive."

Standing between the popular masses and the Government of Moscow, the Cossack chiefs, imbued with Polish political ideas, tried several times to renew contacts with Poland, which, after the catastrophe, was ready for all concessions. The immediate successor of Khmelnitsky, the Hetman Vyhovsky, induced Poland to recognize the territory under his authority as the 'Russian Grand Duchy,' placed under Polish sovereignty. But the people were too violently opposed to a new union with Poland for the Ukraine not to remain within Russia, despite the restrictions which were imposed by the Tsar on the liberties originally accorded. Two years later the attempt of Vyhovsky was repeated by Youri Khmelnitsky, the son of Bogdan, but with no more success. The Hetmanate had now passed to Brioukhovetsky, a partisan of the union with Moscow. Nevertheless these struggles horribly devastated that part of the Ukraine which lies to the west of the Dnieper.

On the other side of the river, in the eastern part of the country, where the Polish power had always been only nominal, the hold of the Russian State proved to be much stronger and tolerable order was established. The population of Western Ukraine took more and

X/175 more refuge in this part. In 1658 the Polish general, Andrew Potocki, who was fighting on the right bank of the River Dnieper, wrote to King John—Casimir: 'All the inhabitants here will soon be Muscovites, because they intend to move to the land on the other side of the Dnieper. That is what they wish and they only await the occasion when they can attain this aim conveniently.'

The idea of evacuating the western part of the Ukraine and of ceding this 'land without inhabitants' to the King of Poland became rife among those Cossack chiefs who had remained faithful to the union with Moscow.

On the other hand Moscow could not, after a series of reverses, contribute the same military effort as at the beginning of the war.

Also, in 1667, the armistice of Androussovo put an end to the Russo-Polish war which had lasted no less than thirteen years. The Ukraine on the left bank and Kiev on the right bank were retained by Russia. On the other hand she lost the greater part of Western Ukraine. This retreat meant very little, as the Western Ukraine had almost become a desert during the rule of the Turks and Tartars.[1]

After the treaty between the son of Khmelnitsky, Youri, and the Poles had intervened, the latter maintained a Hetman under their obedience on the right bank of the Dnieper. In 1666 the third of these Hetmans, Doroshenko, submitted to the Turks. The Turko-Tartar invasion led to the total ruin of the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper.

A year after the armistice of Androussovo a revolt took place in the eastern part of the Ukraine. The relations between the Government of the Tsar and the Hetman always remained confused. Moscow tried to

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[1] See Map No. 4.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

govern the Ukrainian towns (*tcherkass* towns, as one said in Moscow) directly and to collect taxes there through their *voievods* and their officials. This exasperated the *starchina*. 175x

In 1668 the Hetman Brioukhovetsky, until now faithful to Moscow, allied himself with Doroshenko, who had become a vassal of Turkey, and rose against the Tsar. Finally he was supplanted by Doroshenko. The latter made himself recognized as Hetman of the whole Ukraine, under Turkish protectorate. But as soon as he had reached the right bank of the Dnieper, Eastern Ukraine again rallied to Russia. The lower clergy, speaking in the name of the townspeople and the lower masses, informed Moscow: "The whole people shout and cry; no more than the Jews under the Egyptian yoke do we wish to live under the Cossack yoke." Western Ukraine was again ravaged by Turkish troops, led by Doroshenko, and the Poles finally ceded the greater part to them. Then the Turks turned against the left bank and, for the first time, Muscovite Russia was fighting with the Ottoman Empire. But they did not succeed, as the Eastern Ukraine resisted and definitely joined the side of the Orthodox Tsar against the Infidel. The Russian troops even operated with some success on the other side of the river, but they were unable to hold their positions and evacuated the remaining population of the left bank.

After ten years of hostilities Russia, by the Treaty of Bakhtchisarai (1681), had to abandon the right bank except, of course, the territory of Kiev, which remained under the Tsar.

Five years later Poland also definitely renounced Kiev. The east and the centre of the Ukraine were definitely joined to Russia.

After the alarm of 1668, the Government of Moscow

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X/175 adopted a more careful policy and one that was more moderate towards the Cossack chiefs. It kept the right to maintain the troops commanded by the *voievods* of the Tsar in the more important centres of the country. But it abandoned all internal administration of the Ukraine to the Hetman. That which the Act of Pereiaslavl had not foreseen became a reality: the Ukraine, under her Hetmans, became an autonomous entity, a kind of vassal State with its own local legislation.

On the contrary, while recognizing this autonomy, the Government of Moscow henceforth began to control more closely the accession of the Hetmans to power. Contrary to the stipulations of Pereiaslavl, which provided for the election of the Hetman by the Zaporoge army, Moscow herself appointed and deposed him.

The Act of Pereiaslavl was not broken; it was necessary to go beyond its stipulations in installing a regime of real territorial autonomy which, on the other hand, one restrained in establishing a more effective control over the nomination of the person who became chief of this autonomous region.

The new formula had at least the merit of functioning some time. The Hetmanate was consolidated, while enjoying a relatively stable internal peace. The population flocked from the Western Ukraine. Monasteries and schools were again founded and Kiev, having been spared by the wars, began to adorn herself with buildings of the Western baroque style and her Academy again extended her influence over the whole of Russia.

The influx of the population did not, however, stop at the frontiers of the Hetmanate. Farther on, towards the south-east, on the borders of the State of Moscow, in the real wild Steppe, the *Dikoie Pole* of former days, the Russian colonists established themselves. More or less protected by the Muscovite military cordons, a land of free colonization was formed on the Worskla, the Donietz, and the Oskol. It was also called the *Slobodskaia Oukraina*[1] ('Free Ukraine') (actually the departments of Kharkov and of the Donietz). The colonists also came here from Russia Minor and from Great Russia, on whom this country was politically dependent. It is this which gave it, from an ethnical point of view, a mixed character, which it has kept to our day.

During the wars which devastated Russia Minor in the second half of the seventeenth century, the current of colonization in the 'free Ukraine' naturally became intensified. One after another towns were founded, such as Soumy, Izioum, Tor (to-day Slaviansk), Akhtyrka, and Kharkov, which became in time the chief towns of the country. The exodus of the population from the land of the Dnieper gave predominance to the Ukrainian ethnical element, but the 'free Ukraine,' directly administered by Moscow, never became a part of the Hetmanate which, during the first years of the eighteenth century, had to sustain heavy blows.

Under pressure of the West, first felt at Moscow through Kiev, the old Russia became definitely transformed. Peter the Great had taken power. Breaking with the old patriarchal habits, he imported the scientific and technical civilization of Europe, and political ideas of enlightened absolutism, which he grafted on the semi-amorphous body of the old Muscovite State. He thus created a hybrid State and a monster civilization, which dominated Russia during the eighteenth century up to the beginning of the reign of Catherine II. But he also created a powerful empire whose outbursts of progress and enlightenment astonished and still astonish the world.

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[1] '*Sloboda*' is a place inhabited by 'free men,' not serfs. *Slobodskaia Oukraina.* See Map No. 4.

x175 He pursued unrelentingly, on the Baltic as on the Black Sea, the great aims of a true imperial policy, and subjected the whole country to a pitiless dictatorship which was, however, necessary for the attainment of his aims. Peter was not a man who took human susceptibilities into account, whatever they were, not even his own. That which he expected of Great Russia he also expected of Russia Minor.

The Ukraine, too, had to furnish him with the necessary troops for the distant campaigns of the nascent empire. Like the Great Russians, the Ukrainians also perished in great numbers on the marshes of the Baltic, where the untiring Tsar was building the new town of St. Petersburg.

Convinced of the necessity of having the support of a regular army, Peter could not tolerate the independent and undisciplined Cossack troops in his new military organization. On their part the Cossacks, forced to fight in the far north, feared that their traditional organization might be destroyed and that they might be transformed into ordinary regular troops. They grumbled and thought Peter a tyrant and oppressor. But the Tsar had full confidence in their chief, the Hetman Mazeppa, by origin a Polish nobleman, brought up in the Western school, who, after having served Poland and Turkey loyally, served Russia.

Energetic, cultured, very intelligent, sly and unscrupulous, Mazeppa had the appearance of a learned alchemist of the Renaissance period. He followed the changing fortunes in the mortal war which began between Russia and Sweden with anguish. For him it was a question of maintaining his own power. But, possibly, in this complex soul personal ambitions were mixed with cares about the fate of the country which he governed. In prose and in poetry (he sometimes

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indulged in poetry) he liked to lament the fate of the 175x Ukraine—undoubtedly an ambitious demagogue but saturated with a lyric mood. . . .

As long as the result of the war between Russia and Sweden seemed undecided, Mazeppa was careful not to break with the Tsar.

In Poland as well as in Sweden one realized, however, that in order to strike a mortal blow at the power of the Tsar it was necessary to detach the Ukraine from Russia. Advantageous offers to Mazeppa were not wanting and here, for the first time, the Ukraine was named as being an autonomous geographical entity. The Swedish emissaries (the idea of independence had then already appeared as a foreign inspiration) had printed maps of the Sovereign Ukrainian State, which the 'Paladin of the north,' Charles XII, proposed to create.

Logically the cause of Peter seemed lost. The suffering which the Reformer had imposed on the whole country which he governed seemed to increase the chances of the Swedish victor. Swedes and Poles flattered the ambition of the old Hetman in promising him the creation of a semi-independent Ukraine of which he would be the absolute chief.

Mazeppa, having been persuaded, rallied to the cause of Charles XII and succeeded in bringing the Zaporogs on his side. This insurrection differed from all the previous risings against the Tsar. This time a part of the Cossack mass, angered by the taxes, by the requisitions of labour and the military conscriptions, joined the cause of their chiefs. It is the co-operation of the Cossacks and the lower people which could make Peter fear a general insurrection in the Ukraine.

Nevertheless this general rising did not take place.

Mazeppa had negotiated with the old enemy: Poland. Peter knew very well what he was doing when publishing x/115 the letters of Mazeppa to King Stanislas Lescinski (a king forced on Poland by Charles XII), with the following comments by himself: ‘ We had already told you—wrote the Tsar in his manifesto—that the renegade (Mazeppa) has brought the Swede to the Ukraine in order to subject her again to the old Polish yoke. Now his lie, abominable before God, has become obvious; he announces himself as the faithful subject of Lescinski and he says that the Ukraine is the patrimony of Lescinski.[1]’

Some weeks later Peter could already write to General Apraxine: ‘ The people of Russia Minor, with God's help, is so firm in their loyalty that one could expect no more.’ The majority of the Cossacks, having remained faithful to the Tsar, immediately elected a new Hetman who was entirely devoted to Peter. The Ukrainian clergy joined those of Moscow in proclaiming a curse upon Mazeppa. At the same time the troops of the Tsar acted with great energy against the two remaining centres of separatist resistance which remained in the country. The capital of the Hetman, Batourin, was taken by assault. Then, in turn, the *Sitch* of the Zaporoges was completely devastated.

After the total suppression of the insurrection, Mazeppa, who had tried in vain to renew his ties with the Tsar, was obliged, like Charles XII, to seek refuge in Turkey following the defeat of Poltava on 27 June 1709. This battle decided the fate of the Russo-Swedish War as well as that of Eastern Europe.

The unsubdued Zaporoges emigrated to Turkey, where they founded a Hetmanate in exile. But later on they again submitted and returned to their former territories.

The defeat of Mazeppa put an end to the short period of Ukrainian autonomy. The Hetmanate still continued officially for some time. The new Hetman, Skoropadsky (a forefather of the General Skoropadsky who was proclaimed Hetman in 1918), controlled by Russian Ministers who governed the country, had in reality no power. After the death of Skoropadsky the Tsar deliberately left his office vacant. As a result of certain reactions against the political policy of Peter the Great which triumphed immediately after his death, the Hetmanate was re-established in 1724 in favour of Daniel Apostol, who was entirely loyal to the Imperial Government. The Ukraine had yet another Hetman, the last one, in the person of Cyril Razoumovsky, the brother of the favourite of the Empress Elizabeth, who while completely dependent on St. Petersburg, contributed much to the economic and cultural development of the Ukraine. /75*

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[1] In calling King Stanislas by his surname, Peter underlined that he did not recognize a king imposed by Charles XII.

Catherine II, after her accession to power, proceeded to bring about the disappearance of the last vestiges of Ukrainian autonomy. Razoumovsky was dismissed for having attempted to make his position hereditary.

The second half of the eighteenth century settled, on the other hand, two great historical questions: the return of the Ukraine of the right side of the river (the western lands of Kiev, Podolia, and Volynia) to Russia, and the definite conquest of Tartar Steppe by the Russian Empire.

Let us remember that, by the Treaties of Androussovo and of Bakhtchissarai, Russia had been obliged to renounce the Ukraine of the right bank for the benefit either of Poland or of Turkey.

During the years that followed she tried to regain a foothold in this completely devastated country. But the disaster which overtook Peter the Great in 1711, in his war against Turkey, forced him once again to

X/175 abandon this attempt. Under the terms of the Russo-Turkish Treaty which was then signed, the Ukraine of the right bank was to remain empty and uninhabited under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.

This was the last victory of the Steppe over the settled Russian world. The withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire allowed Poland to retake this territory.

The same process, already seen so often, repeated itself; the populations which had been driven back to the extreme north-west of the Ukrainian territory, in Galicia and Polesia, again poured into the lands abandoned by the Tartars of the Steppe. At the end of several decades the whole country lying north of the line Balta–Tchigurin became covered with villages and towns.

And again, as during the sixteenth century in Western Ukraine, the Polish lord, serfdom, and national and religious intolerance closely followed the Ukrainian colonist, who was precisely attempting to escape them. Once more, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the country was divided into immense lordly domains which were veritable feudal principalities. The memory of the vengeance of the Ukrainian people, led by Khmelnitsky, had made the Poles more intolerant than ever. Any political position was forbidden by law to non-Catholics. The Orthodox Russians did not have the right to restore their churches nor to construct new ones. Those which were left to them, as well as the exercise of their cult, were at the mercy of the fanatical and vindictive Polish nobility. This was all the more so as at this epoch there were no longer any nobles of the Orthodox religion in Poland. The Russian faith, 'the religion of the serfs,' was deprived of every legal safeguard. Let us note that this happened in the same eighteenth century which saw Russia give refuge to Jesuits after the dissolution of the company in all the countries of the West.

But the wars of the second half of the seventeenth century had already decided the result of the secular rivalry between Russia and Poland. After the loss of the Eastern Ukraine the Polish State weakened more and more, whereas the Russian power increased continually. Peter the Great treated Poland almost as a vassal. He sent his troops there whenever he thought it wise. He made full use of the right which had been given to him by the treaties, of defending the position of his co-religionists in Poland. The repeated protests of Russia against Polish excesses, strengthened by a formal pact with Prussia which had the defence of non-Catholics in Poland in view, succeeded in remedying the immediate abuses without being able to change the essence of the Polish administrative system. /75x

The relations of the Western Ukraine and White Russia with the Russian Empire were all the closer as, since the end of the sixteenth century, their Church was no longer dependent on the Patriarchate of Constantinople but on that of Moscow, and later on the Holy Synod of St. Petersburg, which was substituted for the patriarchy by a decree of Peter the Great. The coming and going of ecclesiastics was now continuous. The Russian clergy, persecuted in the Polish Ukraine, readily took refuge on Russian territory, where it found all kinds of support.

The Russian influence on the affairs of Poland, a little weakened after the death of Peter the Great, again became stronger under Catherine II.

Almost immediately after the accession of Catherine II in 1762, the most notable prelate of Polish Russia, the Archbishop of Mohilev, George Konisky, presented a memorandum to the Holy Synod declaring the position of the Orthodox Russians in Poland as absolutely intolerable. As a result, two years later, at the elective x175 Diet of 1764, Russia demanded equality of rights for the 'dissidents,' that is to say the non-Catholics, from Poland. She obtained the simple tolerance of the cult, but was refused the demanded civil rights.

The struggles which ensued ended with the intervention of Russian troops in 1768. But while these troops were fighting with the 'Confederation of Bar' (composed of Polish reactionaries) an appalling insurrection broke out in the Polish Ukraine.

At the news of the approach of the Russian Army the peasants and the lower clergy of Western Ukraine believed that this would be the end of Polish domination. And so the scenes of the times of Bogdan Khmelnitsky were repeated. The whole Polish and Jewish population was massacred with unimaginable cruelty, insurgents and repressors rivalling in atrocities.

But the times had changed. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg, which had patiently worked for the emancipation of South-Western Russia, was unable to realize it according to the methods of the *haidamaks* (Ukrainian insurgents). The Chancellor, Count Panin, explained, in a letter of 1 September 1768 to the Bishop of Pereiaslavl (on Russian territory), the whole inexpediency and the horror of such political methods. The Russian troops were used against the *haidamaks* who, however, claimed an apocryphal 'golden bull' by Catherine II. Nevertheless the troubles in the country subjected to the Poles did not cease.

The greater part of White Russia had already been annexed by Russia since the first division of Poland in 1772. In May 1792 the Russian troops again penetrated into the Western Ukraine. On 3 June Prince Joseph Poniatowsky, who commanded the Polish troops which opposed them, wrote to King Stanislas that all the Ukrainian peasants and the petty nobles of the Orthodox

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175x

Faith were openly the partisans of Russia: 'The adversary had knowledge of my intentions, was informed of all that went on in my camp through benevolent spies of all sorts, whom he could easily procure, whereas I had the greatest difficulties in obtaining any.'

In the following year, according to the terms of the second partition of Poland, the domains of Kiev, Bratzlav, and of Podolia and a part of those of Brest and Volynia were annexed by Russia, the rest of the latter domains being taken by her only as a result of the third division of Poland in 1795. With Eastern Ukraine united to Moscow since the time of Khmelnitsky, it was the whole of the Southern Russian lands which had been taken by Poland in 1596, which were rejoined to the Russian Empire.

Only the 'Russian Palatinate,' that is to say Galicia, which had belonged to Poland from the middle of the fourteenth century, remained outside the frontiers of the Russian Empire. She was annexed by Austria, which explains the violent nationalism of the Galicians and the development of their native language (called the Ruthenian language), opposed to Polonization and Germanization.

We must also note that at none of the partitions of Poland did Russia take an inch of ethnically Polish territory, which was entirely absorbed by the two great Germanic States (Prussia and Austria). Only later, after the Napoleonic wars, did Russia annex the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

At the same time the two wars which Russia waged against Turkey under Catherine II carried her southern frontiers to the Black Sea. After a thousand years of struggle with the Asiatic world of the Khazars, the Petchenegs, the Polovetses, the Tartars, and the Turks, the Steppes of the Black Sea ceased to be a perpetual x/175 menace to the Russian world and were conquered by it. The annexation of Bessarabia, taken from the Turks in 1811, completed this conquest. Russian colonization developed in this at last pacified country with an unbelievable rapidity. One can only compare it with the colonizing movement in Siberia, which started some forty years ago with the inauguration of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Potemkin heralded this pact some years in advance by constructing false villages, a piece of theatrical stage dressing intended to impress the Emperor Joseph II. A few years passed and these villages surpassed in quantity and in importance the ambitious imagination of the favourite of the great Catherine. One after another towns were founded in this ancient Tartary, which had now become 'the New Russia': Pavlograd in 1764, Alexandrovsk (to-day Zaporojie) in 1770, Nikopol in 1775, Kherson in 1784, Marioupol and Voznesensk in 1789, Tiraspol in 1791, Odessa and Lougansk in 1795, and then, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Melitopol, Berdiansk, and others of lesser importance. This colonizing fever equally overtook Bessarabia, whose indigenous Moldavian population was small. This explains the large ethnically Russian majority in certain regions of Bessarabia.

The Imperial Government favoured this movement with all means in attracting colonists from the Ukraine, from Great Russia, and even from abroad, particularly Alsatians, Thuringians, Polish Jews, Greeks, and Bulgarians. It is this which gave these territories an ethnically very mixed character. According to the figures of the census of 1897, the three departments of the New Russia, Kherson, Dniepropetrovsk, and Taurida of the north, had 56 per cent Ukrainians, 21 per cent Great Russians, and the rest (23 per cent) being composed of Jews, Germans, Tartars, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Greeks, etc. (we mention them here in the order of their numerical importance).

The imperial colonization of the New Russia has thus assured the predominance of the ethnically Ukrainian element, though only in a weak degree. But economically and strategically everything now changed in relation to the Ukraine, since in the empire and as a result of the power of the empire, she became the borderland of the Black Sea.

With the creation of the New Russia the Zaporoge *Sitch* had to disappear. This vast country having, at last, been pacified, there was no longer any need for the maintenance of a military outpost. By its nature it became the source of all sorts of political and administrative complications affecting the Central Government. In 1775 Russian troops occupied the *Sitch* and destroyed it without meeting with any resistance. It is permissible to regret it from the romantic or sentimental point of view, but one cannot reasonably deny that it was a question of political necessity.

Those Cossacks who were most ardently attached to their privileges emigrated to Turkey, some to Asia Minor and others to the principality of Moldavia. The first still inhabit a village near Constantinople, retaining their faith and their traditions. The second were soon repatriated and directed to the Northern Caucasus, to the fertile region of the Kouban River, where they formed, up to the time of the appearance of the Soviet power, units organized on a military basis like those of their brothers, the Cossacks of the Don. These units were economically very prosperous. They took the name of the 'Cossacks of the Kouban,' while the people called them the *Kourkouls*. They distinguished themselves by their merciless struggle against Bolshevism

X/175 during the Civil War, when they formed one of the most important kernels of the White Army.

All the lands of Russia Minor, the ancient *Slobodskaya Oukraina*, Podolia, Volynia, the land of Kiev, and the New Russia, were not more than simple provinces of the Russian Empire, divided into *goubernii* (governments, departments, counties), and they remained such until the Revolution of 1917.

During the nineteenth century no political event took place in the Russian Ukraine. No actual political struggle happened there, despite some endeavours to draw certain Ukrainian circles into the Polish insurrectionary movement. Never did any Ukrainian compromise himself in this anti-Russian movement.

Neither did any special police or military measure become necessary in Russia Minor, such as had taken place on those territories of the empire the ethnical majority of which was non-Russian: the Baltic lands, Finland, Poland, and the Caucasus. The calm which reigned in the Russian Ukraine was never troubled but by agrarian revolts and by different workers' movements, of which neither the one nor the other had in the least a national Ukrainian character, either autonomist or separatist. The autonomist movement was limited to cultural aspirations, tending to preserve the language, literature, and the consciousness of local patriotism. Therefore the analysis of this movement will become clearer in the following chapter, which deals with the intellectual movement, the language, the literature, and the Ukrainian folk-lore.

Galicia is still to-day the only Russian land of the ancient State of Kiev which had fallen under Polish domination in the fourteenth century, and had never rejoined the Russian unity. After the third partition of Poland her whole territory was annexed by Austria and

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therefore her political, cultural, and religious life developed under different conditions than those in the Russian part of the Ukraine. The uniat Church, which was definitely installed since the beginning of the seventeenth century, facilitated the detachment of the Galician people from the Russian culture and spirit.

Before concluding our historical chapter we should like to say a few words about Sub-Carpathian Russia, which, we must again repeat, we have included in the 'Great Ukraine' contrary to our conviction. The indigenous Russo-Carpathian people speak a Russian idiom which is full of medieval archaisms, and rather removed from the Ukrainian language and more nearly approaching the Great Russian tongue.

Formed by a western branch of the Eastern Slavs, the Carpatho-Russians established themselves on the southern slopes of the Carpathians and began to descend, towards the twelfth century, into the Danubian Plain. Here they met an already existing political and military organization, the Hungarian State, which rapidly submitted this Russian tribe to its authority.

Since then Sub-Carpathian Russia has lived under Hungarian domination (with an interval of eighteen years, from 1921 to 1939, during which it was a part of Czechoslovakia) without, however, losing her cultural and linguistic traditions.

Being a poor country she was unable to develop her cultural life and was incapable of spreading it beyond her frontier.

The cohabitation, which lasted nearly seven centuries, had naturally introduced certain traditions and certain spiritual tendencies into the life of this small people which, at least in appearance, bring them near to the Magyar people.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century a x/175 cultural renaissance of Russian tendencies makes its appearance in Sub-Carpathian Russia.

It was the epoch of the 'Vormaerz' in Austria, during which the revolution of 1848 developed. The national awakening of all the Slavonic people of the old Danubian Monarchy was in full development, while at the same time Hungarian nationalism, which found itself immediately in conflict with all the Slavs in general, was also awakening.

The Cabinet of Vienna was often more liberal towards the claims of the Slavonic people than was the Hungarian nationalism. Even at the last hour, when the Emperor Charles, during the World War, made the supreme effort to save the empire by federalizing it, it was still the Hungarian intransigence which made this manœuvre of salvation fail at the eleventh hour.

Now Sub-Carpathian Russia was definitely a Hungarian territory, and for that reason the intention of Russia in suppressing the Hungarian revolution in 1849 had brought about consequences in the small Carpathian country which the St. Petersburg Cabinet was certainly far from discounting. The population of Sub-Carpathian Russia quickly recognized blood brothers in the Russian troops of General Paskewicz, come to deliver them from Magyar oppression.

The Imperial Austrian Commissioner attached to the Russian armies, Dobryansky, himself a native of Sub-Carpathian Russia, saw things just from this angle. His contacts with the Russians during the intervention induced him later to become the mouthpiece and the organizer of the Russian national renaissance in his native land.

One knows that, during the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, the help of the Slavs in general was of small value to the Austrian Government. For this reason Vienna could see no objection to forming the four northern *comitats* (districts) of Hungary into an autonomous Carpatho-Russian 'land' of which Dobryansky became governor.

This autonomous regime lasted some twenty years, a time which sufficed for a definite orientation of the Carpatho-Russian people towards the Russian civilization. The first schools, teaching only in literary Russian, appeared, and a Russian literature began in the Carpathians and even produced a poet of real merit, Doukhnovitch, whose name has remained for ever a part of the tradition and Russian consciousness of the people of the Carpathian mountains.

In 1867, at the moment of the compromise with Hungary, the Government of Vienna nevertheless sacrificed the autonomy of Sub-Carpathian Russia, which became an integral part of the Hungarian State, now centralized and extremely nationalist.

It is then that a magyarization began, supported by all the forces of the Hungarian State. Almost the entire thin layer of Carpatho-Russian intellectuals became its prey. Instruction was only given in Hungarian, the popular masses, now remaining without leaders, were abandoned to poverty and ignorance. The percentage of illiterates in the country rose, until the beginning of the twentieth century, to 60 per cent. There were entire villages in which not a single inhabitant could read or write.

Nevertheless the national spirit did not become extinguished. Some priests, faithful to their nationality, made great efforts to edit Russian pamphlets and leaflets for the benefit of the peasants. Gradually a new layer of intellectuals was formed. Beginning with the eighties of the last century, there were circles of Carpatho-Russian students in Vienna who were conscious of their x/175 nationality. Russian periodicals, *Nauka* and *Russkaya Pravda*, were published. We will see how, on the eve of the Great War, the consciousness of belonging to the Great Russian world and the national sentiment were stronger than ever in the Carpathians and have remained intact there to this day. If Communism has had a certain amount of success in Sub-Carpathian Russia, it is only because it was Russian and came from Moscow. The rustic simplicity of the Carpathian peasants could not distinguish between the national and the social idea, but accepted them because they were Russian.

It is well to note that no cultural or other Ukrainian movement existed in the territory of this small country until its inclusion, by the Treaty of Saint-Germain in 1921, in Czechoslovakia. There is no serious documentation concerning the rarest traces of this movement.

Lately it has experienced an insignificant development and has become known to the world only after the Munich agreement.

CHAPTER III

THE LITERARY, INTELLECTUAL, AND ARTISTIC UKRAINE

IT becomes apparent from the preceding chapters 177 that the influences of the western neighbours, due to the geographical position and to historic development, have always been more pronounced in the Ukraine than in Northern Russia. We also find Polish and even German influences in the Ukrainian language, literature, folk-lore, and art, which had developed on the foundation of the old indivisible mediæval Russia.

The Ukrainian idiom belongs to the Russian family 197 and even to the Eastern Slavonic family, which is almost the same thing. One of the most characteristic features which distinguish all the Russian idioms and the literary Russian language from other Slav languages, both western and southern, is the appearance of a new vowel between two or more consonants. For example, *gorod* (town) instead of *grad*, *molod* (young) instead of *mlad*, is constantly met with in Ukrainian. One could even say that it is Ukrainian which has encouraged this evolution, which was somewhat retarded in literary Russian by the stronger influences of old Slavonic.

Certain grammatical peculiarities of old Russian, greatly simplified in Great Russian, have been preserved in Ukrainian, such as the 'i' at the end of the infinitive. For example, to give *davat'* in Russian, *davati* in Ukrainian. There are also some peculiarities in the pronunciation. It seems that the 'g' was pronounced as an 'h' in old Russian, very strongly exhaled in the

197 German manner, as one pronounces it in the Ukraine. In Great Russia it has become a 'gu' quite similar to the Latin 'g.' The two ways of pronouncing this letter immediately allow one to recognize the southern or northern origin of Russians. The *yat* of old Russian, fused with the plain 'e' in Great Russian, has in all cases become 'i' in Ukrainian. Thus *khleb* (bread) in Russian is *khlib* in Ukrainian. In this case we witness a very clear geographical differentiation of a formerly identical pronunciation.

On the other hand a large number of words which still exist in the Great Russian tongue and in literary Russian have been replaced in Ukrainian by words borrowed from Polish or, through it, from German. The Polish domination in the Ukraine and the many and prolonged contacts between the Ukrainians and the Poles have led to the direct introduction of many Polish words, pronounced in a slightly different way, into the Ukrainian language.

Notwithstanding all the differences between Great Russian and Ukrainian during the whole nineteenth century, the latter was considered simply a Russian dialect. German scholars, who were then authorities in philological matters, and even Polish scholars like Siarczinski, were the champions of this point of view. Yet on 20 February 1906 the Russian Imperial Academy, true to its tradition of impartiality and independence in scientific questions, decided, by a majority of one, that Ukrainian was really a special language and not simply a Russian dialect. It is well to remember that during the sixteenth century the old Slavonic began to be replaced by more modern forms and such that were nearer to the local dialect, in Southern Russia, which formed a new written language. The evolution of the written language in Muscovy, on the contrary, where the old archaic Slavonic still continued to exist during the seventeenth century, took place much later, and it is Kiev which had given the start to this evolution which ended only in the nineteenth century.

Leaving Sub-Carpathian Russia aside, where the idiom is very similar to ordinary Russian, with only a few peculiarities of pronunciation and where the written language is quite simply the Russian literary language, one can distinguish three different dialects in the Ukraine : that of the north, that of the south, and that of the west. The first, spoken in Polesia and in the wooded parts of the old lands of Kiev and Tchernigov, is that which is most nearly related to Great Russian. The dialect of the south used in all the territories of the Steppe, colonized during the last centuries, is the one which has become the foundation of literary Ukrainian. Finally the dialect of the west, spoken in Galicia and the territories which lie along the border of the old Russian Empire (the land of Kholm, in Volynia and in part of Podolia), has been the most corrupted by the Germano-Polo-Latin influences and has borrowed the greatest number of words to replace the corresponding expressions in old Russian.

But since Galicia has become the real centre of the Ukrainian movement, with a pronounced tendency of escaping as much as possible from all that which is Russian, the literary Ukrainian language has become more and more related to the Galician dialect of the west, which has, as a result of the abundance of Polish expressions, made it more difficult to understand not only by Great Russians but also by Russian Ukrainians.

One has seen, during the period of the German occupation of 1918, that the peasants of Central Ukraine had some difficulty in understanding this Galician idiom. To make themselves understood by the Eastern

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197 Ukrainians, the German and Austrian authorities had to use Russian interpreters instead of Ukrainian ones from Galicia. Trained at the Ukrainian University of Lvov, founded by the Austrian Government, and belonging to another religion, being 'uniats' and non-Orthodox, the Galician men of letters, scientists and politicians who invaded the Ukraine after the Revolution of 1917, appeared as foreigners to the native population.

538 In popular Ukrainian poetry one finds no trace of the epic poem of the Russia of Kiev, of which the 'Tales of the Companions of Igor,' written in a language which was still very close to old Slavonic, is a magnificent example. The epic songs of the flourishing epoch of the State of Kiev, still bearing traces of the mixture of Christian and remnants of old pagan conceptions, have been perpetuated far into the north. They are the *byliny*, songs of St. Vladimir and his companions, which were accompanied by some acting, and which the popular *skazitels* still sing in the most distant North Russian lands in the forests on the shore of the White Sea. In the Ukraine a popular epic poetry of a new kind, based on subjects which have not been published, has appeared, inspired by the Cossack struggles. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have left us a few examples.

This poetry is highly lyrical, noble, and melancholy and has developed especially in the following century. It still lives to our days, known under the name of '*doumy*.' Although it speaks of epic deeds, this poetry is profoundly distinguished by that lyricism which characterizes the whole popular Ukrainian poetic art.

[533] 177 Like all the languages of the Russian family, Ukrainian adapts itself wonderfully to song. It is the Ukraine which has taught the whole of Russia the polyphonic song, which even penetrated to the remotest corners of the Russian land. It is possible that this song itself was early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of Western music.

early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of Western music. 000

We already know that the beginnings of Ukrainian literature, during the epoch of the State of Kiev, are completely interwoven with those of Russian literature. It is at the end of the sixteenth century that one should look for the first example of a literature already written in a noticeably vulgarized form and which approaches modern Ukrainian. 533

The struggles which followed the religious union of 1596 were accompanied by an intense literary activity in the Ukraine which served almost exclusively polemic ends. The cause of Orthodoxy being that of the lower classes after the defection of a great part of the clergy and of the old aristocracy, it was of necessity that its defenders had to turn to the people. We can also note a broad democratization of ideas in the writings emanating from the Orthodox camp, which favoured the use of a language which one tried to make as intelligible as possible to the masses. 197

The Orthodox were at first fundamentally opposed to the use of Latin, which their adversaries wished to impose upon them. 'It is because the Slavonic language is the most fertile and the most loved by God, that the devil rises against it, since, by means of simple and diligent reading, it leads towards God, without pagan malice, such as the grammar, the rhetoric, and the dialectic,' wrote the defender of Orthodoxy, the monk of Mount Athos, John Vichinsky, in revolting against the literary code of the Jesuits who were quite strange to the popular soul. He appealed to the people :

'It is better for you to go to church without bishops and priests influenced by the devil, and to guard the purity of Orthodoxy, rather than to blaspheme it and to trample upon it in going to church with bishops and

791 priests who are no longer those of God' . . . and he called upon the high clergy to preach the Evangelical Fraternity of all men: 'Have you the right to call yourselves pastors of the Church and even to consider yourselves simply the faithful, if you despise your brother who is born, like you, of the baptismal water and devotion? Be he a serf, a skinner, a sadler, or a tailor, he is your brother, your equal.'

The old Slavonic, so much defended, was not after all sufficiently acceptable as a language of the 'serfs, skinners, sadlers, and tailors' for whom it was meant. Vichinsky was really among the first who brought their Slavonic nearer to the popular idiom. Others followed his example, among them Smotritsky and Zizany.

These beginnings of a broadly popularized literature in a language which was already being called 'Russian' and which we can consider as the old Ukrainian, nevertheless had no future. The intellectual evolution of Southern Russia took another course. Orthodoxy emerged victorious from the struggles which she had to endure, but at the same time she widely adopted, in the Ukraine, the literary forms and the ambiguous style of her adversaries, which excluded or strongly hindered the popular influences.

793 It is the name of the Metropolitan Peter Mohila, one of the most remarkable representatives of Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century, which remains bound up with the new tendency of influencing intellectual Orthodox life by Latin scholasticism. Himself a descendant of a noble family of Moldavia, Mohila did not have the same bonds with the popular Ukrainian masses as the Orthodox preachers of the first heroic struggles. Very energetic, haughty, extremely violent in the method of his actions (according to his contemporaries he never hesitated to expel those monks who angered him from the monasteries,

nor to beat the superior of a monastery to such an extent 793
that the unfortunate one died a short time after), Mohila was the personification of the reaction against the democracy of the preceding epoch in the bosom of Orthodoxy. When still an Archimandrite of the 538
Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, he established there, at his own expense, a school which was afterwards to become the famous Kiev Academy. It was to Rome that he sent those monks to study who were destined to become the first teachers, and it was from Latin that he translated his *Ritual*, a book which was read throughout Russia. As a result the people of Kiev became disturbed on learning that the teaching of the Academy was that of Latin scholasticism, and that the Latin language occupied a predominant place.

Greek and Latin naturally remained subjects of teaching, but the whole religious literature suffered from the effect of the forms of eloquence which were then being used in the Catholic world.

We know the role which was played by the Academy [874]
of Kiev in the development of Imperial Russian civilization, and it was Mohila himself who first proposed, though prematurely, in 1640, to found a school on the Kiev model in Moscow. But the artificial character of the religious literature, of which the Academy was the centre, delayed for long the blossoming of literary genius in the Ukraine.

The current of popular inspiration having been slowed down, that which was printed in the eighteenth century had almost no literary or national value. The famous printing press of the Monastery of Potchaiev, in Western Volynia, generally limited itself to editing the books required for divine service in old Slavonic. Amongst its other publications only the collection of religious poems, the 'Bogoglasnik,' presents some

538 interest owing to the traces of popular influences which bring them nearer to the lyrical Ukrainian poetry.

536 It is only in the domain of dramatic art that the national originality could still find expression. For example, the Mysteries and the Fables of the West, the first Ukrainian theatre, is in the beginning the work of clergy who want to edify the people while entertaining them. The students of the Academy of Kiev are its first dramatists, playwrights, and producers. And, just as in the West, it soon loses its serious and strictly religious character. The element of entertainment becomes more and more pronounced. The people acquire a taste for these marionette performances which soon become a truly national amusement. At first they usually represented the Crib of the Nativity and all the events which took place around it. The name of ' Crib ' (*vertep*) remained connected with them for ever. But the Madonna and the Child Jesus were soon supplanted by comical characters such as the Devil, the Vagabond Priest, the sly peasant, and the schemer. The social satire, a direct product of popular feeling, became the real purpose of these marionette performances and on holidays and at fairs the people crowded to see them. The Dwarfs Theatre in the Ukraine so pleased the Tsar Alexis of Moscow that he ordered the establishment of ' Comedy Plays ' in the theatre of his summer residence, and this despite the protestations, the indignation, and the anathemas of the Muscovite clergy.

538 It is at the end of the eighteenth century that the intellectual and cultural movement in the Ukraine first appears. Ivan Kotliarevsky, considered the ' Father of Ukrainian literature,' called himself ' a simple amateur of the Little Russian tongue.' In reality it is the love of poetic folk-lore which characterizes modern Ukrainian literature, and it is that which labels it among local

Russian literatures. It is in this spirit that Kotliarevsky 538
published his comic poem, the *Travesty of Aeneid*, in 1798, the first great Ukrainian literary work, followed by a light comedy, *Natalka Poltavka*, which had a great success in Russia during a century and which is played to-day in all the countries of the Ukrainian language. Under the influence of German romanticism a particular interest arose in the Russian literary world for all that which was connected with the folk-lore, the language, and the customs of the people, as well as for their traditions and their art. Thus the first efforts of Kotliarevsky were well received by the literary circles of St. Petersburg and his *Travesty of Aeneid* remained one of the favourite readings of several Russian generations.

Encouraged by the great Slavophile movement which broke with all exaggerated Westernization, Russian writers turned to all the manifestations of the popular genius and, quite naturally, also to that of the Ukraine.

Just as in the eighteenth century the religious language and culture of Southern Russia had brought about the literary awakening of Moscow, in allowing the Russian language to free itself from its archaic forms, so, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ukraine, her romantic past, the charm of her nature, and of her popular life, inspired Russian literature and poetry. The same period saw the birth of two Ukrainian geniuses who for ever occupy places of a high order in universal literature : Gogol (1809–52) and Chevtchenko (1814–61).
Nicholas Gogol wrote only in Russian, not because he 538
was forced to do so by some exterior factors, or because 192
he ignored Ukrainian, but because the greatness and the diversity of his talent passed beyond the possibilities of expression of the literary Ukrainian language. Despite the picturesqueness and the indisputable richness of its forms, this language never went beyond the literary

538 form of popular idiom. Thus, in the domain of literary,
192 scientific, philosophic, and technical vocabulary, it is incomparably less developed than the Russian language. The pictures of town life, of the life of the upper layers of society, which dominated, during the whole of the nineteenth century, as the subject of imaginative writings and particularly of the novel, are not easily expressed in the Ukrainian language. Some expressions and words, necessary for this, are missing. We even take the liberty of expressing the opinion, which may seem bold, that the reading of *Crime and Punishment*, of *War and Peace*, of *Oblomov*, or of *Dead Souls* in Russian would be of greater value to a Ukrainian than the translation of these works into his mother-tongue. Moreover, the translations of these immortal works into other great European languages seem to us to be closer to the form, the contents, and the ideas expressed by them than their translations into the Ukrainian language, which so much resembles Russian. Therefore every work of Gogol belongs, without any doubt, to the Russian literature without being, for this reason, foreign
538 to the Ukrainian world. A traditionalist, profoundly pious, to a point of being irritated by the Russian 'Intelligentsia,' already imbued with positivist ideas, he loved the whole Russia with an ardent and passionate love. He was hurt by the spectacle of desertions and cowardice which characterized the Russian life of his time, of all those open wounds which he was able to distinguish and to depict with an unrivalled sarcasm. Like the Slavophiles and later Dostoievski, he hoped that the salvation would come from the deeper forces dormant in the Orthodox Church and in the Russian Monarchy. The Ukrainian chauvinists of our day sometimes describe him as a renegade, an opinion which it is unnecessary to contradict. One only has to re-read

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his works consecrated to the Ukraine to feel the love Gogol felt for his native land, for the popular Ukrainian soul, and for her heroic and romantic traditions. Rather let us allow the present-day Ukrainian politician, M. Alexander Shoulgine, to speak, who has written in his book, *The Ukraine against Moscow*, the title of which already indicates his hostility to Russia: 'Could I ever remember without a pang what I felt each time in my childhood, on hearing or reading *The Vigils of the Ukraine* or the history of the tragic struggle of *Taras Boulba*.' And he added that many Ukrainians have confessed to him to the 'awakening of their patriotic feeling' when reading these works. Does not this remark, coming from a convinced separatist, confirm that Russian language suffices to awaken in a Ukrainian his most intimate, most secret passions of the soul? If the Ukrainian language is dear and indispensable to a Ukrainian, he is equally in need of Russian. It opens to him the broader spiritual and intellectual horizons and unites him with the community of great peoples. In this the closeness of Russian and Ukrainian literature gives the Ukrainians a position far superior to that of the small Slavonic nations such as the Slovaks, Serbs, or Slovenes. And the fanatics who make themselves ridiculous by treating Gogol as a renegade, are they not similar to the French Provençals, admirers of the Mistral, who would reproach a Jean Giono for writing in French and not in Provençal?

On the contrary, Taras Chevtchenko, who was considered the model of Ukrainianism, wrote in Southern Ukrainian. Born of a family of serfs and himself a serf in his early youth, he has carried the force of poetic expression of the Ukrainian language to a point which had not been reached before and which has not been equalled since. The sadness of the life of the peasant

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538 serfs, the dreams of past glories, such as they live in the popular songs, are the principal themes of Chevtchenko. We find in them both romanticism and a strong expression of social aspirations. In placing Chevtchenko on the level of the greatest European poets we are obliged to state that the subjects which inspire his poetical works are more limited than those of a Poushkine or a Mickiewicz.

Chevtchenko, the peasant and man of the people, was an instinctive revolutionary in the political sense of the term. He revolts against autocracy and against the lords, and with all his force he appeals for aid for his oppressed brothers and for the struggle for freedom which fascinates him. Though his poetic feeling was high and his lyricism rich, his subjects never go beyond the limited circle of the struggles of the serfs with the lords. One can easily imagine the effect which his poems produced in the circles of the Russian intelligentsia, in which he had been triumphantly received, as they were also dreaming of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.

668 538 The Universities of Kharkov and of Kiev, founded by the Imperial Government, one in 1805 and the other in 1834, were the rallying centres of the intellectual movements of Southern Russia. They produced the celebrated historian Kostomarov, who became the spokesman of Liberalism and of the cultural awakening of the Ukraine.

The active enthusiasm of these young intellectuals with revolutionary tendencies led to the creation of a secret society in Kiev, the 'Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius,' which was almost immediately discovered by the police. The conspirators took the road to Siberia. In 1847 Chevtchenko was condemned to seven years of service as a simple soldier in a far-away garrison. This relatively light sentence—followed, it is true, by the prohibition of writing and painting (he was a painter of talent at the same time as a poet)—was

imposed on a revolutionary with destructive ideas and 668
not on a nationalist Ukrainian. It is only after the 538
accession of the Emperor Alexander II in 1855, when a more Liberal mood became apparent in Russia, that the deportees of Kiev were able to return to Europe.

Some years later Chevtchenko died. Kostomarov, on the contrary, settled at the University of St. Petersburg where, during long years, he wrote his great historical works. Having become a well-known historian and, with age, more moderate, he nevertheless remained, during the whole of his life, a regionalist patriot of the Ukraine, which he wanted to see included in the framework of a great Russian Federation governed by Liberal principals. Even the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, despite its revolutionary extremism, had had no more than federalist ideas and had never dreamed of the separation of the Ukraine from Russia. This is confirmed by the Ukrainian historian of note, M. E. Borschak, in his interesting study, published in the *Slav World*. He writes that 'the Ukrainian movement was then free of any ideas of separatism, of which we did not find any traces when analysing its ideology.'

Let us repeat again: The struggle, in the Ukraine as in the whole of Russia, was begun in the name of Liberalism and of Social Reform against an existing political and social order, not against Russia in the name of the Ukraine, and in this the Ukrainian movement differed deeply from the national movements of the ethnically non-Russian groups. At the time when thousands of Poles, poor and rich, peasants and aristocrats, socialists or monarchists, were being deported to Siberia for wishing to separate Poland from Russia, *not a single Ukrainian* joined the convoys of political deportees as a partisan of the autonomy or the independence of his country. If thousands of Ukrainians settled in the

668 Siberian *taiga*, it was for having been republicans or
538 socialists or for having struggled against Tsarism but not against Russia.

538 Sometimes it is claimed that Chevtchenko was personally hostile to everything Russian. But he seems to have been nothing of the kind. An admirer of the 'noble spirit' of Gogol, Chevtchenko himself wrote his personal diary in Russian and he has left us no less than eleven novels and some poetry written in the same language, of which two poems were written before his exile. By conviction and by temperament a revolutionary, Chevtchenko felt himself intimately united with the opposition circles in Great Russia and belonged, as such, to the great family of Russian men of letters.

[609] On the other hand, always true to the popular feelings and sharing with the Ukrainian peasants the hostility towards the German and particularly towards the estate-owners and the school-teachers, he vituperates, in his *Epistle to Compatriots*, against their subjection to German intellectual and cultural influence. When speaking of his young compatriots he says that they blamed their parents 'as they have not taught them to chatter in German in their childhood.' And Chevtchenko laments that 'Ukraine, such are your sons, your young flowers, watered with ink in the German hothouses.' He equally revolts against the vanity of Ukrainian youth, taught by German scholars of whose infallibility they are convinced :

> 'I have seen everything, I know everything.
> There is no hell nor paradise,
> Nor God :
> There is nought but I,
> And the small angular German,
> And nothing more. This is enough, little brother,
> But what do you represent in reality ?
> . . . As the German says : we do not know.'

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Sometimes these laments bear a character of bitter irony. The pretended infallibility of German opinion concerning the fate and the history of the Ukrainian people exasperates him. 'The German will tell you: You are Mongolians. Yes, Mongolians, nude descendants of Tamerlaine clothed in gold. The German will tell you: You are Slavs. Yes, Slavs, unworthy great-grandsons of glorious ancestors.' 538

While ironizing about the faithful pupils of the German school he continues: 'They spoke according to German precepts in such a way that the German himself, though a great professor, could understand nothing of it . . . at Sitch the German, full of wisdom, grows the potato and you buy it and eat it for your health and you glorify the Zaporoges . . . but by whose blood has this earth been fertilized to produce the potatoes? . . . Her own children have led the Ukraine to the edge of the precipice, they have crucified her worse than the Poles, they want to teach them, at least they pretend it . . . they want to train this blind old man which is the Ukraine under German influence.' (*Kobzar.*)

For him the German question was not only one of literature since he, his sister, and his two brothers were serfs of the German estate-owner Engelhardt, who was noted for his coarseness and the absence of any culture.

The Liberal era which began in Russia with the accession of Alexander II gave broad satisfaction to the aspirations of the circles of the former opposition. The liberation of the serfs in 1861, the inauguration of municipalities elected by the people, the radical reforms based on the permanence of judges, and the establishment of juries and judicial guarantees, eliminated the major reasons for the old revolutionary leanings. A wide movement of reconciliation began to develop which would probably have benefited the Ukraine as 668 175

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668 well as the whole empire. The Imperial Government
175 was clearly inclined to the idea of a regime of constitutional monarchy, based on the cultural autonomy of the various Russian territories and on the application of sufficiently broad systems of political autonomy to the ethnically non-Russian majorities.

As before, the Government was in no way opposed to the publication of books and journals in the Ukrainian language.

000 This whole evolution was compromised by the Polish insurrection of 1863. One knows that in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Alexander I committed the mistake which the great Catherine had taken care to avoid at the moment of the partition of Poland. He annexed the greater part of the ethnically Polish territory, the Grand duchy of Warsaw. Despite all the attempts at the establishment of an autonomous regime, the 'Polish question' became henceforth the most vulnerable point of internal Russian policy. During the Liberal era of Alexander II the autonomous political regime was naturally intended to be applied first of all to Poland. Nothing came of this attempt except a new and violent Polish insurrection. The insurgents, traditionally attached to the old conception of the Great Poland of former times, maintained the old pretensions to the Ukraine and White Russia. The programme of Prince Adam Czartoryski, the forerunner of the Polish insurrectionist movement, envisaged the co-ordination of the Polish and Ukrainian movement, the latter to be included in the plan of the Polish insurrection, in order to shake the omnipotence of the Russian Empire and to create a Slavonic federation under the direction of a Great Poland on her ruins ! The efforts to draw the Ukrainian and the White Russian peasants towards her were to experience a fatal check; the peasants did all they could to facilitate the task of

the Government in the struggle with their secular enemy—the Poles. The attempt of the insurgents to join hands with the Ukrainian intellectual circles also led nowhere. Kostomarov answered them by literally telling them to go to the devil. It confirmed a complete ignorance of the Poles of the true history of the Ukraine and of White Russia.

But the Polish insurrection, although checked, warned the Imperial Government. Russian historians generally agree in recognizing that it was the Polish insurrection of 1863 which made it abandon its plans of reform and awakened its mistrust of Liberal ideas and also of any autonomism.

On 8 June 1863, when the Polish insurrection was at its height, the Minister for Internal Affairs, Valouiev, issued the famous circular which declared that the Ukrainian language was 'only Russian, corrupted by Polish influence.' From this he deduced that 'there had never been a Little Russian language, that there is none and that there never could be one.' He ordered that nothing further should be published in Ukrainian except, however, purely literary works.

There can be no doubt that the Government committed a fundamental mistake, in our judgment inexcusable, in employing an arbitrary measure which was so grossly a police one and so short-sighted. Nevertheless, if it could not be excused, the Government could find an explanation in its distrust of the plan of Polish-Ukrainian collaboration which was inspired by the programme of Prince Czartoryski. Yet the Russian Government had every opportunity of leaning on the support of Ukrainianism, essentially hostile by its tradition and its instinct to Poland, against militant Polonism. But it did the contrary, it became more and more hostile to Liberal ideas. The Government soon

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000 lent its other ear to the Polish landowners who described the Ukrainian peasants as fomentors of trouble, aiming at the overthrow of the existing agrarian order, which offered great advantages to the Polish nobility.

204 As a result of the circular of Valouiev,[1] publications in the Ukrainian language almost ceased in Russia. The review *Osnova*, which had been the rallying centre of Ukrainian intellectuals, was closed. As a result there was an almost total eclipse, for several decades and almost until the Revolution, of the Ukrainian journalistic movement in Russia. Nevertheless some periodicals appeared, among which *Ukrainskaia Jizn* (Ukrainian Life), edited in Russian at St. Petersburg by that same Simon Petlioura who later became the chief of the insurrectionary Ukrainian movement against the forces of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, and who was assassinated in Paris in 1926. But now, in the place of a cultural Ukrainianism, there formed, on the other side of the frontier, in Galicia, a political Ukrainian movement which was openly anti-Russian and even aimed at the separation of the Ukraine from the rest of Russia.

175 Henceforth Galicia played the role of the Ukrainian 'Piedmont.' We know that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Galicia had been the real centre of Russian resistance in Poland. But after the armistice of Androussovo which, in giving Kiev to Russia, had nevertheless left the land of Halytch under Polish domination, many things had changed there. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Poland had reached the aim never yet achieved before: the definite union of the Orthodox Church in Galicia with Rome was introduced. The last attempts at resistance of the old Russian brotherhoods, now fallen into decadence, did not suffice to prevent it. The direction of religious affairs passed to the Poles and to Polonized Russians who

[1] [i.e. the circlular which declared that the Ukrainian language was 'only Russian, corrupted by Polish influence'--Analyst]

were so detached from the popular masses that often they did not understand the Slavonic language in which, however, they had to read the liturgy of the Eastern rite. This led immediately to a terrible decadence of religious instruction among the people, an instruction which had, during centuries, been the backbone of national resistance.

The later evolution which followed soon showed that the Polish State had never been concerned with religious unity in the matter of dogmas but much more with the total denationalization of the Russian people. The Church of the Eastern rite remained in Poland in a position of political and social inferiority, even after its union with Rome. The Poles wanted to achieve a complete latinization of the Church, that is to say a total Polonization of their Russian subjects. As a result the Uniat Church, remaining a more or less persecuted Church because it maintained that ancient national rite, was gradually transformed into a guardian of national traditions in general and became in Galicia the last bastion of resistance to the invading Polonism, thus reassuming the role of the Russian Orthodox Church of former times.

But, dogmatically separated from the Russian Church, she could not direct herself towards Moscow and, later, towards St. Petersburg as easily as the Orthodox Church of Eastern Ukraine had done it. This was all the more so as the Empire continued to consider her as being suspect of Polonism to such a point that she was interdicted on Russian territory (decree of Nicholas I of 1839). This suspicion did great harm to the Russian cause in Galicia even during the Great War. Only a new and violent Polish persecution was required—that which raged in Galicia just before the present war—to induce the Orthodox and the Uniats to unite in a common wish for resistance. We shall return to this question later.

Nevertheless the hopes which were founded on the power of the Russian Empire never ceased entirely to manifest themselves in Galicia. They were alive at the moment when Austria seized this territory during the partition of Poland. That was understood at Vienna, and to ward off this danger the Austrian Government adopted a clever policy of attempting to favour the development of a separatist national consciousness among the Russians of the 'Kingdom of Galicia.' Vienna immediately displayed a Liberalism towards the Uniat Church such as Poland had never shown. This had the effect of raising the level of religious instruction among the clergy and the people. In putting the difference which existed between the Uniat Church of Galicia and the Russian Orthodox Church into relief, the Austrian Government tried to give the word 'Ruthenian' a meaning which opposed it to the conception of 'Russian.' It did not prevent publications in the local language, especially religious ones, but it did not allow the penetration of the language and the influence of the immense empire of the east.

The struggle between the Poles and the 'Ruthenians' continued, however, in other forms under the Austrian domination. The Polish element had always been represented by the great landowners, the clergy of the Latin rite, and by a great part of the middle classes of the towns, whereas on the other side were the peasant masses and the Uniat clergy of the Slavonic rite. The first great political shock in Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian revolution of 1848, could, therefore, be nothing but a new episode in this region of the now four times secular struggle with Polonism.

The Danubian Monarchy, frightened by the rising of

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the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Poles, allied itself 175 at this moment with the anti-Polish Ruthenian movement, just as it allied itself at the same time with the Czechs and the Croatians. The greater part of the promises of the Austrian Government, given under the pressure of revolutionary events, were not kept afterwards. This applied particularly to those promises which concerned the partition of Galicia into two provinces, that of Polish Cracov and of Ruthenian Eastern Galicia.

Nevertheless this 'springtime,' although of short duration, did not fail to awaken the hopes which had survived so long and which helped the task of Austrian policy. An important social consequence emerged from the events of 1848: the abolition of serfdom thirteen years before the emancipation of the serfs in Russia.

In the following decades Austrian policy developed cleverly between the Poles and the Hungarians, although more inclined towards the first who were more conservative from the social point of view and, consequently, more in tune with the general lines of the policy of Vienna.

The Ruthenian language and instruction continued to enjoy a certain liberty on condition that they did not fall under Pan-Russian influences.

Austrian policy at least had the merit of allowing the 517 Ukrainian language and culture to develop and thus to give birth to an imaginative literature and to a journalistic movement of some importance, having its centre at Lvov, which became the nucleus of Ukrainian intellectual life. Numerous cultural institutions appeared one after another; journals, reviews, literary circles, and finally the Ruthenian University of Lvov.

After the measures of restriction which were taken against Ukrainianism in Russia, the intellectual circles of

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517 the Russian Ukraine had resource to Galician publications and, from time to time, they published their own works in that country. It is as a result of this that the Chevtchenko Society was founded at Lvov, which has since held the predominant place in the Ukrainian movement.

Following the example of Chevtchenko, another influence joined the popular so to say 'folk-lore' tendency of the literary Ukrainian movement: it was the social question, identical with that which dominated the literary spirit of the whole of Russia.

565 668 The second half of the eighteenth century, which had seen the union of Western Ukraine with Russia and the colonization of the shores of the Black Sea, was at the same time the epoch of the greatest development of the privileges of the aristocracy. We shall not be able to go into the details of this evolution, which would go far beyond the purpose of this book. Let us only note that after the death of Peter the Great in 1725 the new nobility, of military origin, became the greatest political force in the State. This nobility definitely emancipated itself from its old bondage to the State and at the same time transformed the dependence of the peasants, which had hitherto not been unconditional, into a real servitude. Thus Catherine II established in Russia, as also in the Ukraine, a new political and social order which was founded on the privileged position of the aristocracy which had carried her to power, and on the servitude of the peasants. She conferred similar rights on the Ukrainian nobility as those of the aristocracy of the whole empire and, moreover, liberally distributed the new lands to the landlords. Since that time the question of the servitude of the peasants, a distant but direct prelude of the Revolution, became an open wound of the Tsarist regime.

One knows that the movement of ideas aiming at the 668
abolition of servitude began to appear in the higher 186
layers of society at the epoch of the Napoleonic War. Quite naturally it appeared together with an interest for everything popular and was, at the same time, inspired by the ideas fashionable in the West: on the one hand encyclopædism and voltairianism and on the other freemasonry and carbonarism. It could not fail to spread in the Ukraine, as elsewhere.

Thus a secret society, the 'United Slavs,' was formed, among whose members were not only Ukrainian officers and officials, but also actual Great Russians. A naïve romanticism reigned—oaths were sworn on swords and speeches made in the style of Plutarch, associated with a passionate love of popular traditions and with the desire to lighten the destiny of the peasant masses under the burden of servitude. Following the example of the romantic revolutionaries of the West, the young conspirators dreamed of the epochs of the past and of the Cossack epics, the heroes of which appeared to them as champions of liberty. Kotliarevsky himself, without belonging to the 'United Slavs,' was intimately connected with masonic circles, and his amazing pamphlet, *Travesty of Aeneid*, already denounced the social weaknesses and injustices of the epoch.

Conforming to the ideas of romantic and revolutionary nationalism, the 'United Slavs' aimed at a republican and democratic federation of all the Slavs. Their pro-Ukrainianism represented only a link in the Pan-Slav revolutionary chain, and it was diametrically opposed to a rupture between the Ukraine and Great Russia. One of the principal chiefs of the Ukrainian movement, Gorbatchevsky, wrote in his memoirs, in Russian, that the success of the insurrection 'might have signified a new era in the history of the Russian people.'

668 186 The society of the 'United Slavs' was only one expression of the great liberating movement, and its failure was the logical consequence of the suppression of the Decembrist insurrection at St. Petersburg on 14 December 1825, which gave it its name.

This failure checked for a long time the attempts of political revolt in the whole of Russia. Nevertheless the intellectual movement continued, always inspired by the same sources and the same ideals.

538 The genius of Chevtchenko determined the path which the whole Ukrainian literature was to follow. It clung especially to the description of popular life, of the peasant life with its sadness and its injustices. Deeply steeped in folk-lore, it was especially inspired by the pity of the disinherited, by this social pity which is a feature of its affinity with the great Russian literature. In the writings of Marko Vovtchok (pen-name of Marie Vilinska Markovitch) in the *Popular Tales*, approved by Chevtchenko himself, we find again the touching picture of the peasant miseries. Later, in Galicia, Franko, Martovitch, and Stefanik give some pretty examples of this literature, more social than national. Parallel to this, in Russian Ukraine, this tradition was pursued until the revolution by Kotsiubinsky, Tobilevitch, and, above all, by Lessia Oukrainka, the niece of Michael Dragomanov, to whom we will presently return.

536 545 The Ukrainian Theatre experienced a remarkable development towards the end of the nineteenth century. We have already considered the taste of the Ukrainian people for dramatic art, a taste which had already found expression in the old marionette plays. The rise of the new Ukrainian literature could not fail to bring about the development of a modern theatre. As a result a troupe of Ukrainian actors, that of Kropivnitzky, was formed at Kiev and had a great success. The Imperial

Government authorized the creation of a Ukrainian 536
language theatre, limiting, however, the subjects which 545
could be treated. In conforming to the official point of view, according to which Ukrainian was only a local Russian dialect, it forbade the showing of plays other than those which bore a popular and local character. But this restriction could not seriously hinder the development of Ukrainian dramatic art, as it was the chief aim of the whole Ukrainian literature to treat subjects taken from the popular life. The success of the Ukrainian Theatre of Kiev did not fail to find imitators. Amateur troupes were formed almost in all parts of Russia and especially in the country, which successfully exploited the artistic qualities of a people so richly gifted.

As for Galicia, the political movement always 668
continued to develop rapidly here.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new figure appeared on the Ukrainian political arena, that of Dragomanov (1851–95), whose role was to become enormous.

Born in Russian Ukraine, he soon joined the intellectual revolutionary circles. Following the example of other revolutionary organizations in Russia, that of *Stara Gromada* of Dragomanov sent him abroad to spread there, as a political *émigré*, the ideas of a revolutionary Ukrainianism. Dragomanov at first allied himself with the Galician circles and settled in Austria, but he could not remain here as a result of his ‘ too red ’ ideas. After this he took the road to Geneva, the rallying centre of political *émigrés* from the old Russia. There he founded a political review, *Gromada*, and undertook, from his exile in Geneva, the direction of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia. The impulse which he gave it was extremely vigorous. It led to the formation of a new party, tinted

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 with radicalism, the Popular Ukrainian Party, which broke with the old clerical traditions of Galician Ukrainianism.

Dragomanov was a republican and, consequently, above all anti-Tsarist. He had developed under the influence of positivist and socialistic ideas which were strongly tinted with syndicalism in him. He shared fundamentally the leading ideas of the revolutionary movement as it appeared in the west.

Republican and socialist, Dragomanov was the champion of the free existence of the people. These themes, in the spirit of the epoch, were indissolubly united. But Dragomanov was not anti-Russian. He only had a contempt for the chauvinists who, to glorify the Ukraine, wanted to belittle Russia at all costs. 'The Ukrainian Nation,' he writes, 'cannot obtain political liberty by taking the path of separatism, but only together with the other nations and territories of Russia, along the path of federation.' In this he continued the federalist tradition which had been that of the whole Ukrainian political movement. Dragomanov saw the 'Free Russia' as a federation of several national entities, themselves divided in their turn into autonomous territories.

. . . . .

In Galicia, however, the movement was to go far beyond the aims which had been intended by its spiritual fathers. A pronounced hostility to everything Russian appeared in Ukrainian political circles. And the Austrian Government, more and more convinced of the inevitability of a conflict with Russia, began to take an interest in the Ukrainian movement and to give it its support.

The penetration of Ukrainian separatism in Russia met at first with great difficulties. Ukrainianism as a cultural, regionalistic, and even federalist movement had not ceased to exist in Russia. On the eve of the

first Russian revolution, that of 1905, one realized at 668
St. Petersburg and began to understand that this movement was not in itself a danger to the unity of the empire. The Governor-General of Kiev, Kleigels, in a good position to judge it, explained it in precisely this sense in his reports to the Imperial Government. But at the same time the Tsarist police, generally very well informed of everything which concerned it, was convinced that the Ukrainian *separatism* was but a weapon of the Austrians; it considered, moreover, that its success in Russia was almost insignificant.

Among the other expressions of the cultural life of the 177
Ukraine, western influences have been particularly strong 341
in the artistic domain and especially in architecture and in decorative art.

The architecture of Kiev, at the period when it flourished most, had above all been a simple branch of byzantine art, transplanted without any modification to Russia. In the north, however, architectural art, although of byzantine inspiration, soon developed original forms of a purely national character.

Kiev, close to Byzantium, was too profoundly impressed by the splendours of Constantinople to be quite independent of them. The celebrated historian of Russian art, Grabar, notes that at the end of the twelfth century architects from Novgorod were invited to Kiev in order to replace the Greek masters by native Russians and to build churches and palaces in the national style. The people of Kiev were amazed by it.

Besides the more important assimilation in the north, the style of religious architecture (the only which was of importance in the old Russia) was quite similar throughout the whole extent of the old Slav-Norse State.

Later, when the centre of gravity of Southern Russia was moved towards the west to the lands of Galicia and

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

177 Volynia, Western influences became more pronounced.
341 Even at Kiev we find churches in the gothic style,
[531] modified, however, by national and above all by byzantine
traditions. A salient feature of byzantine art especially survives. These are the magnificent frescoes, in which this art excels as does, too, the art of the old Russia of Kiev.

During the sixteenth century the influences of the Renaissance were already felt in Galicia, which was still at this epoch the principal centre of Southern Russia. But they were soon supplanted by those of the baroque, which, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, leaves its mark on the whole Ukrainian architecture. It forced the traditional forms of Russian architecture of the byzantine type to recede more and more, to a point at which Grabar asks himself if the Ukrainian art had not undergone a complete denationalization.

Nevertheless a peculiarity belonging to the whole of Russia was responsible for a revival of the national style: the old Russia, a land of forests, overlooked any other constructional material but wood. That which is built of stone obviously cannot be built in the same way as wood. Thus there developed in the Ukraine the special baroque style of the wooden churches, just as the original 'gothic' style in wood had appeared in the north. This exquisite style was most probably created without any Western influences.

The wooden churches not only protected the Ukrainian art from complete denationalization, but their original and national style began to fuse little by little even into the baroque architecture in stone. At the end of the seventeenth century, and in the first years of the eighteenth, this baroque, called 'Cossack,' was almost exclusive to the Ukraine.

In the eighteenth century the 'Cossack baroque' loses itself in the magnificent bloom of the Imperial

Russian baroque. At the end of the century it is replaced 171 by an equally imperial rococo. The churches built in 341 Kiev by Rastrelli clearly cannot be considered monuments of Ukrainian art. The empire style, originally transformed in Russia into the so-called 'Alexander' style, afterwards dominates in Kiev as in St. Petersburg.

As much as the old Ukrainian architecture has certainly 177 contributed to the later development of the 531 imperial baroque, Ukrainian painting, open to all the Western influences from the seventeenth century onwards, has played a very important part in the development of modern Russian painting. Here the Western influences were often transmitted through the Ukraine and were assimilated there before dissolving in the civilization of the empire. The Ukrainian portraitists Levitsky, Borovsky, and Venetzianov, working at St. Petersburg, had a strong influence on Russian portraitism.

It was also the painter Lossenko and the sculptors Kozlovski and Martos, equally Ukrainians, taught by the Academy of Arts of St. Petersburg, who illustrated the century of Catherine II with their works.

The national originality was also maintained in the popular art, especially in iconography, thanks to the deep traditionalism of the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless Ukrainian iconography had lost much of its austerity in comparison with that of Northern Russia, under the influence of that levelling which came from Poland.

Eastern influences still make themselves felt in the popular art, in the taste for richness of ornamentation, and in the magnificence of colours. Embroideries, tapestries, jewellery, glassware, crockery, and sculptures in wood witness the rich artistic aptitudes of the Ukrainian people and have the just reputation of their value both in Russia and in the whole of Central Europe.

CHAPTER IV

UKRAINIAN ECONOMICS

ooo AS we have seen, the most important part of the Ukraine has developed, during more than two centuries, within the Russian State, that same State of which it had been the cradle at the most distant period of the mediæval epoch.

Thus, on the eve of the Great War, the Ukraine, with the exception of her few western provinces, formed an integral part of the Russian Empire, geographically and administratively as well as from the point of view of culture, religion, and economics.

This last-named link became especially important at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the rise of industry, the advent of capitalism, the development of communications, and the commercial intercourse between various countries, which were so characteristic of that epoch.

The rapid growth of the population, due to a diminution of infantile mortality and the beginning of the agrarian over-population in the centre of the empire, brought about a rapid extension of the colonization of the New Russia, conquered by the empire at the end of the eighteenth century and which forms to-day the southern districts of the Ukraine.

The economic unity which, since that time, closely links the Ukraine with the rest of Russia, develops more and more, not only as a result of geographic and climatic identity, but, above all, thanks to the increase ooo

of the productive power and to the direction given to it by the general policy of the empire. Moreover, this policy, paradoxical though this may seem, is continued in its broad outlines by the Soviet Government, and this despite the radical transformation of the social, political, and economic order.

It would be difficult to undertake the study of Ukrainian economic conditions without, each time, taking the economics of the whole Russian territory into account, especially as two economic factors come into question, both very important, that of the distribution of production and that of communications.

The aim of this book would be to study this question, not in the form of an analysis of figures of the economic position in the Ukraine on the eve of the last war or after twenty years of Soviet rule, but of guiding the English reader in the analysis of the economic potential of the Ukraine, of the conditions in which this potential would be able to develop, and of the role which the Ukraine plays and could play in the economics of the world as well as an independent organism or as a link of the Pan-Russian economic system.

We shall not give much time to a discussion of the economic transformations which this country has experienced under the Soviet regime, but rather to the new perspectives which these transformations have opened while they have checked, destroyed, or disorganized the different branches of the already existing economic activity.

Thus the figures which will appear in our exposé will be drawn from pre-war (1914) statistics as well as from those of more recent years. Our only aim is to clarify the question of the economic potential of the Ukraine, which seems to be to-day an attraction for those countries whose economic potential is exhausted or naturally poor.

000 It seems to us that the method of economic geography is the most suitable as giving our study the required direction. Thus, after having defined a geographical basis of the whole, we shall successively study the most important factors in the economic geography of the Ukraine in the following order :

1. Man. (Population, its density, its aptitudes, and its level of economic culture.)

2. Agricultural riches and their exploitation. (The soil, plants, forests, and breeding.)

3. Riches beneath the soil and their extraction, heavy industry and light industry.

4. Communications on land, river, and the sea.

The fact that economic geography is a science which deals with two essential factors, man and the soil, whose relative importance varies in different regions and different epochs, but which is determined by the existence of man on the land, forces us to choose man as the first subject of our study.

The other factors will follow it in the order of their exploitation by man ; the exploitation of the surface soil, of the subsoil, and finally the transformation of the products of this exploitation—industry.

As to the means of communication, we shall leave them to the end because they assure the distribution and the exchange of the products of the soil and of the subsoil, reflect the sites of industry, and, being able to create a new economic geography of the land, appear as the last link of the economic system.

Therefore the geography of the Ukraine appears to be relatively simple.

133 The whole territory has approximately the same altitude. Therefore its profile is uniform. Its geological origins are absolutely identical. The river system is poor and equally uniform ; the three important rivers,

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Dnieper, the Boug, and the Dniester, all flow from 133 north to south, to empty into the Black Sea.

The climate is similar on the whole territory, with an 132 average 'multi-annual' temperature slightly higher in the south and south-east, due to the great heat of the months of July and August in these parts, with the exception of a narrow border of the Black Sea, between Odessa and the isthmus of Perekop, where the winter and the autumn are very mild, which explains the presence in this region of such plants as cotton (a plant with a long period of growth) and trees so delicate as those of the peach.

On the whole territory of the Ukraine the month during which the average temperature is always the highest (20 degrees C.) is July, and that during which it is lowest (minus 4·5 degrees C.) is January.

The average rainfall varies between 25 and 80 centimetres per annum, with the dampest climate in the north-western part. Everywhere there is more rain during the summer.

This uniformity of the whole, which makes the task of geographical description an easy one, seems at first sight to make the division of the Ukrainian territory into different zones impossible, while giving each zone some original characteristics in the sphere of economic geography.

Nevertheless, when going deeper into an analysis of 131 the question, we establish a division of the Ukraine into two agro-climatic zones.

This separation is determined by climatic and agrarian factors. There are differences of rainfall, of the soil, and of flora.

The border of these two zones begins at the western frontier of the Ukraine, on the 48th degree latitude north, and rises in an almost straight line up to the

131 eastern frontier at the 50th degree latitude north, while cutting the territory into two almost equal parts.

132 In the northern zone (Zone 1)[2] the rainfall is everywhere greater than 50 centimetres, while in the southern zone (Zone 2)[2] it is less than 50 centimetres and varies between 25 and 50 centimetres.

134 The predominant soils of Zone 1[2] are poor *tchernozioms*, that is to say somewhat exhausted by the currents of water which have deprived them of their humus to a varying extent in different regions, and have brought to them some sand and clay from their sources.

On the contrary, the lands of Zone 2[2] are rich and complete *tchernozioms*.

137 Zone 1[2] comprises a vast forest region which, while spreading along the courses of the river becomes little by little a land of light woods, is yet characterized by the general presence of forests.

Zone 2[2] has no forests and is the true Steppe.

131 This separation is in practice nothing else but the frontier between the Steppe as such and the *lesso-steppe* (a Steppe with occasional woods)—a geographical term which has been accepted by Russian scientists for a long time.

This border is also that which defined the cradle of Russia, the ancient principality of Kiev, separating it from the savage Steppe of the nomads. Therefore, already at that distant epoch, the separation between these two agro-climatic zones existed in practice. Thus justified from a geographical point of view, the border between these two zones is all the more acceptable, as it is in tune with an historic reality since the establishment of settled populations.

000 Each time when we treat the question of populations in our study (the difference of density, of social distribution, and of ethnical composition), of agriculture

[2] [see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

(the northern or southern limits of certain cultivations 000
and of different methods of agricultural exploitation), of cattle-breeding (the predominance of cattle and of pigs in Zone 1 and of horses and sheep in Zone 2), of industry (metallurgy and other heavy industries in Zone 2 and light industry in Zone 1), or of communications, this border corresponds with undoubted economic realities.

Chance, or rather its geological structure, has decreed 135
that Zone 2[1] should possess all the mineral riches of the Ukraine while Zone 1[1] has none except, however, an insignificant deposit of oil in Polish Galicia, near Stanislavov.

I

Population

As we have previously said, the population of the 161
Ukraine is about 43,000,000, of whom 33·5 millions live within the frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine in the 11,500 parishes, 95 hamlets, and 90 towns.

Among all the Russian lands the Ukraine, with the industrial region of Moscow, is one of those with the densest population, especially in the region of Kiev and of Vinnitza, where the density reaches about 100 inhabitants to the square kilometre.

The average density of 70·6 inhabitants per square kilometre for the whole territory is almost the same in both zones, though a little higher in Zone 1, being from 65 to 87 with an average of 76 inhabitants per square kilometre, while Zone 2 has only 43 to 76, with an average of 65.

The least populated districts are the provinces of the south-east, the districts of Melitopol, Mariupol, and Lougansk, all in Zone 2.

Despite the small differences in the density of the

[1] [see category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

161 population in the two zones, the character and origin of this density are not the same.

162 361 The density in Zone 1* is characterized by an agrarian over-population, resulting from a long feudal period and the servitude of the lands. The population is concentrated there in a large number of hamlets, in small towns and in small villages, the inhabitants adding to their agricultural revenues those of artisans, of small commerce, and of small industries.

There is almost a complete absence of large towns. Actually the whole of Zone 1,* within Soviet boundaries, contains only one town whose population exceeds 100,000—Kiev, the administrative capital of the Ukraine (625,000 inhabitants).

Even if one adds Polish Galicia to this territory, as it is wholly part of Zone 1,* we find only one other big town—Lvov, with 325,000 inhabitants, an administrative and cultural centre.

In Zone 2,* on the contrary, we find three big towns: Kharkov (650,000 inhabitants), Odessa (550,000 inhabitants), and Dniepropetrovsk (375,000 inhabitants).

Apart from these three large towns, Zone 2* possesses a further four towns whose population exceeds 100,000: Nicolaiev, Mariupol, Zaporojie, and Lougansk.

The greater part of Zone 2* is a land of recent colonization. It is the New Russia and the free Ukraine, colonized during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Great Russian and Ukrainian elements.

The agricultural population is of a lesser density, and if the average number which expresses it is the same for the whole territory as for Zone 1* this is only a result of the greater number of large towns.

162 It would not be useless to point out that before the last war Odessa with her 700,000 inhabitants was the largest town of the Ukraine. But since the beginning

* [see category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

of the Soviet regime and the quasi-disappearance of the export of cereals and the importation of coal and of colonial products, Odessa has given up its place to Kharkov and then to Kiev, the first an industrial centre and the second an administrative one. 162

On the whole territory of the Ukraine 25·5 million human beings live in the country and obtain their means of existence from agriculture and allied trades and only 8,000,000 live in towns.

The latter thus form 24 per cent of the population, representing 19 per cent in Zone 1* and 27 per cent in Zone 2.*

The principal occupations of these 8,000,000 town-dwellers are the following: workers, 6·5 million; military, officials, and free professions, 1 million; artisans, ½ million. As these figures are taken from Soviet statistics, the professions of traders, industrialists, and people of independent means are not represented.

It is interesting to note that of the 8,000,000 town-dwellers, 70 per cent are not Ukrainians but national minorities, which are less numerous in the country-side. Nevertheless their average proportion is much greater in Zone 2* where it sometimes reaches 40 per cent, as, for example, in the district of Odessa, and nearly 50 per cent in the Donietz basin.

The natural outlet for the surplus agrarian population of Zone 1* seems to be the great industrial centres such as the oil basin of the Donietz and the mines of Krivoi-Rog, where the landless peasants can find work. And yet the majority of the working mass has come from districts outside the Ukraine, whereas many of the farmers of these regions have emigrated to Eastern Siberia, where they have founded whole villages. Others have gone to the United States or to Canada, where they have founded prosperous agricultural communities. 167

*[see category 116, pp. 139-140. ---Analyst]

369 The Ukrainian people, being an old nation with an agricultural civilization, is not attracted by industry and by large concentrations of population. It prefers to live in the country, when its material life is assured, seeking to supplement its revenues by semi-agricultural professions such as those of artisan, or small trade, or finally the service of the State.

241 The Ukrainian agriculturalist, especially in the regions of the south, is conscious of participating in the general economy of the country. He takes a great interest in the choice of plants to be developed, in the organization of co-operatives for trade and credit, and in the construction of the means of communication. He is a civilized peasant, a quite European farmer. Without disparaging the intellect and the practical sense of the Great Russian people, it is necessary to recognize that the Ukrainian is more Western in all his conceptions, and more European, than his brother of the north.

163 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people have a great vitality. Among the peoples of Europe they have the greatest rate of increase, which reaches 2·3 per cent per annum. The fecundity of the women is astonishing: between twenty and thirty years it is 23 per cent, while in France it hardly reaches 8 per cent at the same ages.[1]

142 The average height of the men at the period of military service is about 1 m. 69½ cm.

137
342 Ukrainians are very clean and their houses very neat, mostly whitened with whitewash and surrounded by gardens. Fruit trees, particularly cherry trees, give the villages an attractive appearance, especially in the districts of Kiev and Poltava (Zone 1)[*] where the rich and green nature resembles the landscape of Southern England.

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[1] That is to say that for a 100 women between twenty and thirty years one meets 23 expectant ones.

[*] [see category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

On the contrary, in Zone 2* the absence of trees, the 137
drier climate, the dusty soil, and the isolated farms
make the landscape more severe and more similar to
the barren table-land of Northern Castile. Only the
immensity of the cornfields with their golden ears
introduces a lyrical note, vision-like, into this flat and
treeless country. The villages of the Steppe are not 361
very picturesque and look mostly like colonies in which 342
the spirit of calculation dominates over the care of
beauty. The habitations here are more modern, bigger,
and better planned. The thatch here gives place to
tiles and to corrugated iron. On the other hand, the
poor people, deprived of wood, live in primitive hovels
built of clay.

In the extreme north, in the forest region with its 133
sandy soil, the picturesque landscapes gradually disappear
to resume the severe and sad monotony of the
White Russian country-side.

The Ukrainian is very adaptable to civilization, that 181
is to say to the improvement of everyday life, and very
quickly adopts all practical inventions, without any
spirit of routine.

The Ukraine is the most literate part of Russia. Even 212
Soviet statistics, which cannot be assumed to be well
disposed to the Tsarist regime, show that the percentage
of the generation which was of a school age in 1914,
which could read and write was, in 1923, 90 per cent in
the towns and 73 per cent in the country, which, by the
way, is a vigorous reply to the generally accepted opinion
that in the pre-war Russian Empire the population
stagnated in a condition of utter ignorance.

In the other parts of European Russia the percentage
for the same generation was respectively 82 per cent in
the towns and 57 per cent in the country-side.

It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine 000

*[See category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky II-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

It seems to us oppertune to give an idea of The Ukraine

361 by describing the urban populations which are, from the point of view of European town life, to a great extent among the best organized Russian towns.

The most European town is Odessa. Founded at the end of the eighteenth century, it has broad and straight avenues and streets bordered by plane trees and acacias and built according to a plan, very well paved, with the most perfect modern drainage systems, with very comfortable houses, and finally with its port which is constructed in accordance with the technically most advanced principles. Odessa can easily compete with the great European towns of the same importance. It is curious that the first governors of Odessa, who have done much for the embellishment of the town, were two French *émigrés*, the Duc de Richelieu and the Comte de Langeron, whose names have been given to two
[874] important streets. The University of Odessa, called that of New Russia, has been the cultural centre not only of the southern region of the Ukraine but it also attracted the young people of the Crimea and the Caucasus. Its great commercial activity, its external night life, and its
[162] cosmopolitan population, having 43 per cent Jews, 42 per cent Russians (Great Russians and Ukrainians), 6 per cent Greeks, 3 per cent Germans, 2 per cent Poles, 3 per cent Italians, Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, and others, gave it before the Revolution the appearance of a Mediterranean city.

Kharkov, also a University town, is to-day a European city, but, unlike Odessa, it owes its modern appearance to the Soviet regime. During fifteen years it had been the capital of the Ukraine and it has taken advantage of this position by completely changing its appearance which, before the last war, was very poor.

Kiev is a picturesque town lying on the hills of the right bank of the Dnieper. It is undoubtedly the most attractive town not only of the Ukraine but of the whole 361 of Russia. Its magnificent public gardens amaze the visitors. It is excelled by Odessa from the point of view of town organization but excels it by far from the æsthetic point of view. Its[2] University of St. Vladimir and its [874] Polytechnic School enjoyed a great reputation in Russia.

Among the other towns with a European appearance one can mention Nicolaiev, the port at the mouth of the Boug; Vinnitza, the capital of Podolia, and to-day perhaps Dniepropetrovsk, which has the School of Mines, founded some years before the Great War. These cities have modern public buildings, up-to-date railway stations, good networks of tramways, etc.

In the domain of the organization and the appearance of the towns and the houses, the difference between Zone 1 and 2[2] is great. In Zone 1 the country-side is better organized and possesses better roads, while the telephone system had appeared there before the last war, etc. On the other hand the towns which, as we have already shown, are almost all small, can hardly be called such at all.

The towns of Zone 2[2] are new towns which have had the benefit of modern organization, while the country-side still has a colonial appearance, without roads, with numerous isolated hamlets and farms, far removed from each other.

Now a few words about the ethnical composition of 162 the population of the Ukraine. The most important 563 minorities living on Ukrainian territory are the following:

First of all the Great Russians; workers, officials, and some colonists in the eastern and southern parts, especially in the New Russia. Then the Jews, very numerous (about 2,500,000), almost all traders, artisans, or members of the free professions before the Revolution; to-day employees in commerce, in the State co-operatives

[2] [Kiev--Analyst]

[2] [see category 11b, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

162 where they represent 30 per cent of the employees,
523 artisans, and workers in heavy and light industry.

The Germans, mostly agriculturalists, very rich before the Revolution, are concentrated in the districts of Odessa, Kherson, and in Northern Taurida.

According to information from German sources, and especially according to articles which had recently appeared in *Deutschtum im Auslande*, the number of German colonists in these regions had been, in 1914, about 750,000, of whom only 50,000 to 60,000 inhabited the great towns. Before the Revolution 2,500,000 hectares belonged to them. It is after 1840 that German colonization became intensified in the New Russia. Originally the Imperial Government had granted 600,000 hectares of excellent land to the colonists. Thanks to their labour and to the favourable economic conditions after 1840 and right up to 1914, the German colonists were able to acquire nearly 2,000,000 hectares at the expense of private owners descended from the nobility.

563 The German colonists always lived quite apart from the peasant community, enjoying a special legislation which granted them very important privileges in economic matters, especially in all that concerned the rights of succession. They had powerful economic organizations such as the Land Bank of Kherson (with a branch at Odessa) and numerous credit and trading co-operatives. In cultural and religious matters the German colonists also remained separated from their Ukrainian and Great Russian partners. Catholic and reformed parish schools were to be found in almost every German village, of whom some even possessed secondary schools and especially *Realschulen* based on the German schools of the same name, in which, though the general teaching was in Russian, German history and German geography had a predominant place.

Nevertheless, if the economic level of the German colonists was much higher than that of the Ukrainian peasants, their cultural level always remained very low. The majority among them were distinguished by coarseness and extreme obscurantism.

That which remains of this important minority, partly repatriated to the fatherland, dispersed by the Civil War, or exterminated as *koulaks*,[1] belongs to-day to the community of collective peasants.

The Poles are not numerous in the Soviet part of the Ukraine. The landowners have left the country. There remain the farmers, the workers, and the employees, especially in the service of the railway.

In Polish Galicia the Ukrainian population is, as everywhere, almost entirely agrarian. The Poles are the landowners, the officials, and the military. The Jews are traders, industrialists, and members of the free professions.

This division of activity according to the ethnical groups has played a very great role in the political struggle which had developed in the Ukraine during the period of the civil war of 1917–20. The native population had always been hostile to other non-Russian nationalities, not as a result of an instinctive or infused xenophobia, but for reasons of a purely social order. The Poles were landowners to them, the Jews traders and bankers, and the Germans privileged foreigners to whom one had granted the lands to the detriment of the native population.

Besides these important minorities it is equally necessary to note the Bulgarian colonists, as well as the Moldavians and Macedonians, whose most important occupation was the cultivation of vegetables and especially the growing of melons, as well as sheep rearing,

[1] Rich peasants.

563 and the Greeks who competed with the merchant Jews in the great ports, where they formed very united and wealthy autonomous communities which to-day have been repatriated or dispersed.

II

Agriculture

241 Fundamentally an agricultural land, the Ukraine is particularly the land of cereals.

The incomparable richness of these lands, her temperate climate, and the aptitude of her population have made this branch of human activity the fundamental wealth of the country.

134 With the exception of the forest regions of the north-
311 west, where sandy soil is met, nearly all the lands of the Ukraine are arable and actually only a few tens of thousands of hectares of waste land remain, which serve as natural pasturages and give an excellent hay which is very well suited for horses.

243 About 25,000,000 hectares are sown, of which 20,000,000 are growing cereals.

The abundance of nitrates in the surface layer of the earth, and its capillary structure, perfect for irrigation, allow the cultivation of the most valuable of cereals—
[311] wheat. The area that has been sown with this cereal occupies more than 35 per cent of the worked land of the Ukraine and its production rises to 90,000,000 quintals, representing almost 8 per cent of the world harvest and 18 per cent of the European harvest.

The cultivation of wheat seems to develop from year to year at the expense of barley and of rye, cereals of inferior quality.

From the end of the nineteenth century wheat has

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
UKRAINE,
ECONOMICAL
NOTES:
Boundaries of the Gt Ukraine as described in Chapter I.
Western boundaries of the Soviet Ukraine
State boundaries inside the Great Ukraine
Railways
Main double track Railways
Highways
Rivers
Rapids of R. Dnieper & Dniepr
Towns of more than 300.000 inh
Towns of more than 100.000 inh
Other towns and places of economical importance
Separation line of agroclimatic zones & northern limit of maize
Northern limit of sunflower
Limits of beet root
Forest regions with the predominance of fir trees.
Forests of oaks.
Forests of different trees.
Cotton
Vine.
Coal
Iron
Soft Coal
Graphite
Manganese
Oil
Warsaw
POLAND
WHITE RUSSIA
U.S.S.R.
VOLYNIA
GALICIA
Lvov
Sarny
Chernigov
KIEV
Jitomir
Romny
Kharkov
Poltava
Cherkassy
Vinnitsa
Uman
PODOLIA
SUBCARPATHIAN RUSSIA
HUNGARY
RUMANIAN BUKOWINA
BESSARABIA
RUMANIA
Kishinev
Odessa
Nikolaev
Kherson
NEW RUSSIA
Krivoi Rog
Dniepropetrovsk
Zaporozhe
Nikopol
NORTH TAURIDE
R. DNIEPER
Berdiansk
Mariupol
DONETZ BASIN
Lugansk
REGION OF DON (Cossacks of Don)
Rostov on Don
REGION OF KUBAN (Cossacks of Kuban)
SEA OF AZOV
CRIMEA
Sevastopol
BLACK SEA
CAUCASUS
Bucarest
R. DANUBE

MAP No. 5

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

243 experienced a great extension and has acquired an industrial and commercial character. Millions of hectares are sown with it, and a special selection of seeds has been undertaken for its development and for the production of new varieties which would resist drought, with a view to bringing about a stabilization of harvests. Considered best on the world markets for the production of fine flours and of nourishing bread, the well-known Russian 'hard corn' had, especially at the time immediately before the last war, a very good price in the world markets. Powerful elevators had been built in the ports of the Black Sea where the grain was stored before being loaded on the boats.

This crop occupies the great majority of the fields of Zone 2,[1] where the lands are richer and suffice adequately for the increased production of this cereal. More than 4,000,000 hectares are producing wheat in this zone of a total of 6,500,000 in the whole Ukraine.

Farther to the north, and especially towards the relatively poor lands of Volynia and of the region of Tchernigov, rye, the production of which is as high as 30,000,000 quintals, begins to replace wheat, but it only serves, unlike the latter, to supply the internal consumption as it has not yet reached a level of export production.

Apart from wheat and rye, the Ukraine produces an important quantity of barley, about 35,000,000 quintals; of maize, 22,000,000 to 25,000,000; of oats, 20,000,000; and finally great quantities of buckwheat and millet.

Wheat, the harvest of which can easily reach 100,000,000 quintals and more, is an excellent export commodity.

Its extensive exploitation had not only benefited the great landowners, but equally the average farmers who have the good sense to increase their revenues by

[1] [See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

applying improved methods of working and in engaging 243 in a selection of varieties as demanded by the mills and the exporters.

The State and local organizations equally try to come to the aid of the cultivators in order to improve the quality and raise the production of this precious grain.

The Soviet State, wishing to substitute itself for all [474] former capitalist enterprises, organized the *sovkhoses* (State agricultural enterprises), where it tried to return to the pre-war traditions of exploitation. The general system of Soviet economy does not, however, permit the organization of the exploitation of wheat on a commercial scale. The figures which we have just cited cannot be applied to the Soviet Ukraine in its present state. Actually agricultural decadence during the Civil War and the period of militant communism and the collectivization of the peasants had disorganized all that which had been done during the preceding epoch for the rational exploitation of this important resource. The widespread utilization of tractors has not yet compensated for the losses which have been sustained. Nevertheless wheat remains and will remain the essential product of Ukrainian soil. It is its most important agricultural potential.

Although the cultivation of maize, almost entirely concentrated in Zone 2,[1] only occupies the fourth place among the cereals of the Ukraine, its importance is great owing to the fact that this country alone produces 65 per cent of the maize of the Soviet Union. On the other hand this crop is a very recommendable phase in the enrichment of the soils, whose supply of water and chemical salts is pitilessly exhausted by the growing of wheat, more so, as in order to replace them the utilization of manure in the southern regions sometimes presents a certain danger owing to the possible droughts.

[1] [See category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

243 Quite recently one has experimented in the Ukraine with two crops formerly unknown in that country—soho and rice—which have given good results. The experience is especially interesting in the case of rice, a very important cereal unknown in Europe, except in Italy, and the cultivation of which may well open new agricultural perspectives.

. . . . .

249 Beside the cereals, the most important sown surface (2,500,000 hectares) is occupied by the so-called technical cultivations, the products of which serve as raw materials in industry, both food and general.

These are the sugar-beet, oil-bearing plants, linseed, hops, and tobacco. The beet, the sown surface of which covers nearly 1,000,000 hectares, occupies the predominant place.

This cultivation expects concentrated exploitation by the great enterprises, furnished by an appropriate agricultural organization and abundant labour, in order to give big harvests.

Thus, before the advent of the Soviet regime, the harvest of beet in the Ukraine reached 150,000,000 quintals, representing nearly 18 per cent of the world's production. At present, notwithstanding the increase of the utilized surface, the harvest only reaches a maximum of 110,000,000. This diminution must be considered as being temporary and solely due to the new system of State capitalism which cannot fully replace private initiative.

One cannot, however, expect a new increase of production in this direction because the cultivation of sugar-beet exhausts the land, hinders the rational system of agricultural exploitation, and requires an enormous outlay on chemical manure, which has to be set off as a capital investment against a revenue which does not surpass the normal revenue of a well-organized production of wheat.

The cultivation of sugar-beet is concentrated in the region of Kiev, Kharkov, and in Podolia (Zone 1).[1] The harvest is almost everywhere made into raw sugar on the spot. The refineries, however, are dispersed over the whole territory; 95 per cent of the sugar industry of the Soviet Union is in the Ukraine and owes its expansion to the general Pan-Russian economic organization.

The oil-bearing plants are represented in the Ukraine by the sunflower, linseed, hemp, and mustard.

The cultivation of sunflowers occupies about 800,000 to 850,000 hectares. This is the only source of consumable vegetable oil. Sunflower oil is very nourishing and much appreciated by the native population. It has only one fault—it cannot be preserved for a long time and must be used from harvest to harvest.

Linseed and hemp furnish machine oil and that which is used for the manufacture of paint. Linseed also furnishes the seeds for the northern regions, in Great Russia, where it is cultivated for its fibres. Mustard grains give, apart from the well-known seasoning, small quantities of oil which is used in some food industries.

Among other non-food cultivations, the surface and the harvest of which are more or less important, let us mention tobacco, hops, and cotton.

The production of tobacco in the Ukraine is considerable. 60 per cent of the tobacco plantations of the U.S.S.R. are to be found in the region of Tchernigov and of Romny (in the district of Poltava).

These are tobaccos of an inferior quality, furnishing the partial requirements throughout Russia, and which

[1] [See category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

249 are known under the name of '*makhorka.*' Fine tobacco is only cultivated in the southern region, near the Crimea, and only in small quantities.

243 As to hops, they are spread over the relatively poor lands of Volynia. Since the end of the nineteenth century this crop has experienced a great development in the Ukraine, which has furnished more than 50 per cent of the hops on the markets of the Russian Empire. This, as is well known, is an indispensable product in the manufacture of beer.

Owing to their utilization in the breweries oats can equally be considered as being not only a direct food crop. This would also apply to a part of the potato harvest (total of 1·2 million hectares), which supplies the most important material for the production of alcohol.

248 The cultivation of cotton which was begun five or six years ago in the extreme south of the Ukraine, between the mouth of the Dnieper and the isthmus of Perekop, is a recent industry. We have little information about its possible future and cannot dwell on it. Actually cotton plantations occupy about 150,000 hectares. The employment of a new variety, called the 'non-irrigated cotton,' seems to give satisfactory results.

241 In all that concerns agriculture, the division into agro-climatic zones seems to be entirely justified.

Actually the northern limit of the cultivation of maize and sunflower corresponds almost entirely to the border between these two zones. On the other hand 95 per cent of the land occupied by sugar-beet is to be found in the southern part of Zone 1.[1] This separation is also not quite so definite for the cultivation of cereals, but nevertheless it exists. The greater amount of wheat is grown in Zone 2.[1] Rye and oats, on the contrary, occupy a greater surface in the north. In the case of the two less important cereals, buckwheat and millet, the separa-

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[1] [See category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

tion is very clear, buckwheat growing in Zone 1[1] and 241
millet in Zone 2.[1]

The great development of agriculture has created a 392
growing demand for agricultural machinery, which brought about the appearance and the rapid development of this branch of industry, concentrated to-day especially at Kherson, at Zaporojie, and at Kharkov.

Parallel to this a very important industry of food 241
products has developed. These are the great and highly perfected mills, the sugar refineries, the distilleries, the breweries. and the tobacco factories which cover the whole territory of the Ukraine. As auxiliary products of agriculture, apart from vegetables of all kinds, known in Europe, the production of which is difficult to estimate, one can mention the melons, water-melons, cucumbers, and tomatoes, to the cultivation of which important tracts have been given.

The production of fruit and grapes has not experienced 245
so great a development. The surface given to fruit trees (cherries, apples, apricots, and pears) reaches about 250,000 hectares. The most important horticultural centres are to be found in the region of Ouman, on the banks of the Dniester, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and equally in the surroundings of Odessa, which are famous for their peach trees. The town of Ouman has a horticultural school and an experimental station which had already long before the Great War a great agricultural reputation throughout Russia.

The marketable harvest of fruit reached 80,000 tons before the Great War.

The surplus production of fruits and especially of vegetables (tomatoes) have brought about the rise and the rapid development of a food tinning industry which seemed to offer great possibilities in the future.

As to the vineyards (about 60,000 hectares), they are

[1] [see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

245 found in the extreme south of the Ukraine, on the banks of the Dniester and the Boug (Voznessensk), in the region of Odessa, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and in the region of the rapids near Zaporojie.

Despite the small importance of the vineyards in the agricultural economy of the Ukraine, a great effort has been made by Russia in this sphere. An experimental station for vines has been established near Odessa which has a laboratory for the analysis of the harvests. Highly qualified specialists have made researches there on the growth of native and French varieties for the creation of species adapted to the soil and to the climatic conditions of the Ukrainian vine region.

246 The cultivation of fodder, such as clover and others, are relatively little known in the Ukraine. The lands which are given up to them are almost entirely in the western part of Zone 1,[2] which is over-populated and provided with natural pastures. Their surface does not exceed 1,000,000 hectares. In the Ukrainian Steppe only the natural pastures are of importance. (It is to be hoped that the culture of fodder will develop in the Steppe as it is necessary for the rational enrichment of the land.)

241 Before going on to the question of forestry and to breeding, let us say a few words about the state of agriculture in the lately Polish part of the Ukraine.

Being a natural continuation of Zone 1,[2] with a poorer soil, this country produces a large proportion of rye, which occupies more than a third of the sown surface.

The other crops are barley, wheat, oats, and potatoes, all of which are used by the native population. The cultivation of sugar-beet is very limited.

246 On the other hand the cultivation of fodder is more extensive in Polish Galicia than in the Soviet part of the

[2] [see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Ukraine, where, as we have seen, it is only intensive in the western part of Zone 1. 246

. . . . .

Both from the point of view of numbers and of quality, the Ukraine is of little interest in forestry. Its production is even insufficient to satisfy the local needs. 137

The forests are mostly concentrated in the districts of Volynia, Kiev, and Tchernigov and are mainly fir trees. Their surface does not exceed 3,000,000 hectares.

Apart from the forests one meets, in the western part of Zone 1, oases of oaks and those light woods which are familiar to the rest of Europe, excepting, however, the beech tree, the geographical distribution of which is the best justification of the division of our continent into Western and Eastern Europe.

As to Zone 2, it is completely treeless with the exception of some oases to the east of Kharkov.

Towards the west the forest region increases and its exploitation becomes more intense. Already in Galicia, near the Carpathians, they represent an important part of the production of the country without, however, playing the role of an important export.

. . . . . .

A land of great size and magnificent pastures, the Ukraine occupies an important place in Europe in the sphere of cattle-breeding. 231

The Ukrainian Steppes provide excellent conditions for the breeding of horses, the number of which before the last war reached 5,500,000.

It would be unjust not to note that the German colonists have contributed much to the improvement of the horses in Southern Ukraine, especially in the region of Kherson, where many great enterprises were devoted to them.

The years of collectivization and the extermination

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

231 of the wealthier peasant have, unfortunately, struck a terrible blow (as elsewhere throughout Russia) at the total number of horses, which has fallen by 50 per cent and amounts to-day to only 2,750,000.

Cattle have experienced the same disaster.

The number of cattle, which reaches 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 to-day, was 9,000,000 in 1914.

The position is still more serious with regard to sheep—from 6,000,000 they have fallen to 2,500,000.

Only the breeding of pigs has been able to remain at approximately the same level. It only shows a fall of 10 per cent to 15 per cent and the number of these animals reaches 4,500,000 at the present time.

Cattle-breeding is characterized in the Ukraine by the predominance of pigs in Zone 1[1] and of horses and sheep in Zone 2.[1] As to cattle, the milk-producing species are more numerous in Zone 1[1] and the beasts of burden in Zone 2.[1] The Ukrainian breed of oxen is one of the best in the world. It provides excellent meat, but the cows of this breed give only just enough milk to feed their calves. The raising of oxen for the drawing of ploughs and carts is very seriously menaced by the introduction of tractors for agricultural work.

It is interesting to note when studying cattle-breeding in the Ukraine, that it is certain that under other political, social, and economic conditions it could become a very important branch of the economic activity of the country. Pre-Great War statistical figures show us that the number of domestic animals increased at a greater rate than that of the people who owned them.

The Ukraine consumes almost entirely, in the form of meat and milk, the products of her own cattle-breeding, and does not export to the industrial regions beyond her frontiers, except some horses, beasts of burden, skins, wool, and pig-bristles.

[1] [See category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

The milk industry, too, is relatively undeveloped in the Ukraine and might even become insufficient to supply the needs of the big towns and the industrial centres if the breeding does not increase in order to be able to overtake the other branches of economic activity. 234

The general opinion which considers the Ukraine an inexhaustible source of meat and milk seems to be unfounded, at least at the present time. This is all the more true as, while the purchasing power of the native population rises, the insufficiency of the resources in this respect becomes more and more noticeable. 000

The transformation which the Ukraine has undergone in the sphere of the exploitation of the products of the surface soil since the establishment of the Soviet regime, while leaving aside the crisis in cattle-breeding, has undoubtedly not led to progress.

The trial plantations of cotton, of soho, and of rice, the mechanization of the working of the land by the extensive employment of tractors, seem to be the only advantages which have been given by the new regime to the development of Ukrainian agriculture. 242

It would seem necessary to note another wealth of the Ukrainian soil which does not enter into any of our economic categories—these are the various spas. 529 757

In the first instance there are, in the environs of Odessa, two lakes, the Kouialnik and the Khadji-Bey, ancient bays which formed when they were the mouths of rivers since dried up and which are to-day completely separated from the sea. The medicinal value of these two lakes is appreciated by all Russia. Tens of thousands of invalids, especially rheumatics and paralytics, flock there every year for the mud baths which are very rich in iodine salts.

Many parts of the coast of the Black Sea are very 529

529 popular for sea bathing, although the beaches still lack a good tourist organization.

000 Nevertheless this branch of the activities of the country could, under more favourable circumstances, give a stable revenue to the population and thus contribute towards the enrichment of the Ukraine.

III

The Subsoil and Industry

135 Among the mineral riches of the Ukraine the first place belongs to coal and to iron ore.

These two important raw materials are to be found in Zone 2,[1] coal in the Donietz basin and iron ore on the left bank of the Ingouletz (a tributary of the Boug) at Krivoi-Rog.

Besides these two fundamentally important resources the Ukraine possesses important deposits of manganese and aluminium in the surroundings of Nikopol, graphite and soft coal mines, recently discovered in the centre of the country, salt in the Donietz basin, and finally peat and oil wells in Polish Galicia, in the surroundings of Stanislavov. Geological researches recently carried out have led to the discovery of oil on the shores of the Sea of Azov.

433 In order to give an idea of the potential reserves awaiting exploitation in the subsoil of the Ukraine, let us indicate that before the last war production represented 135 gold francs per annum per inhabitant.

316 As a result of its naturally very rich geological structure and of the organization of the extraction of its resources, the basin of the Donietz could be compared with the best coal-producing centres of Europe. Its reserves may be less important than those of Siberia (Kouznetsk),

[1] [see category 116, pp. 139-140 ---Analyst]

but they are estimated as having a depth of 1000 metres 3/16 according to the most recent work undertaken by the Soviet Government, and the information given by German sources estimate them at 55 milliard tons, which makes these deposits almost inexhaustible.

By their quality the coals of the Donietz are among the very best, having a very high calorific value.

They give excellent varieties for heating and furnish coke for the metal industry, gas and liquid fuels. Rich in volatile substances, they are a raw material of the chemical industry.

The exploitation of the Donietz basin is relatively recent, beginning as it does only in the second half of the nineteenth century. This field has not known the methods of exploitation of the pre-mechanical kind which characterized the European pits and those of the Moscow region.

In the greater part of the mines the technical organization has already reached a high degree of perfection and continues to progress rapidly. This progress results in a great increase of extraction, the annual figure of which rises to-day to 75,000,000 tons (12,000,000 in 1900 and 31,000,000 in 1914), representing 65 per cent of the total production of the Soviet Union and exceeding that of France by 15,000,000 tons.

The application of mechanization to the extraction, an exploitation which is commercially more rational, and a better organization of labour in the sense of stabilization, of its specialization, and of the raising of the standard of living of the workers, could increase the production further by many million tons.

Two very important factors are favouring the rapid growth of the production of coal in the Ukraine. First it is the relative nearness, of 500 kilometres in a straight line, of the whole basin of the Donietz from the iron

316 mines of the Krivoi-Rog and secondly the presence between these two centres, in the surroundings of Nikopol, of important deposits of manganese, whose annual extraction exceeds 1,000,000 tons.

Actually the proximity of the mines of Krivoi-Rog, the resources of which, according to the exact estimates of geologists, are considerable (1 milliard 100 million tons of mineral which contains 40 per cent of iron), has allowed the distribution of the whole iron industry of the Ukraine between these two regions—that of the
316 Donietz and that of Krivoi-Rog. This centralization
489 allows one to utilize on the spot the enormous quantities of coal and of employing the railways in the most economical way, thus reducing the transport charges which are a heavy item in relation to a material.

The whole traffic between these two regions goes in two directions. The coal of the Donietz is loaded on trucks which are directed towards the Krivoi-Rog. These trucks return with a load of minerals. Thus a continual exchange takes place between these two centres, resulting in a very small circulation of empty trucks and thus creating one of the essential conditions of a rational exploitation of the railways.

316 The centralization of the Ukrainian metal industry
433 strongly favours its development. The Ukraine to-day occupies one of the leading places in the production of pig-iron (the fourth place, with 6,500,000 tons annually), of steel (third place, with 5,000,000 tons annually), and of sheet-iron (fifth place, with 3,000,000 tons annually).

327 The shaping of the metal and its transformation into metallic manufactured objects is equally concentrated on the borders of these two producing regions. Thus only 18 per cent of the coal of the Donietz and 5 per cent of the raw mineral of the Krivoi-Rog are exported from the Ukraine. The rest is shaped and worked on the

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

spot and leaves the country in the form of special steels, 327 of sheet-iron, of all sorts of machines and tools, as well as of chemical products.

The two mining regions and the regions of Dniepropetrovsk possess forty-five furnaces having a volume of 25,000,000 cubic metres and more than 110 Martin ovens. Russian industry still depends to-day in great measure on the factories of the Ukraine.

As we have seen, the state of industry in the Ukraine, especially of heavy industry, is conditioned by the geographical position of its raw materials and of the sources of energy. All the metal is concentrated at Krivoi-Rog and the source of energy is represented in the first instance by the coal of the Donietz.

The peat bogs dispersed over the whole territory and 316 whose extent does not exceed 400,000 hectares and the production 500,000 tons, and the brown coals the extraction of which is only 300,000 tons, can enter into the calculation only as auxiliary fuel of a definitely local importance.

The Ukraine, on the contrary, is well supplied with 377 hydro-electric plant. This energy is mainly given by the station of *Dnieprogues*, better known under the name of '*Dnieprostroi*,' which means 'Construction on the Dnieper.' This name was especially valuable during the building of the station which, having been finished, has taken the name of '*Dnieprogues*,' an abbreviation of '*Dniepro*vskaia *Gu*idro-*E*lectritcheskaia *S*tantsia,' which means 'hydro-electric station on the Dnieper.' Built by the Soviets on the rapids of this river, it employs the energy and the power which reach 600,000 kwh.

In the other regions of the Ukraine the network of hydro-electric stations is relatively poor, as the rivers do not provide the necessary resources in this respect. The existing stations serve the mills, the oil mills, the sugar refineries, or the town stations of small power.

377 The functioning of the *Dnieprogues* station, which could open enormous possibilities of development of all kinds of industries and of the electrification of the railways, has nevertheless, despite its enormous power, failed to change the industrial geography of the Ukraine because it is just half-way between the Donietz basin and Krivoi-Rog and thus does not bring about any alteration in the distribution of the sources of energy.

438 Thus the heavy industry of the Ukraine remains, in its greater part, concentrated around this region, round Nikopol and along the northern edge of the Donietz basin.

325 Kharkov and its surroundings are the greatest metallurgical centres of the Ukraine. There great factories of turbines, of generators, of electrical machines, of tractors, of locomotives, of railway trucks, and of factory equipment, etc., are to be found.

327 The production of sheet-iron and of steel rails, tubes, plates, beams, wire, etc., is distributed among many factories of the Donietz basin, at Nikopol and at Dniepropetrovsk.

Zaporojie (not far from Krivoi-Rog and near the *Dnieprogues*) produces nearly 60 per cent of the special steels of the Union. The Soviets intend to create a new powerful centre of metal industry there.

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392 Apart from Kharkov, factories producing all the heavier machines such as locomotives are to be found in the Donbass (abbreviation of Donietz basin which we will now use), at Lougansk, and at Kramatorski, where an enormous newly constructed factory is one of the largest in the world.

402 The equipment for the light industry—the mills, winepresses, oil mills and elevators—is chiefly manufactured at Berdiansk (Donbass), Melitopol (Northern Taurida), Tcherkassy (centre), Kiev, and Odessa.

392 Agricultural machinery comes from the factories of

Zaporojie, Ielisavetgrad (region of Odessa), Berdiansk 312
(on the Sea of Azov), and Kherson (at the mouth of
the Dnieper).

The marine docks in which the ships of commerce 396
and of war are being built are at Nicolaiev (at the mouth
of the Boug), and river constructions of all types at
Kiev. There are important repair shops for railway
stock at Odessa and Kiev.

We enumerate here only the districts in which the 000
larger metal industries are concentrated, the production
of which exceeds local needs. The greater part of the 325
large Ukrainian towns, especially of the seaports, possess 438
small metal factories, the total production of which is
not negligible.

It suffices to consult the economic map[1] of the Ukraine
to realize that the heavier the products of the metal
industry are, the more its centres are removed from the
mining regions, a fact which gives a clearly rational
character to the geography of Ukrainian metallurgy.

Besides metallurgy, heavy industry is represented in 385
the Ukraine by the chemical industry and in the first 382
instance by that which is based on coal. Such is the
industry which produces azote, benzole, nitro-benzine,
and sulphuric acid. Important factories engaged in the
production of volatile materials have been built at
Gorlovka, Lissitschansk, Konstantinovka, and Slaviansk
(in the Donbass). This industry, which is still in its
very early stages, already meets 30 per cent of the needs
of Soviet Ukraine.

The factories producing superphosphates, whose
annual production reaches 250,000 tons, are distributed
between Konstantinovka (Donbass), Odessa, and Vinnitza,
in Podolia.

Kharkov possesses great dye factories and those 386
producing paints, varnish, and enamel.

[1] [see category 116, p. 151---Analyst]

339 To finish with heavy industries, let us still mention the production of building materials—600,000 tons of cement (in the region of the Sea of Azov) and 1 milliard of bricks are annually manufactured in the Ukraine.

258 As for light industry, it is that of food production which occupies the first place.

257 The sugar industry of the whole of Russia is to be found almost entirely in the Ukraine. 12,000,000 quintals of crystallized sugar and 4,000,000 quintals of refined sugar can be produced here annually.

256 The milling industry also occupies an important place. Very important mills, many of which are supplied with highly perfected means of sifting and straining, specialized in the manufacture of fine flours for export before the last war. This industry is concentrated in the ports or in the towns near these or near river ports and in the surroundings of important railway junctions of the southern region. This industry represents 35 per cent of the whole milling industry of the Union and produces, despite the fact that it is not working at full pressure, 2,500,000 tons of wheat flour per annum.

249 The oil mills of the Ukraine produce 40,000 tons of sunflower oil, 3000 tons of linseed oil, and 3000 tons of mustard oil.

274 70 per cent of the alcohol distilleries of the Soviet Union are also in the Ukraine, manufacturing all types of alcohol: from corn, for drinks such as vodka and other liqueurs, and from potatoes, for the dye industry, for pharmaceutical products, and for perfumery.

271 The very important tobacco industry is distributed throughout the great centres of the territory.

255 As for the production of tinned foods, 78 per cent of the production of the Union originates from the Ukraine. Important quantities of vegetables (especially of tomatoes) and of fruit are tinned and exported from the territory.

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The possibilities of the development of this industry are enormous. The excellent quality of the vegetables and fruits and the big supplies of fish at the mouth of the Dnieper would have been able to give this industry a great importance, but in this respect the Soviet Government has shown especial incompetence. 255

Light industry in the exact sense of the word is relatively little developed in the Ukraine. Apart from a few saw mills, soap factories, skin and leather works, furniture works, perfumeries, and porcelain factories, there is little which would attract our attention. We will limit ourselves to simply mentioning them. One cannot really speak of a textile industry. The whole Ukraine has only three factories and only produces 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in Russia. 000

If agriculture is in a state of curtailment since the appearance of the Soviet regime, if neither light industry nor the means of communication have made any progress (which is equivalent to an absence of progress), the production of minerals and the metal industry show great development, especially since 1932, to which must be added the construction of the *Dnieprogues*. 433 327

This progress is not only manifested by the increase of production, but by the centralization of the metal industry in the districts in which the raw materials are extracted. Before the last war the Ukraine was a country of a great surplus of corn, iron, and coal. To-day the surplus of her production is represented by manufactured metal goods and in this her economic potential is found to be radically changed. 433

The displacement and the development of the industrial potential of the Ukraine ought to have resulted in the increased welfare of her population. Nothing like that has been achieved.

Neither the aim nor the object of this book allow us

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433 to enlarge upon the reasons which have determined the destruction of the favourable results which ought to have appeared in this direction. We shall only limit ourselves to enumerating the more important points.

1. The defective distribution due to frequent failures of transport which are expressed by the accumulation of unused manufactured goods in the great industrial centres and by the irregularity of furnishing the factories with raw materials.

2. The very inferior quality of the manufactured goods, the enormous percentage of rejects, the continuous shortage of spare parts required for the normal functioning, and the upkeep of the machines. These defects are due to an insufficient technical staff, to low wages and salaries, and to the police system introduced into the administration of the industries.

3. The lack of co-ordination between the different branches of industry, the poor condition of State commerce, due to the incompetence of the staffs and to the very complex and very slow bureaucratic procedure.

Nevertheless, imperfect though they may be, the new mines and factories exist and under other political and economic conditions, accompanied by the revival of agriculture, of foreign commerce, and of a better functioning of transport, the Ukraine would be put on the same economic level as the best organized and the richest countries of the world.

IV

Means of Communication

496 In no other sector of economic activity does the link
489 between the Ukraine and the rest of Russia become so clearly apparent as in the matter of the organization of

the railway system. At a superficial glance at the map we immediately see that the main railway lines follow the ancient riverways which unite the Black Sea with the rest of Russia. Towards the north, however, they divide into two important branches, that of Leningrad, the old direction to Novgorod, and that of the new direction to Moscow. The Russian railways radiate from these two centres, Moscow and Leningrad, to end in the numerous ports of the White, Black, or Caspian Sea or the Pacific Ocean or at the western and eastern frontiers of the State.

In this Russia does not differ much from, say, France where, too, the railway network converges towards Paris as a centre.

Forming a part of the Russian railway system, the Ukrainian main lines are only sections or continuations of the Russian main lines, starting, as we have said, from Leningrad or Moscow.

These are the lines: (Leningrad–Jlobin)[1]–Sarny–Kiev. (Leningrad–Vilno–Rovno)–Kazatyne–Odessa. (Moscow–Koursk)–Kharkov–Sinelnikovo (Sebastopol) and (Moscow–Koursk)–Kharkov–Marioupol–(Rostov-on-Don–Caucasus). (Moscow–Briansk)–Koupiansk–Lougansk.

The Ukrainian network, including the continuations of the great Pan-Russian lines, whose length totals 14,500 kilometres (31 kilometres of rail for each 1000 square kilometres and 4·6 kilometres per 10,000 inhabitants), can be divided into four distinct classes:

1. *Lines for the export of corn* uniting the agricultural regions with the ports of the Black Sea. The direction of these lines can only be justified by the conditions of a normal expansion of grain export and the importation of colonial produce, to which the advent of Soviet rule has brought an unfavourable change.

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[1] The towns put in brackets are outside Ukrainian territory.

1 [see category 116, p.151.---Analyst]

000 The import and export were characteristic of the pre-Great War Ukrainian economy. To-day these factors are almost absent.

496 At the beginning of the twentieth century a railway called the corn line had been constructed, with termini at Romny and Libava, a port on the Baltic now belonging to Latvia and recently partly given back to Russia by special treaty, for the corn export trade. It is clear that to-day its Ukrainian section, which does not exceed 250 kilometres, has only a very restricted local interest. Recent events may bring some changes here.

The movement of merchandise on the network which, before the Great War, had been most important in the direction from north to south, takes to-day an opposite direction and brings the surplus of cereals from the southern region towards Kharkov and Moscow. As to the most recent grain line, the construction of which had been begun in 1913 and had been completed after the Revolution, connecting Kherson and Nicolaiev to Kharkov via Zaporojie, it has to-day acquired a purely industrial character and serves to transport metal and coal to the factories of Kharkov on the one hand and to those of Kherson and Nicolaiev on the other.

489 2. *Means of communication* which serve the mines of
496 Krivoi-Rog and the coal basin of the Donietz. The region of the Donietz has a sufficiently close network and is provided with many lines with a double track which connect the different mines. Nevertheless this network was clearly insufficient already before the last war, when the annual production of coal was only 40 per cent of that of to-day. The enormous accumulation of unused coal at the stations, as a result of the weakness of the transport system, had forced pre-Great War Russia to import coal from England.

The network of the Donbass is linked with the Krivoi-

Rog by a main line which is devoted to the continual 489
exchange of coal for mineral. The stock of this mine 496
is the most powerful of the Union and the average loading per axle (about 4·5 tons) is the highest in Europe. The system of the coal network is characterized by the working of the raw material in the proximity of the districts of extraction. Numerous branch lines are prolonged into supplementary lines which radiate towards the outer regions, to end at the great centres at which the metals are worked. This whole network, destined for the transport of heavy materials, and which dates from the last decades of the nineteenth century, is in general very well constructed and even partly reinforced by electric welding.

The only railway of importance constructed since the 496
October Revolution, which joins the industrial network, is that which links Moscow to Lougansk. The direction of this line confirms the continuation by the Soviet Government of the traditional economic policy, in tending to organize the Russian railway system on the Imperial plan.

3. *Strategic lines* are represented by the line Odessa-Kiev, with a double track and with numerous branches towards the Polish and Rumanian frontiers, some of which continue in a direction of Lvov, others to Kovel, to end at Warsaw.

The exploitation of these mines, since the establishment of the Russo-Polish frontier after 1920, was fundamentally changed. As a result of being cut by the frontier, they had lost their importance as strategic lines, since the principal junctions, such as Kovel or Rovno, specially intended for this purpose, were recently outside the frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine. Parallel to this they had experienced a diminution of traffic owing to the most complete disappearance of trade with Poland.

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496 4. *Local railway lines*, of which the most important are those which link the large towns and join them to the agricultural regions.

Although certain strategic lines now function as lines of local importance, owing to the change of the frontier, this fact has not remedied the insufficiency of such railways.

The reinforcement of industrial lines, the entire rebuilding of the stations on the strategic lines in the sense of increasing the number of storage lines, as well as the construction of new local lines, must be considered a task of immediate importance so as to avoid the slowing down of the economic development of the country. Actually if the economic potential of the Ukraine is greater or at least equal to that of France on roughly the same extent of territory, the Ukraine only possesses one-third of the rail network of France (14,500 kilometres as compared with 44,000 kilometres). If one adds the almost complete absence of roads to this, especially on the left bank of the Dnieper and in the south of the Ukraine, the inactivity and unproductiveness of the Soviet regime in the sphere of the construction of new lines seems difficult to explain.

491 In reality the Ukrainian network of roads before the Great War was in practice limited to a single road which was maintained in a satisfactory condition and which linked Kiev with the Austrian frontier via Jitomir. As far as we know that was the only motor-car road before the last war in the whole of Europe. This main road had several important local branches leading towards the south and ending at Kamenetz–Podolsk, and leading towards the north in the direction of Korosten and Kowel. Several very narrow carriage roads, whose foundations and surface were very poor, were to be found in the region of Kiev and in Podolia and they were being

maintained by the Zemstvos (local organizations some- 491
what similar to County Councils, elected by citizens with
a certain property census).

Quite recently the planning of the organization of the road system of the Soviet Union was put in the hands of the planning commission. It seems that important sums are to be spent on this project. It is almost unnecessary to mention that great economic transformations could be brought about by the construction even of a few thousand kilometres of roads, especially in New Russia where the composition of the soil makes the present tracks absolutely impassable after the slightest rain. Many villages still remain almost isolated from the rest of the world during periods of bad weather and are only connected with their respective centres by telegraph and, in case of their defect, by postmen on horseback.

The question of roads which we have approached 647
allows us a small diversion. We can say a few words 744
about the Zemstvos. This organization was distin- 657
guished after the abolition of serfdom as a factor of the
first order in the development of the economic organism 657
of the country, of the raising of the well-being of the
population, of public hygiene, and of instruction.
Having resources resulting from taxes on the land, the
Zemstvos were able to cover Ukrainian territory, as
also that of the whole of Russia, with a dense network
of hospitals, veterinary centres, agricultural advisory
bureaux, of experimental fields, of credit and trade
co-operatives, and insurance offices, and finally of
primary and even technical schools. The personnel of 647
the Zemstvos, recruited among the intelligentsia often
belonging to the popular classes, was always conspicuous
by its devotion to the cause and did not lack in highly
qualified specialists who did not hesitate to sacrifice

647 their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian
[871] intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent,
[165] infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent,
[164] epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the
[232] southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

206 The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

505 As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a
[503] considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports on this river was more than 80 per cent of the river 505 tonnage of the whole country. The ports of the Dnieper had, before the Great War, 360 steamers and more than 1800 other boats. Timber, salt, and corn composed, and still composed to-day, the predominant part of the goods carried by the Dnieper.

The insufficient and incompetent management of the river ports and the small tonnage of the ships still do not allow one to-day to increase the river transport of the Ukraine to any noticeable extent.

On the other hand the geographical possibilities of sea transport are enormous. Excellent ports like Odessa and Nikolaiev, lying 600 kilometres from Constantinople and 1000 kilometres from Batoum, can assure the transport of export and import goods on a big scale and especially that of petrol from the Caucasus. Beside [504] Odessa and Nikolaiev, the Ukraine still possesses other ports which are also favoured from a geographical and technical point of view, among them Marioupol, Berdiansk, and Kherson and some smaller ports of local interest.

We have noted that under normal conditions of 433 economic exploitation the Ukraine, thanks to its agricultural and industrial potential, could be put on the level of the richest countries of the world. The continuation of the economic development of the Ukraine is conditioned by the existence of a stable outlet. If it is a question of a surplus of wheat, sugar, and other produce of the land, or of the products of industry, this surplus is to-day dependent on the consuming regions of the rest of Russia. The Ukraine, which consumes 85 per cent of its resources of energy and almost all its minerals in order to transform them locally into manufactured articles, is not only a source of raw materials, as is usually imagined.

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German economists who foresee a perfect collaboration between the Ukraine and Germany ('Germany and the Ukraine supplement one another economically,' wrote the *Volk und Reich* in 1933) make a great mistake or even deceive the public intentionally in continuing to consider the Ukraine an agricultural land. If one compares the national agricultural revenue of the Ukraine with that of her industry, the first is certainly inferior to the second.

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If one day the Ukraine should enter into the German economic system, and if Germany were to export the mineral which she lacks from the Ukraine, what would one do with the immense machine factories, and the coal mines which supply the metal industries, and with the quarter of a million workers of that industry? Let us admit that the Ukraine should become independent and that she should become detached from the Russian economic system, and that by this fact she should become hostile to Russia, who would cease to absorb the surplus of her economy, what would happen then?

Russia would, perhaps, create a new Ukraine in her Asiatic possessions. The wealth of the subsoil of Western Siberia is far greater by many times than that of the Ukraine. Metal is also more abundant. The soil of Siberia is more fertile and the possibilities of agricultural development are immense. That is not all. What would the Ukraine do with the surplus of her agricultural population, whose average density is greater than that of Germany, and which could emigrate, to-day, to Siberia and found colonies as it pleases? Is there another country in the world which will accept so great an emigration?

If the Russian Empire, backward though it is supposed to have been, has been able, during hundreds of years, to transform the wild Steppes into an industrial and prosperous country, why then could not the present 000 Government, or another which would succeed it, do as much with Western Siberia? What would, in such a case, become of the economy of the Ukraine, which is based on her common economy with that of the rest of Russia? Let us take the example of Poland, a country with an equally rich subsoil and agriculture and equally over-populated. During the nineteenth century, thanks to plentiful and cheap labour, Poland had become one of the most important industrial centres, especially of the textile industry, the whole production of which was absorbed by the Russian market. Since the separation of its economy from that of Russia, Poland has shown a fall of more than 30 per cent and in some spheres even of 60 per cent of her industrial production and a strong rise of unemployment. Would such a situation be desirable in the Ukraine?

To begin an independent existence it would be necessary that the Ukraine should transform her whole economic system. One can easily imagine that such a transformation would entail expenses which would be such a heavy charge on the population that it would be threatened with ruin for many years to come, that every chance of prosperity might be endangered, not to mention the great outlay on defence which would then become necessary along the whole frontier with Russia, which has a length of several thousand kilometres and lacks every natural obstacle.

By this we do not want to say that economic reasons could be invoked to deny the right of a nation to an independent political existence. But if the motives, whether geographical, historical, ethnical, cultural, linguistic or others, are insufficient or even do not exist to justify this independence, then the economic element should not be neglected.

CHAPTER V

THE UKRAINE AFTER THE GREAT WAR

000 BEFORE undertaking a short exposé of the events which have affected the Ukraine since the Great War, we must first admit one fact: Russia before 1914, with the exception of her recent acquisitions (the Duchy of Warsaw, the Caucasus, and the Baltic lands), was endowed with a national, spiritual, and cultural unity. The existence within her frontiers of different Russian peoples (Great Russians, White Russians, and Ukrainians) in no way destroyed this unity, of which the Ukrainians were the most important, the most valuable, and the most active part. Thus the term 'russification' cannot reasonably be applied either to White Russia or the Ukraine. The 'russification' in the exact sense of the word only took place in ethnically non-Russian territories.

The idea of Russian unity was also fostered beyond the borders of the empire in Austrian Galicia and Bucovina and in Sub-Carpathian Russia. A Russian movement, very popular among the peasant masses, existed there on the eve of the war, a movement supported by the non-Uniat Orthodox Church which, by virtue of its national essence, was at all times the bastion against latinization and denationalization. The Russian organizations of Galicia had an important number of cultural centres and edited many journals and pamphlets. The Russian movement gave concern to the Austrian

authorities by its rapid development and by its hold on 000
the people. Some months before the declaration of war a monster trial took place at Marmaros-Sziget, in which the adherents of the russophile organizations were tried for high treason. Most of the accused were peasants, which confirms the success of Russian ideas among the popular masses. Many were condemned to long terms of imprisonment. Immediately after the beginning of the war arrests again took place among the same Russian circles. These measures led to another trial at the beginning of 1915, but this time the tribunal sat at Talerhof under martial law and pronounced several death sentences. The account of these repressions against the Russian circles of Galicia by the Austrian Government was brought back by Count Bobrinsky, who served as a liaison agent between the Russian organizations in Kiev and those of Galicia and who was a witness at the first trial.

We have seen that the anti-Ukrainian police measures 648
taken by the Russian Government after the Polish 175
insurrection of 1863 were politically directed against the eventual possibility of Polish-Ukrainian collaboration, which was incidentally unrealizable. These measures did not bring about any political reaction in Russian Ukraine. They only brought the Ukrainian intellectual circles into evidence by their brutality and lack of justification. On the contrary they helped to crystallize the anti-Russian Ukrainian movement in Galicia, which found a loyal supporter in the Austro-Hungarian Government. The ideas developed in the plan of Prince Adam Czartoryski, despite their being out of tune with the whole history of the Ukrainian-Polish relations, were later adopted by certain Austrian circles which, as one knows, had become masters of Galicia after the last partition of Poland. Austria-Hungary

intended to put itself in the place of the Great Poland of other days and to create, under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs, a federation of Slavonic lands. In the immediate entourage of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne, the idea of transforming the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a federal State found great favour. The idea of taking advantage of the anti-Russian Ukrainianism of Galicia as a counterweight to Russian power and, at the same time, to Polish pretensions to cultural and political direction of the Ukrainian movement, was quite in tune with this plan. It was the intention of the Austrian politicians to use Ukrainian separatism as a means of creating difficulties behind the Russian front in case of war, and of securing some allies on the other side of the frontier.

In order to attract the sympathies of the Ukrainian intellectuals the Austro-Hungarian Government showed great tolerance towards the cultural institutions of the country, readily authorizing the creation of Ukrainian schools and putting no obstacles in the way of the development of political societies and institutions which, as we have already said, also served to eclipse the Polish influence over the leading circles of Galicia. The Austrian Government did not only authorize the creation of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine,' but gave effective assistance to its development in granting it the means of action, which it did not grant to the political organizations of the other Slavonic minorities. Skoropis-Ioltoukhovsky, Jouk, Dorochenko, and Salisniak, all convinced separatists and extreme anti-Russians, were placed at the head of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.' The Russian general staff became alarmed by this movement, whose principal aim it suspected—the disorganization, in case of war, of the foundations of the army which would be formed in the south of Russia. Later on, in 1917, the bulletin which was published at Stockholm by the members of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine' confirmed the justified anxiety of the Russian military authorities. This bulletin declared that the 'Union' had taken up a clear-cut position in all that concerned the relations with Russia, in basing all her hopes on the military defeat of the latter. It hoped for the occupation of the Ukraine by the troops of the countries at war with Russia, in order to attain a national independence with the aid of the central empires. Thanks to the great ability of her propagandists and to the continual support of the Austrian Government, the 'Union' was able to obtain considerable financial assistance consisting, apart from the contributions of the Galician and Bucovinian peasants and the Ukrainian colonists in America, of the grant of the 'Friends of Ukrainian Independence,' who belonged to those nationalities who were prepared to go to war with Russia. The accounts of the financial organization of the 'Union' were brought, in 1917, to the Russian military authorities by one of its former collaborators. One can say without exaggeration that the initiative and the elaboration of the programme of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' can be traced to Austria, which proposed, in case of an offensive in Russian-Ukrainian territory, that the members of this organization should follow her army with the aim of finding supporters of separatism among the native population of Russian Ukraine, and on the other hand for creating the new administration in the conquered country. But the Austrian advance did not take place. The Russian troops invaded Galicia and the most active members of the 'Union' had to take refuge in Vienna. Many of their number simply entered the Austrian secret service after this failure. That which remained of the 'Union'

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175 148 continued to receive subsidies from the Austrian Government and engaged in cultural work and autonomous propaganda among the Russian prisoners of Ukrainian nationality.

This propaganda began immediately after the Austrian defeat in Galicia in 1914. Special camps were organized in which Galician instructors tried to subject the Ukrainian peasants to their influence and to the idea of Ukrainian autonomy. The conditions under which these prisoners lived were better than those of Russian soldiers from other parts of Russia. But soon, owing to her continual military and political defeats, Austria began more and more to make way for Germany, who finally took over the affairs of the 'Union.'

The idea of a confederation of vassal States carved out of the Russian territory developed in Germany in certain intellectual and political circles since the end of the era of Bismarck. The decisive role in the development of these ideas was played by Baltic Germans originating from the Russian Baltic provinces, whose influence, at first purely cultural, became progressively stronger in the Reich.

000 The short-sighted policy of crude and superficial russification, inaugurated in the Baltic provinces in the reign of Alexander III, had exasperated a part of the Baltic nobility and especially of the intellectuals. Their national pride, encouraged by the great rise of Germany in 1870–1, was deeply offended by the policy of russification. Thus these barons and these intellectuals began to turn more and more towards the Reich. Some of them even tried to find a new home in the at last united Reich. They took with them a hate of Russian politics, their contempt of all the native peoples of Eastern Europe and their historical traditions, full of reminiscences of those struggles which the Teutonic order

had experienced against the Slav world during many 000 centuries. Writers and journalists, many tied by bonds of relationship to the Prussian aristocracy, these German nationalists of the Baltic played the role of experts in East European matters and of the Russian question (*Russlandkenner*) in Germany.

Bismarck still had too great a personal respect for the power of Russia to attach any importance to the persevering propaganda which already aimed at popularizing the idea of the dismemberment of Russia. At all times he only had contempt for the 'oppressed brothers' of the Baltic and treated the first apostles of the *Drang nach Osten* as dreamers. Everything changed with the accession of William II, who personified the enormous conceit of that generation which had been brought up under the influence of the German triumphs of 1870–1. The prophets of German revenge on the coasts of the Baltic were quick to rally the various Pan-Germanist elements and to become in some respects their inspirers.

Recent events, which forced Hitler, under Russian pressure, to evacuate the Balts of German origin, have removed the chance of ever reviving these policies in the Baltic.

It is thus that Rohrbach, a Balt himself, could, during long years and with more or less brilliant success, lead his campaign for the deliverance of all the 'European peoples oppressed by Asiatic Russia' and for the 'civilizing mission,' the *Kulturtraegertum* of Germany in the East European world. The perspectives grew more and more. Attracted first by the vestiges of Teutonic domination over the Baltic provinces, the eyes of Germany looked farther towards the east and south-east. It is not Rohrbach who has made the discovery of the Ukraine in Germany. But by his persevering activity as a propagandist he has contributed more than any other

000 to make the Ukrainian idea one of the principal pivots of German claims.

175 If, under Austrian direction, one did not dare to speak
668 of separatism to the prisoners, the German general
701 staff, the new master of the Ukrainian movement, thought of the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State, under German control, and gave its propagandists directions in this sense. From 1915 the Little Russians who agreed to declare themselves Ukrainians and not Russians were sent to the camp of Radstadt. In this camp specialists of the Ukrainian question, under the direction of Professor Bezpalko, undertook a series of lectures in which they drew pictures of the independence and liberty of the Cossacks for the benefit of their hearers, appealing to them to reject the 'heinous yoke of Asiatic Muscovy.' Towards the beginning of 1917, that is to say after two years of assiduous work, the German general staff succeeded in recruiting, in the camp, 15,000 prisoners. The regiment of 'Taras Chevtchenko' was created. This regiment consisted of eight companies and had about 1600 men. The soldiers of this regiment, looked upon as undoubted partisans of the independence of the Ukraine under German protection, were armed and equipped in readiness for being used in a possible offensive in South Russian regions. The remainder was divided into four groups:

1. About 1500 men formed the *Sitch* (the name of the ancient Cossack community) and enjoyed the complete confidence of the German authorities with regard to their loyalty to the new Ukrainian cause, without yet being entrusted with arms.

2. The 'apprentices,' about 3000, still considered as not absolutely reliable but already somewhat influenced by the propaganda.

3. The 'candidates,' about 3000, those who were

neutral or indifferent to the question but without /175
marked hostility. 668
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4. Finally the ‘opponents,’ about 6000, who, although they had agreed to take the name of ‘Ukrainians,’ were actively opposed to separatist propaganda. They were continually sent to penal work and had to undergo severe and frequent punishments.

Thus of the 15,000 men who, enticed by the promise of an improvement of their lot, had agreed to join the Ukrainian units, one could only rely with difficulty on 3000 (the Chevtchenko regiment and the *Sitch*) who had been really affected by the propaganda. At this period the number of Russian prisoners exceeded 3,000,000, of whom at least 700,000 were Ukrainians, which confirms the absolute failure of this movement.

It would be interesting to remember that from the Russian side the same policy was inaugurated with respect to the prisoners of war of Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, etc., origin. This move enabled one to establish whole divisions composed of Slavonic minorities. From the beginning of the war Austro-Hungarian military units formed of Slavs, and especially of Czechs, went over to the Russians with their officers, arms, and baggage. Not a single similar case occurred in the Russian Army, which included many entirely Ukrainian regiments. On the contrary, according to the evidence of high Russian and German officers, the Ukrainian regiments were among the best troops, often used as shock units, the most famous of which was the ‘Iron Brigade’ commanded by General Denikine, future commander of the White Army.

To sum up, the political movements of autonomy and of Ukrainian separatism gave no tangible results despite a subsidized propaganda having the support of such powerful organisms as the central empires.

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When the February Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg no political Ukrainian movement developed in the early stages. Quite naturally the intellectual circles obtained more liberty to spread their ideas, which were not anti-Russian.

The municipal elections undertaken at Kiev almost immediately after the February Revolution, and which had undoubtedly taken advantage of all the liberties which characterized the first days of all revolutions, gave a result which clearly shows the almost complete non-existence of a Ukrainian political movement. In fact, of ninety municipal councillors the so-called Ukrainian parties obtained only six places, and that was in the capital of the Ukraine itself.

All classes of society hoped that the Provisional Government which replaced the Monarchy would be able to maintain the front and would allow the country to convoke a National Assembly which would decide the future political regime on the whole territory of the former Russian Empire. As soon as the active members of the Ukrainian political organizations of Galicia entered the Russian Ukraine they organized a kind of Ukrainian committee at Kiev, which started its autonomist political work. On 24 March 1917 the Ukrainian Associations spread over the whole territory were called upon to send their representatives to Kiev to form the first nucleus of a future Ukrainian Parliament. Although only the representatives of such Associations which had declared themselves Ukrainian were invited to this assembly, and although the direction of the assembly was entrusted to Galician Ukrainians, under the Presidency of Professor Hrouchevsky, not only was the idea of separatism absent, but the autonomous aspirations were of the most mild kind. This first assembly of Ukrainian deputies took the name of ‘ Rada ’ (the name

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of the Cossack Assembly of the time of Bogdan Khmelnitsky), which means 'Diet' or 'Council' in Ukrainian. Once installed, it tried to establish relations with the central Provisional Government, whose power became more and more fictitious. The menace of a Bolshevik *coup d'état* hung over the Government of St. Petersburg, a fact which allowed the Rada to justify its own establishment in declaring itself alone capable of protecting the Ukraine from Bolshevik invasion. This political manœuvre had many chances of success. The Ukrainian peasant was fundamentally hostile to Bolshevism, to the social levelling, and to the collectivization of the land. Nevertheless, anxious for the peace which the Bolsheviks had promised, the Ukrainian peasant lent them his ear. The leaders of the Rada, loyal to the principles of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine,' were also not opposed to the idea of an immediate peace and their promises to preserve the Ukraine from Bolshevism and to conclude peace with the central powers was their most important trump card. The Provisional Government, in a state of complete disintegration and without any remaining support, hastened to recognize the Rada as a political organization, although no election in the proper sense of the word had taken place at the time of its formation. A statute, known under the name of 'Universal,' was instituted on Ukrainian territory. After the agreement between the Provisional Government and the Rada, Ukrainian autonomy was recognized but was limited to questions of language and culture and to the organization of local administration.

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All other important questions, including the agrarian question, were left to the future National Pan-Russian Assembly. The administrative activity of the Rada was, at the beginning, limited to the town of Kiev alone, where its assemblies took place. During the summer of

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175 1917 the propaganda agents of the Rada covered the
668 whole country where they organized meetings and
642 distributed pamphlets. They tried to persuade the proprietors of land that their aspirations would be more easily realized within the framework of an autonomous State and underlined the impotence of the Central Government in the face of a Bolshevik attack. The Ukrainian peasant, like that of the Volga and of Siberia and like the Cossacks of the Don, opposed the revolutionary theories, and it is in these countries that they met with the strongest opposition. The Rada could not have a better justification of its authority in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant than the statement that the Bolshevik movement, of Great Russian origin, was imported into the Ukraine from the outside, which, moreover, was true. The title which the Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno, gave to his book on the Civil War, *The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine*, is singularly significant. The leaders of the Rada were careful not to proclaim their separatist ideas openly, knowing that such ideas would never find the support of the popular masses. Profiting, however, by the decay of the Provisional Government, they formed, with its consent, a sort of Ministry which took the name of 'General Secretariat,' and which declared itself the supreme power in the Ukraine on 29 July of the same year. The agrarian movement which spread over the whole territory of the Ukraine aimed especially at the great landowners, most of whom, especially in the west, were Poles. Thus the real popular movement took the form of the ancient quarrel between the peasants and the lords and developed quite independently of the Ukrainian movement represented by the Rada. When, in October 1917, the Provisional Government fell as the result of a Bolshevik insurrection, the only official

authority existing in the Ukraine was represented by 175
the General Secretariat of the Central Ukrainian Rada. 668

The peasants, hostile to Bolshevism, did not find any 642
other political organization on which they could lean. Mistrusting the organizations of the Right (which were later to form the political nucleus of the White Armies) and equally fearing the local democratic municipalities where the intellectual and Jewish elements dominated, openly hostile to the working class which was almost entirely Bolshevized and consisted of non-Ukrainian elements, the farmers seemed to tend more and more towards the support of the Rada which seemed to be the only force capable of realizing their aspirations. Nevertheless the first clash between the elements which accepted the idea of an autonomous Ukraine and those which rallied to Bolshevism, was not to the advantage of the first. The agrarian question meant much to them. The Ukrainian Rada was unable to formulate a clear policy with regard to this most important question. Its resistance to the anarchical division of the lands, supported by the Bolsheviks, rapidly reduced the number of its supporters and the already small authority enjoyed by the General Secretariat in the eyes of the peasant mass. Nevertheless, on 20 November, the Rada proclaimed a democratic Ukrainian Republic. It is at this period that the allied military missions then resident at Kiev recognized *de facto* the Ukrainian Republic. At the same time the fourth ' Universal ' was promulgated, one of the articles of which declared that the independence of the Ukraine was considered indispensable only because the rest of the Russian territory had fallen to the power of the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to remember this detail because it again proves that, even in politically favourable circumstances, the Rada did not dare openly to declare its separatism. This act did not increase the

175 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local
642 municipal or other organization took the slightest note
668 of its existence. Every department, every district, and
every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

648 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and
727 intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to
give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

its members, especially of Petlioura, decided to send its 648 representatives to Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace 727 with the central empires. This idea met with the sympathy of the Austro-German authorities whose negotiations for a peace with the Soviet Government had already lasted a long time.

The peace which was dictated by the German general staff was signed by the Rada. As compensation for the efforts of the central empires, who promised to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism, the Rada accepted German occupation and agreed to supply 1,000,000 tons of grain of which Germany and Austria had immediate need. Under the threat of German bayonets the representatives of Lenin also had to recognize the independence of the Ukraine. Already the Austro-German troops were making their entry into Ukrainian territory while meeting with only a feeble resistance of the armed units of the local Soviet governments and the remnants of the fleeing Imperial Army.

The only aim of the Austro-German military command was to obtain the stores of grain and of other food products which they hoped to find in abundance in the Ukraine. Yet, for political reasons, the Governments 727 of the central empires decided to support the fiction of Ukrainian independence under their protection. The entry of the troops was followed by the proclamation composed more or less in these terms: 'At the request of your Rada we have decided to enter your country in order to protect you from Bolshevik anarchy and to give you the possibility of developing in complete alliance with our two empires.'

One can say that no citizen took this declaration seriously and that the occupation was considered as an invasion by enemy troops. The Ukrainian Government 642 was established at Kiev[1] and was composed of three 727

[1] [i.e. in 1919--- Analyst]

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642 727 political groups: the separatists of the right, the national democrats, and the federalist social democrats. Thus, as these names show, the Ukrainian Government formed by the Austro-Germans was not homogeneous in the matter of its partisanship of independence.

721 The Austro-Germans did not take this farce of political independence any more seriously than did the population. Their attitude was simply that of conquerors. 'For every German soldier killed, ten *Russian* soldiers, chosen among the population of the district where the crime has been committed, will be immediately shot,' the terrified inhabitants of Kremenetz (town of Volynia) (Order No. 2, town of Kremenetz, 28 February 1918) read on the posters signed by the commandant of the Austrian division a few days after the proclamation of official friendship. The 'friendly country' closely resembled a colonial conquest. The general staff of the army of General Eichhorn reported to the commander of the eastern front on 4 May 1918: 'The Austro-German troops would have no difficulty in maintaining order and public tranquillity from the moment we renounce the fiction of a friendly country. We are still obliged to obtain the permission of the Ukrainian commissioners, who are confused and irritated, for some of our actions.'

643 Meanwhile two points of view existed in Austro-German circles concerning the subject of the independence of the Ukraine. The army considered the Ukraine a conquered enemy country which had to furnish, with the least possible delay, agricultural produce in accordance with the terms of peace.

On the other hand diplomatic circles saw in the independence, fictitious though it was, the future of German diplomacy, based on the partition of the succession of the dismembered Russian Empire. Parallel to

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thus, rivalry began between Austria-Hungary and Germany concerning the question of the predominance of one or the other in the direction of Ukrainian policy. The resentment of Austria, outstripped by Germany in the political and military spheres, has allowed us to have, to-day, possession of genuine documents which reveal the point of view of the central empires on the organization of the Ukrainian State and of its principal leaders.

Disappointed by the lack of success of the policy of its Government, the general staff of Austria-Hungary reported, on 16 April 1918, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna the characteristics of the principal Ukrainian statesmen, whose subjection to Germany caused alarm:

'Holoubovitch—Premier—a fanciful theorist, eloquent but without character, appointed by the Germans.

'Lioubinsky—Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—a clean-shaven young man, well versed in Socialist and revolutionary theories. Entirely in the hands of the Germans.

'Joukovski—Minister of War—in my opinion russophile, former Colonel of the Russian General Staff, does all he can to appear a hundredper cent Socialist-revolutionary to his colleagues. Effectively a "German puppet."

'Khristiouk—Secretary-General of the Rada—an intelligent young man, outwardly very smart, apart from that of German sympathies.

'Hrouchevsky—President of the Rada—an old man in the grip of fear and of tremblings, whose decayed old body is intended to give the Rada the noble rust of an honoured senate. He anxiously clings to the German authorities and expresses no sympathy for Austria.'

Despite the cynicism of this document, one must admit that its author, General Waldstatten, did not lack humour or intelligence.

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148 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

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177 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

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642 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

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[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.

-[i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

as a base for the new Government which had to replace 727
the Rada and which, in their opinion, would be better 642
capable of organizing the supply of agricultural produce. On 29 April 1918, on the day after the proclamation of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic, the German troops interrupted the session of the Rada in the building which it occupied and forced the deputies to leave the hall. The Rada was dissolved. The landowners, the *khliboroby*, in agreement with the Austro-German general staff, elected the Hetman of the whole Ukraine in the person of General Pavlo Skoropadsky, the leader of the popular Democratic Party and descendant of the genuine Hetman of the Ukraine, but in fact a brilliant officer of the Russian Imperial Guards.

The German authorities thought that the new Govern- 727
ment, from which the politicians were excluded, would 645
be more in tune with their interests. In agreement with the General Hetman they appointed the new Cabinet. This Cabinet was composed of landowners, some experts, and a representative of commercial and industrial circles of the country in the person of a rich Jewish industrialist of Odessa, Goutnik. All the Ministers were people of openly Russian sympathies. Thus the bluff of the independent Ukraine received the approval of the same State which had invented it. The German Minister in Kiev, Muhm, wrote in his report to the chief of the German general staff, Groener: 'I insisted, when speaking to M. Lizogoub, the Premier, on the fact that the German Government wanted to see a Cabinet with a greater *couleur locale*.[1] In another report Muhm says that the greater part of the Ministers of the
Hetman are not far removed from russophile ideas. 645
'Nevertheless,' he added, 'one must not take this too much to heart as the Government is continually under

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[1] In French in the original text.

645 my control and under that of the German general staff.'

An amusing, but true, story described the political position of the Ministers of the Government of the Hetman. The anecdote concerns the General Ragoza, the War Minister, whose sympathies were in no way Ukrainian. In October 1918 the Russian newspaper *Goloss Kieva* published a so-called order of the day of General Denikine, Commander-in-Chief of the White Army, declaring himself supreme chief of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory. His representative Colonel B., adorning himself with the uniform of the Imperial Army, presented himself without the slightest regard for etiquette to General Ragoza to inform him of the order of General Denikine and requested that the War Minister of the Ukraine would put himself at his disposal. The Minister was so taken aback that he began to assure the envoy of his loyalty to Russia and hastily gave his signature to prove his sincerity. The Russian officers living in Kiev took advantage of this incident to appear in the streets in their most brilliant uniforms of the old Russian Army and invited the population to decorate the city with the Imperial colours. It is unnecessary to say that the order was enthusiastically received by the population. The joke is that it was only a trick played by a Russian newspaper in Kiev, as this order of General Denikine had never existed.

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642 The personality of the Hetman himself was also not very reassuring to the idea of Ukrainian independence. Here are the informations which were sent to Kiev on 30 May 1918 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich: 'In June 1914 Skoropadsky presented an *aide-mémoire* to the Imperial Government in which he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, identifying them with the Russian people.' 'The whole Ukrainian

movement is only the product of Austrian intrigues,' 648
he explained in this document. In July 1917, we are 142
also informed by this document, Skoropadsky published an open letter in which he called Kiev 'the centre of *Russian* culture,' and concluded that it would be necessary to take the initiative to 'unify all the *Russian* lands in a federal organism.'

All these testimonies show the illusory independence of the Ukraine under German occupation.[1] It is easy to understand that the Russian reactionary circles in the first place, and even other more moderate circles, should have considered the establishment of the Government of the Hetman, whose separatist convictions were more than doubtful, a happy event. The superficial Ukrainization, which continued more or less effectively under the fictitious power of the Rada, ceased almost completely under the Hetman. Only the official journal and some insignificant leaflets continued to be published in Ukrainian. Russian again became if not the official at least the semi-official language and the only one actually used in the administrative offices. The Russian circles considered the Government of the Hetman a provisional one which, supported by the Austro-German military forces and entrenched behind the fiction of an independent Ukraine, was able to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism. In their eyes the Government of the Ukraine was only a political and economic base for the future anti-Bolshevik movement in the whole Russian territory, able to serve as a springboard to the White

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[1] All the documents which we quote here are contained in the book that appeared in Moscow in 1936 under the name of *The Failure of the German Occupation of the Ukraine*, a book which contains the secret correspondence of the Austro-German authorities in the Ukraine with their respective Governments. The Soviets of the soldiers of the Austro-German units in flight transmitted these documents of enormous value to the Soviet Government.

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648 Army which was being organized in the territory of the
642 Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossacks with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

642 The internal policy of the new Government, com-
727 pletely at the service of the forces of occupation, was
423 characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

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[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

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deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles 642 of 1917. The application of these laws was followed 727 by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became very frequent and summary executions became general throughout the country. The hate of the peasant population was directed against the Austro-Germans and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset, except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The Government, incapable of acting without looking for the support of the military forces of the invader, did not escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that, hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support, and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence, the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as 668 soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire, revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed from their posts after the establishment of the Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement and received, at first, the unconditional support of the peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany Army in which the Galician element predominated. Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants 669 marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

669 of Western Ukraine. On 14 December the Hetman had to flee from his capital, after having proclaimed, in an absolutely Platonic way and without achieving any concrete results, the re-incorporation of the Ukraine in Russia! At the same time the Soviet Government 726 annulled the peace of Brest-Litovsk and began troop movements, invading Northern Ukraine on their part. A third force, the White Volunteer Army and the Don Cossacks, also made their appearance on Ukrainian territory. These three forces fell upon the Ukraine and made her a battle-field.

Supported by the remainders of the Austro-Hungarian troops and supplied with war material abandoned by the retreating invaders, the forces of the Directorate (new name of the Ukrainian Provisional Government) seemed to be beginning to be in a privileged position. But the lack of officers, the bad administrative organization and, above all, the unpopularity of separatist Ukrainian ideas, tended to give success to the side of the Soviets, who were able to take control of the popular insurrectionary movement which had so far been in the hands of Petlioura. Soviet military historians, while recognizing the high qualities of the Russian counter-revolutionary army, note that among all the opponents of the Red Army the troops of the Directorate were distinguished by their low fighting effectiveness. On the other hand the rigid policy of General Denikine, chief of the Volunteer Army, prevented its union with the adherents of Petlioura, so as to form a single front against the Soviets. Thus the White General was fighting on two fronts, in the north against the Soviet troops and in the west against the Ukrainian troops. On their side the Ukrainians fought both against the Whites in the east and against the Reds in the north.

At the beginning of 1919 the Soviet offensive took

place, which succeeded, towards the end of March of 726
the same year, in clearing the Ukraine of the troops of the Ukrainian Directorate.

Following closely after the routed Ukrainian troops, the Red Army penetrated into Volynia where it met the Polish troops commanded by General Haller. From the month of July the Soviet Army slowly began to retreat from Polish territory. At the same time, encouraged by the retreat of the Soviet forces, the troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' (Galicia), defeated by the Poles and united with Petlioura, made an incursion into Ukrainian territory. Though not friendly to the Poles, these troops had also no great desire to fight against the Russians, Red or otherwise, but the Directorate of Petlioura, which hoped to obtain a foothold in the Ukraine, ended their indifference by promises and threats.

At the same time the great offensive of Denikine was developing with amazing rapidity. In August Kiev was taken by assault, in the east by the Whites and in the south by the troops of Petlioura. The discussion between the two armies led to nothing and finally the Whites displaced the Ukrainians and pursued them towards the south-east. At the beginning of October 1919 the victory of the Whites seemed more and more probable. General Denikine held Kharkov, Odessa, and Kiev, while Petlioura, under pressure of the Whites, was fighting a retreating action in the direction of Galicia. He hoped for the support of Poland, which cost him his popularity in the eyes of the Ukrainian
peasants. The struggles which, in 1919, soaked the 727
Ukraine in blood, crealled the Cossack insurrections of the seventeenth century by their atrocities. Thousands of inhabitants, and especially landowners, Jews, and German colonists, were massacred in a frightful manner

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727 by the troops of Petlioura. On their part the Soviet authorities took their vengeance in the towns and the country districts on hostages, in proceeding with mass executions of members of the middle classes, intellectuals, rich peasants, and clergy, while the Whites inaugurated the mass hanging of Communist leaders. The interval of the French occupation of Odessa, in April 1919,
669 changed nothing in the situation. The second counter-
727 offensive of the Soviets, followed by still more atrocious massacres, ended in putting the whole Ukraine under Soviet domination at the end of the winter of 1920. The Whites, under the command of General Wrangel, entrenched themselves on the Crimean peninsula. The troops of Petlioura were again driven back towards Poland. From this moment a new phase of the Civil War begins in the Ukraine. Guerrilla fighting, led by chiefs of Ukrainian bands such as Makhno, Kosak, and others, known under the name of the *bat'ki* (the fathers), began. They had important forces at their disposal. Under the cover of political ideologies (Makhno was anarchist, the others 'Communists without Jews,' etc.) they devastated the rear of the Soviet front. The personnel of these bands was undoubtedly of peasant extraction. They were mostly the remnants of the Army of Petlioura which had succeeded, after his defeat, in filtering to the rear of the Soviet front. Until a long time after the establishment of the Soviet regime, these bands menaced the communications and disorganized the life of the country. Full-scale military operations would have been required to deal with the *bat'ki*. The Ukraine did not easily submit to Bolshevism.

648 In 1920 a last attempt of foreign intervention in Ukrainian affairs was undertaken by Marshal Pilsudski.

The defeat of the Central Powers led to the unchaining of the eternal struggle between the Ukrainians and the

Poles. First the Galician question was raised immediately 648
after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy (in October 1918). Following the example of all the nationalities which had been a part of it, the Ukrainians of Galicia [642]
formed a national council at Lvov, which proclaimed the independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic. After the fall of Skoropadsky this new republic was eager to unite with the Directorate of Petlioura. The Act of Union was proclaimed in January 1919. But the Poles did not think on the same lines. During the same 726
January 1919, Poles and Ukrainians already fought 648
each other furiously in the streets of Lvov. The arrival of the Polish troops of General Haller, formed in France, quickly turned the tide. A regular army of 80,000 men represented a very important force in Eastern Europe where, from the Carpathians to the Pacific, an immense territory was plunged into anarchy. For General Haller there was no question of a Western Ukrainian Republic, but only one of a Little Poland, a simple province of the reborn Great Poland. As we had already seen, the detachments of the Polish Army of Haller threw themselves, in April of the same year, against the vanguards of the Red Army. Recently restored, the Polish State already claimed the frontiers applying before the first partition, that is to say the annexation of White Russia and the Ukraine up to the Dnieper. While the Petliourians, the Reds, and the Whites faced each other on both sides of the Dnieper, the Poles seized the greater part of Volynia and of White Russia and entered Minsk. But the Poles did not seem to exploit their success, most probably in order to give the Red Army the chance to destroy the White Army which, in case of victory, might transform itself into a national Russian Army, dangerous from the point of the territorial pretensions of Great Poland.

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648 While awaiting further developments, Poland occupied herself with the Ukraine.

While the Polish sympathies of Petlioura became more precise, an important, if not the best, part of his troops, recruited among the Galicians of the former Austrian regiments, united, in November 1919, with the Russian Volunteer Army. Later the Galician Army was involved in the general collapse of the Whites. But it had tried the only chance of rescuing the Western Ukraine from Polish domination. Petlioura, safe behind Polish bayonets, appeared as an instrument completely in the service of the new Poland and of her chief, Marshal Pilsudski.

728 In December 1919 the representative of Petlioura
648 signed, in the name of the Ukraine, a first declaration which recognized the Polish sovereignty over Galicia, Podolia, and Volynia, a declaration which, on 21 April 1920, was supplemented by a secret treaty of alliance according to the terms of which the popular Ukrainian Republic confirmed the cession to the complete sovereignty of Poland of these lands, in all more than 150,000 square kilometres with almost six million inhabitants, in return for the recognition of Petlioura by Poland as chief of the Ukrainian Government. Poland promised, amongst other things, to support the creation of a Ukrainian State, which had become very small and only included a very narrow territory between the new Polish frontier, very advanced to the east, and the old Polish-Russian frontier of the time before the first partition. This secret treaty was supplemented by a military agreement, which was signed three days later. Its terms guaranteed the formation of allied Ukrainian units, which would be under Polish command, in the territory ceded to the Poles. The railways of the Ukrainian territory were to be entirely at the disposal

of the Polish troops. No more than the secret convention 728 did the military treaty foresee Polish help, except 648 in the Ukraine on the right bank, which alone interested the Poles. The authors of these agreements were so well aware of the incompatibility of this treaty with the national sentiments of the Ukrainian people that they never dared to publish these acts. Even the members of the Directorate, apart from a few exceptions, were not informed of it. It is only in 1926 that this document was published by Professor S. Cheloukhine, a Ukrainian monarchist and former President of the Law Tribunal of Odessa under the Tsars.

After the signature of the military treaty on 7 May 1920 the Polish troops, followed by Petlioura, entered Kiev. The Polish domination over a large part of the Ukraine seemed re-established. But soon the divisions of the Red Cavalry, commanded by Boudenny,[1] marched towards the east and the Ukrainian peasants, despite their dislike of the Soviet regime, supported them with all means. The former Commander-in-Chief of the south-western front at the time of the Tsar, General Broussilov, proclaimed a national war against Poland and published an appeal to which, raised by a wave of patriotism, many thousands of Tsarist officers replied, though they would never have, till then, agreed to serve in the Soviet Army. We will be unable to study the details of the Russo-Polish War which saw Poland escape from disaster at the decisive battle under the walls of Warsaw.

After the defeat of Warsaw, Soviet Russia signed the 728
Treaty of Riga in 1921 and abandoned to Poland that Ukrainian territory which had been ceded to her by Petlioura—Eastern Galicia, Western Volynia, and Polesia. There can be no doubt that only the Soviet

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[1] Former Cavalry Adjutant, to-day Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow Military district.

728 Government, hostile in principle to everything connected with Russian national tradition, could put its signature on such a document, considered as an even greater national humiliation than the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Ukrainian separatist movement, doubly compromised by its agreements with the central empires and with Poland, foundered as a result of general contempt.

648 Soon the Allied Powers recognized the Polish domination
728 over the whole of Galicia, at first as a temporary measure. It became definite on 15 March 1923. Poland agreed to establish an autonomous regime here, but this promise had never been honoured. From this date, too, Poland exercised her absolute power over a considerable part of the Ukrainian people.

000 The Soviet attitude to the Ukrainian question at that time is not of great interest and does not furnish new factors which could throw new light on the problem.

If Soviet policy with regard to this problem seems confused and inconsequent, this is so because it is not determined by a firm and well-established point of view, but by two factors which are outside this question : by the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the ‘ social experience ’ to which it is subjected and by the attitude of Germany and Poland to the Ukrainian problem.

642 Immediately after the establishment of Soviet rule on Ukrainian territory, and in full agreement with Marxist theories, the right of peoples to determine their own fate was proclaimed and naturally also affected the Ukraine, as every other member of the Soviet Union. Thus the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine was founded. The Constitution even gave it the official right of ceding from the U.S.S.R. This is the official aspect. In practice the Ukraine became an integral part of the Soviet Union and completely dependent on the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

An important group of Ukrainian politicians,[1] who had 186
formerly supported Petlioura, joined the Bolshevik 191
cause after his defeat. The Soviet Government in- 177
augurated a policy of Ukrainization from the beginning in order to satisfy their ambitions and to show the world their nationalistic Liberalism. But, as under Petlioura, it was a superficial one and never penetrated in fact either into the private life of the citizens or into the sphere of education, or even into the administration.

Although Ukrainian had become the official language, nobody used it and correspondence between official institutions continued, with rare exceptions, in Russian. One of the authors of this book, who held an administrative post in a Soviet enterprise in the Ukraine from 1921 to 1924, had never written a single word in Ukrainian and had never been prosecuted for this defection. It is not because the word 'Odessa' is now written with one 's' instead of two and the word '*plochtchad*' (in Russian a town square) is to-day replaced by the word '*maidan*,' that the Ukraine has ceased to be Russia.

The policy of Ukrainization continued without great changes and in spite of the lack of common sense until 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party suddenly decided to introduce the Russian language as the second official language. One can explain this sudden change by the development of separatist anti-Soviet propaganda, undertaken by secret organizations,
formed under the protection of Poland. There occurred 661
in the Ukraine the first wave of purification which was directed against the 'Nationalistic Chauvinists,' accused of spiritual connection with Galician 'counter-revolutionary' elements, which had been affected by the propaganda of Polish 'Fascists.'

The people's commissar for education of the Ukraine,

[1] [i.e. in 1923---Analyst]

661 Choumsky, and a group of his friends had opposed this policy of the Central Government. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine accused Choumsky himself of 'spiritual connection' with the counter-revolutionaries of the Polish Ukraine and especially with the U.N.D.O., the most important among the Ukrainian political parties in Galicia and working under Polish influence. At that period one still didn't shoot Soviet Ministers. But Choumsky was forced to leave the Ukraine and to accept a small administrative post in Moscow.

186 177 To regain the initiative in the Ukrainian question, the Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in November 1927 directing the Communist Party in the Polish Ukraine to struggle resolutely for the separation of this country from Poland and for its re-inclusion in the Soviet Ukraine.

On the other hand the inauguration of the first five-year plan, which strengthened the economic ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the Red Army on a basis of discipline and of modern military science, made the use of Russian necessary throughout the whole Soviet territory.

669 This pro-Russian tendency did not last long. The forced collectivization of the land, undertaken in execution of the five-year plan, turned the Ukrainian peasantry against the Soviet Government. This resistance soon changed into a kind of civil war and became underlined by hundreds of thousands of deportations, by thousands of executions, and by a terrible famine.[1]

The resistance to collectivization, which was incompatible with the spirit and the vital interests of the peasant proprietors, was so violent and seemed so 669 justified that it carried certain Communist circles of peasant extraction with it, and especially the former *borot'bistes* (Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries of the left) who had accepted the Soviet programme in 1917. A new and violent purification followed.

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[1] See the work of Calvin B. Hoover: *Economic Life in Soviet Russia*, M.R.S., Paris, 1934, in which many pages are given to the question of collectivization.

Fearing a connection between the discontent of the 186 peasants, the opposition within the party, and the 661 nationalist movement supported from abroad, the Soviet Government took Ukrainianism under its control in order to prevent its use by the opponents of collectivization as a weapon against the Soviet regime. This time Ukrainization was pushed to the extreme and was maintained by the huge apparatus of repression. In all the enterprises, and in workers' syndicates, special cells were formed for the propaganda of the Ukrainian language and for the rigorous control of the knowledge of Ukrainian, which had become the obligatory language, established by the officials. The number of Ukrainian teachers was increased, new Ukrainian theatres, clubs, and libraries were created in industrial centres. Russian newspapers were almost completely suppressed. Those who resisted Ukrainization were mercilessly expelled from the administration and everything was put under the direct control of a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars. To all the countless suppressions to which the Soviet citizens were subjected that of the Ukrainization was added.

The attempt to snatch Ukrainianism from the hands of circles socially opposed to the Soviet regime was not successful. A veritable nationalistic anti-Soviet propaganda spread everywhere, supported by the officials of the regime. Then came the second change of policy. 661 Two trials, one of the 'Union for the Deliverance of the Ukraine' and the other of the 'National Centre' took place. From the darkness which characterizes all the Soviet political trials came a beam of light showing the anti-Ukrainian reaction of the general line of the party.

Nevertheless the XVIth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. had still declared in June 1930 that the 'Pan-Russian Chauvinism' was always 'the principal danger during the present phase.' This declaration was voted for by the Congress after the long speech of Stalin himself, a speech consecrated to 'Soviet Culture,' 'proletarian at its foundation and national in its forms.'

It was in 1933 that the great purification of the Communist Party of the Ukraine took place, with the object of eliminating 'Ukrainian chauvinism.' The instigator of the nationalist opposition, the people's commissar Skrypnik, committed suicide in July, preferring an honest death to a bullet in the back of the neck, preceded by 'spontaneous confessions.' In November, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the question of the direct relations between the group of Skrypnik and the 'Polish Fascists' was openly discussed. Kossior had even declared that the 'Ukrainian nationalists hidden within the Communist Party' had been in contact with the U.N.O., the terrorist group of Ukrainian *émigrés* led by Colonel Konovaletz (recently assassinated by the G.P.U. at Rotterdam). The question of a Ukrainian organization (U.V.O.), which was said to have been discovered some months before in Soviet territory, was also raised. According to Postychev, the forced Ukrainization of the schools, carried out by Skrypnik, had opened the way for the 'chauvinists' who had profited by it in order to penetrate into various branches of the Soviet administration in pursuing the aim of detaching the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

And for the first time it was said, at this plenary assembly of November 1933, that 'for the moment' the enemy No. 1 in the Ukraine is no longer Pan-Russian chauvinism but Ukrainian chauvinism. 661

The suicide of Skrypnik brought hundreds of his collaborators to the cellars of the G.P.U. at Kharkov. The leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party was given to Postychev, a man in the confidence of Stalin, and of Great Russian origin. He was given two tasks, to purify the Communist Party of elements suspected of sympathies with Ukrainian nationalism, and to check the sabotage by peasants in the *kolkhoses* (collective agricultural enterprises), the new forms of agricultural exploitation. Postychev successfully achieved the first task. More than a quarter of the Communists were expelled from the party and nearly the whole leading personnel was replaced.

As for the second task, despite the bloody suppressions, the war between the Ukrainian peasants and the Soviet Government continued, taking the form of a definite refusal to collaborate with the Soviets. This refusal led to a fall of agricultural production and to a famine, formerly unknown.

As the so-called 'Nationalist' movement was nothing else but an expression of the anti-Soviet social movement, the 'chauvinism' of which was only a pretext, the effects of the purification undertaken by Postychev were soon reduced to nil. Again executions were resumed, followed by very many suicides of Ministers, among whom were two Presidents of the Council. Finally Postychev himself was dismissed, being accused of a lack of energy and vigilance.

In November 1933 Kossior, the successor of Postychev at the head of the Ukrainian general secretariat of the party, declared that Ukrainization had given the National

661 Oppositionists of the party the opportunity of releasing a veritable ' Petliourization ' of the peasant class and of the small town-dwellers, aiming at the separation of the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

648 Since 1936, as a reaction to the policy of the Reich, which tended to unite the different Ukrainian movements under its guidance, the Soviet Government adopted a new Ukrainian policy the official thesis of which was the *brotherly union of the Ukrainian and Great Russian people, as bequeathed by history.*

197 To-day we observe an attempt at bringing the Ukrainian and Russian languages closer together. Ukrainian is being purged of its Polonisms and its Germanisms, imported from Galicia, which ' the enemies of the people ' had tried to implant in the Soviet Ukraine. A system which tends to awaken and to maintain Russian national pride has been inaugurated. The victory of Poltava is no longer the victory of a Tsar who oppressed his people, but the liberation of the Ukrainian workers from the Swedish and Polish aggressors.

000 To sum up, among all the countries subjected to the ' social experiments ' by the heirs of Lenin, the Ukraine bows to them with far greater difficulty than the others. In this she seems to be the obvious prey of separatism, led by foreigners, the declared enemies of her people.

The Soviet Government is alone responsible for the existence of this separatism, which cannot be justified from any point of view and is foreign to the spirit and the interests of the Ukrainian people.

[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

CHAPTER VI

THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM TO-DAY

IF before the Great War Galicia was the home of the /75 Ukrainian movement, and if since 1917 the first landmark of the new Ukrainian State was erected in the Russian part of the Ukraine, it is since 29 September 1938 that the tiny Sub-Carpathian Russia was invested with the role of a 'new Ukrainian Piedmont.' How did this come about? How could a country, linked with Hungary during seven centuries, though sentimentally tied to Russia, become this new 'Piedmont'?

We know that during the Great War the Carpatho-Russian people showed their attachment to the Russian cause almost openly, which exposed them to the severest repressions on the part of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The inter-allied agreements of the time of the war, in giving Russia full liberty of establishing her new frontier with Austro-Hungary, seemed to have prepared the annexation of this small country by Russia.

The Russian Revolution, and the anarchy which followed, rendered these arrangements void. President Masaryk mentions the following in his memoirs:

'The collapse of Russia made the annexation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by the Czechoslovak Republic possible. First it was only a hope, but when I was in Russia, and particularly in the Ukraine, I was forced to give my attention to this plan.'

Immediately after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary the Czech legions were eager to occupy the western

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

175 part of Carpathian Russia—the district of Priachev. On 9 January 1919 this district was purely and simply annexed by Slovakia, which had herself become an integral part of the young Czechoslovak Republic.

In the other, the greater part of Carpathian Russia, power had fallen into the hands of the Russian national committees which remained in constant contact with the representatives elected by the Carpatho-Russian *émigrés* of America. This American delegation played a decisive role in the events which followed. Greatly attached to the national Russian cause, it nevertheless bowed to circumstances in recognizing the impossibility, owing to the situation in Russia, of uniting the Carpathian country to the Russian State. And it is thus that the Carpatho-Russian committees accepted, on 16 May 1919, the decisive resolution :

'Sub-Carpathian Russian forms an autonomous State within the Czechoslovakian Republic.'

It was this solution—the inclusion of Sub-Carpathian Russia as an autonomous entity in the Czechoslovakian State—which was expressly ratified by the peace treaties. Articles 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain established in effect the international status of Carpathian Russia :

Czechoslovakia accepted the proposal of the powers of the *entente* which aimed at endowing Sub-Carpathian Russia with the largest possible autonomy (Article 10). She undertook to give her a Diet freely elected by the population as well as a local administration responsible to the Diet (Article 11). The officials of the State in Sub-Carpathian Russia were to be natives of the country and the Carpatho-Russian people were to be fairly represented in the common Parliament of the republic (Articles 12 and 13).

This statute, guaranteed by the powers of the *entente*,

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was never put into operation, notwithstanding the repeated demands of Carpatho-Russian organizations which even tried, but in vain, to seize the Secretariat to the League of Nations.

Unfortunately for the Czechoslovakian State and for Europe, the Government of Prague showed itself extremely distrustful of all Russian national tendencies. Not only was the autonomous Diet never summoned, but the Czech authorities neglected, moreover, the international obligation to recruit the administrative staffs among the native population. According to an *aide-mémoire* presented to the League of Nations in 1923, there were 1213 Czech officials of the Ministry of Finance in Sub-Carpathian Russia against only 77 Russians, 272 Czech officials of the Ministry of Interior against 45 Russians, and 14 Czechs of the Ministry of Health against 2 Russians, etc.

Such a situation made collaboration between Russians and Czechs very difficult. It soon ended in the resignation of the first governor of the country, M. Jatkovitch, of Russian sympathies, who had played a very important role in the inclusion of Sub-Carpathian Russia in Czechoslovakia.

But it was not only the Czech officials who made their appearance in large numbers in the land of the Carpathians. Distrusting the Russians, the Government of Prague clearly favoured Ukrainian tendencies. Masaryk himself mentioned in his memoirs that he viewed with ‘ the greatest sympathy the efforts which aim at the introduction of the Little Russian language in the schools and the administration ’ of Sub-Carpathian Russia. The popular masses were completely strange to this Ukrainian movement and one attempted to implant it in the Carpathians with the help of *émigrés*, mostly from Galicia. The Russian Press of the Carpathians never

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1
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175 ceased to disclose the favourable conditions enjoyed by these foreign elements to whom the Czechoslovakian Government was quite ready to entrust public education in preference to Russians.

Thus Ukrainization nevertheless remained without appreciable results, when in 1937 the Czechoslovakian Government undertook a referendum in Sub-Carpathian Russia in order to establish the desires of the population concerning the choice of the language of instruction in primary schools; 82 per cent of the votes were given for the Russian language and only 18 per cent for Ukrainian. Even if we admit that this referendum had no political character, one would have to believe that the figures which resulted correspond to the facts.

A few days before the events of September 1938 the Czechoslovakian Government decided to inaugurate a federal policy and appointed the President of the 'Russian Agrarian Union,' Brody, as chief of the Government of Sub-Carpathian Russia. But as soon as the Munich agreements were signed the German Government demanded a change of political direction of this Cabinet. For a short while yet Brody remained at the head of the Cabinet of Sub-Carpathian Russia, but he was supplemented by two Ukrainian Ministers. In October a new change put an end to the power of the Russian party.

Under the growing pressure of the Reich, Czechoslovakia established a new Government in Sub-Carpathian Russia, presided over by Monsignor Volochine, of Ukrainian sympathies and with pro-German tendencies. Volochine proclaimed an 'Autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' thus conforming to the German plan which tended to the creation of a Ukrainian springboard which was required by the policy of the *Drang nach Osten*. The installation of this Government was

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1
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in clear contradiction to the aspirations of the people. Actually, in 1937, during the last relatively free elections to the Czechoslovakian Parliament, the Russian block, called the 'Russian Agrarian Union,' had obtained 120,000 votes against 40,000 Ukrainian votes of the party of Monsignor Volochine.

Always pursuing their anti-Russian policy, the agents of Monsignor Volochine denounced Brody to the Government of Prague, accusing him of high treason to Czechoslovakia, and insinuated that he had had the intention of uniting Sub-Carpathian Russia to Hungary. Brody was imprisoned, but had to be freed in February 1939 as the tribunal had pronounced his case not proven. But Volochine was already strongly in power, supported by Revay, a partisan of the close union with Germany and a former social democratic deputy of the Hungarian Parliament, who had become one of the active members of the 'Ukrainian National Union,' 'U.N.O.,' a terrorists' organization whose headquarters are at Berlin.

Prague and Berlin already sheltered numerous Ukrainian *émigrés*, since the union of Galicia and Poland, and especially the members of the U.N.O. who, as soon as the New Ukraine was proclaimed, moved to Ujhorod, an ancient medieval city, the capital of Sub-Carpathian Russia, to reinforce the ranks of militant Ukrainianism. The population, poor and often inert and illiterate, did not participate in any Ukrainian political movement.

The installation of the Ukrainian Government was immediately followed by the inauguration of Hitlerist methods in the country. Semi-military organizations, formed on the model of the S.A., took over the direction of public affairs. The new methods were applied to the elections to the Ukrainian Diet, the results of which were astounding: 92 per cent of the votes were given to the Ukrainians, whose candidates figured on the one

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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and only list, that of Volochine. It seems to us superfluous to insist on the impossibility of so rapid a change of public opinion, especially as no serious propaganda whatever had taken place before the installation of the new Government.

In order to have an idea of the new regime it is curious to note that the land, whose population does not exceed 600,000 people, saw itself endowed with three concentration camps in which all those were locked up who were Russians at heart and did not want to submit to this political farce.

During the period which passed between the Munich agreement and the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, Sub-Carpathian Russia underwent the amputation of a narrow strip of her territory, along the Hungarian border, which was given to the latter together with the ancient capital, the town of Ujhorod.

As a reaction to the policy of Ukrainization of the Czechoslovakian Government, the Hungarians were eager to adopt a pro-Russian policy in the parts of Sub-Carpathian Russia which fell to them. The Russian schools were re-established and Ujhorod and Mukacevo returned to their ancient role of Russian cultural centres.

The Russian deputies of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, who represented the regions given to Hungary, and, in the first instance, Fenczik, the leader of the Russian Fascist Party, automatically became deputies of the Magyar Parliament.

It is curious to note that at the same time as the blue and yellow flag of the Ukraine was raised over the new autonomous Ukrainian republic, the tricolour flag of Imperial Russia is the only one authorized in the Hungarian part.

Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, deprived of the only big town, Ujhorod, had to establish a provisional capital at

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Chust, a place which is no more than a hamlet, and which has not even got a railway station. In this improvised capital the innumerable manifestations of the military force of the Ukrainian movement were displayed every day with the habitual pomp of Hitlerist mass meetings.

The scandal and the abuses of the last elections, the arbitrariness and brutality of the men of the *Sitch* (the name of the Ukrainian S.A.), obliged the Czechoslovakian Government to undertake measures for curbing the too clamorous activity of the blue-yellow Hitlerists, which was becoming too compromising.

The Czech general, Prhala, known for his Russian sympathies, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Czech troops stationed in the Ukrainian territory and entered as such into the Cabinet of Monsignor Volochine. At the same time Revay was dismissed. This operation did not please the German Government, which saw one of its most fervent adepts in Revay.

It is only after the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia and the establishment of the protectorate by the Reich in Slovakia and the occupation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by the Hungarian Army, that Ukrainian activities ended on its territory.

To-day we do not know yet what the immediate future of this country will be. It is more than probable that, once rejoined to Hungary, every expression of the Ukrainian movement will be suppressed, and the partisans of the Russian culture and spirit will again return to the direction of the land.

This seems to us the more likely as the Ukrainian movement was severely suppressed in Poland, the loyal ally of Hungary. This latter will never allow the inauguration of a movement on her territory which could one day be considered as being against the interests of Poland.

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175 At a first glance the pro-Russian movement seems equally dangerous in the eyes of the Poles. But if the Ukrainian movement has a clearly political character the russophile movement in Sub-Carpathian Russia never raises the question of the return to Russia, but limits itself to the expression of its cultural aspirations.

The official indifference of the Reich to the suppression of the 'Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' which had been created by it, seems astonishing. Is it because Germany has acknowledged that the 'Piedmont' had been badly chosen and had no chance whatever of becoming a serious Ukrainian springboard? Recent events would seem to indicate much wider plans. Or is it because for the moment she considers it inconvenient to take up an openly hostile position towards Hungary? It seems that the influential members of the U.N.O., disconcerted by the attitude of the Reich, hurriedly left Germany to find refuge elsewhere. The near future will throw light on this enigma. The scale of events is growing.

. . . . .

000 The following three factors have put the Ukrainian problem in the forefront of to-day's international politics:

1. The development of the German dynamic initiative which seeks to assure a new living space and to open a path towards the east.

2. The Soviet power which finds itself to-day the master of Russia, but which shows itself of being incapable of sufficiently influencing the situation in Eastern Europe by its actions and of giving it permanent equilibrium.

3. Polish events.

The idea of a German hold on the Ukraine was inaugurated during the Great War, if not earlier, and has survived the downfall of the Central Powers in 1918. 000 During the session of the Peace Conference, Erzberger declared to the Constituent Assembly at Weimar :

“ We need Lithuania and the Ukraine, who are destined to become the vanguards of Germany. If, on the other hand, we keep Poland, we shall be able to close all the doors which lead to Russia. Russia will be ours. Is there anyone who would not understand that it is there that the future of Germany lies ?

That was already the programme which was later again taken up and amplified by National Socialism.

We have seen the role played by the German intellectuals of the Baltic Provinces in the elaboration of the plans of the dismemberment of pre-Great War Russia. It was also a Baltic *émigré*, a former Russian subject, Alfred Rosenberg, who is the real inspirer of *Ostpolitik*, ‘ the eastern policy ’ of the Third Reich.

Born in 1893 at Reval, he began his studies at the Technical University of Riga, which was evacuated to Moscow during the Great War. Having thus lived in the old Russian capital during the first years of the Revolution, he left Russia in 1919 and settled in Munich. There he soon joined the National Socialist movement which was only just beginning to form.

During the first years there were only two men in the immediate entourage of the Fuehrer capable of influencing the formation of his views on international politics. One was Scheubner-Richter, his most brilliant lieutenant during the whole early period, a European who was widely open to all ideas and was deeply pro-Russian. The other was Rosenberg. Scheubner-Richter was killed by a bullet at Hitler's side during the attempted insurrection of 8 November 1923 at Munich. Rosenberg remained.

Director of the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, the official

000 paper of the party, since 1925, and chief of the Foreign Affairs office of the party after the capture of power, and entrusted since with the national education of the German people, Rosenberg is considered to-day in Germany as the most eminent representative of the National Socialist philosophy. His writings formed part of the school instruction, and the whole of German youth is thus impregnated with his ideas.

Rosenberg hates Russia, both in her Christian as well as her Bolshevik form. He hates her traditions, her history, her literature, her statesmen, and her poets. And he considers the Ukraine the key to all international questions. In all his writings he constantly returns to this. Charles XII of Sweden, who was the first in the West to have the idea of detaching the Ukraine from Russia, is his favourite hero.

In his book, *The Paths and the Aims of the Foreign Policy of Germany*, published by the party in 1925, Rosenberg devotes a leading place to the Ukraine. He speaks of her as the principal bastion which the 'Nordic race' needs against 'mongoloid' Russia and as an essential economic base required by Germany as a support against 'negroid' France. He affirms that the Ukraine is an integral part of Central Europe and at the same time a natural agricultural adjunct of industrialized Germany. According to him the Ukraine must serve as a link between Germany and Great Britain. 'British India has to be protected on the western frontier of Russia,' and it is Germany which, in seizing the Ukraine, would take the responsibility of administering the mortal blow to Russian power.

This book of Rosenberg was accepted as the official programme of the foreign policy of the party by the National Socialist Congress at Nuremberg in 1926.

'Germany, as a racial and national State, will be the central power on the Continent and will protect the 000 whole south and south-east of Europe,' he writes in his other book, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*. 'As to Russia, she has to content herself with a reduced role, while moving her centre of gravity towards Asia.'

In the chapters of *Mein Kampf* consecrated to international policy, Hitler is the echo of the ideas of Rosenberg. This is the essential proposition :

'When we speak of new territories in Europe, we first of all think of Russia and of the border countries which depend on her. It seems that fate shows us our path. Delivered over to Bolshevism, Russia has fatally lost the intellectual layer which had founded and which safeguarded her political existence. Because the organization of a Russian State is far from being the result of the political talents of the Slavonic element in Russia, it is only a striking example of the constructive political activity of the Germanic elements active among an inferior race. It is thus that many empires in the world were founded. During the centuries the power of Russia was supported by the Germanic element which constituted its ruling upper layers. This racial kernel can be considered as almost completely destroyed. The Jew has put himself in its place. The immense empire of the east is ready to fall and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will be the end of the Russian State.'

Long before the advent of power, the National Socialist Party closely followed the evolution of the Ukrainian movement. In 1924 Rosenberg put a new pretender to the crown of the Ukraine forward in the person of M. Poltawetz-Ostranitza, a former colonel of the Russian Army, who willingly lent himself to the German schemes. After having caused a small stir, the affair was compromised by some rather doubtful

000 financial affairs which must have involved the National Socialist Party in expense rather than profit. In the course of the following years contacts were established with various separatist groups who were active in Polish Ukraine. Here the personality of M. Motz, collaborator and intimate friend of Rosenberg, was often in the forefront. He was active in the Ukrainian Press of Galicia.

It was particularly difficult to realize a union between the different Ukrainian separatist groups. The attempts which emanated from Berlin failed all the more as the Ukrainian democrats, traditionally the most influential in Galicia, regarded the German 'Fascism' with some distrust. After some hesitation the hopes of M. Rosenberg and those of the National Socialist Party were centred on the ex-Hetman Skoropadsky, who was living in Berlin since his flight from Kiev.

After the seizure of power the National Socialists were still more preoccupied with the Ukrainian question. Since the spring of 1933 lectures are being held at the villa of General Skoropadsky at Wannsee, at which the most important personalities of the party such as Rosenberg, Goebbels, and Kube, who was the chief of the eastern section of the propaganda office and who has since committed suicide, attend. Roehm was amongst the most frequent guests, which made one think, after the drama of 30 June, that the eclipse of Skoropadsky was at hand. But it did not happen, as his connections with the National Socialist Party were sufficiently strong.

All the meetings did not, however, end in the reconciliation of the different Ukrainian tendencies. The primitive plan of bringing about Skoropadsky's acknowledgment by all the other groups was abandoned. But the Government of the Reich nevertheless obtained the assurance of collaboration from most of these Ukrainian groups. 000

Far more important were the talks which the Government of Hitler began with Poland and which ended in the German-Polish agreement of January 1934. According to the official Note recently published by the Polish agency 'Iskra' (May 1939) one can have no further doubts about the purpose at the time of the propositions which the Third Reich suggested to Poland—the partition of Russia into spheres of influence including White Russia, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus.

At the same time the Reich played the role of mediator between the Ukrainians of Galicia and the Polish Government. In fact there was a possibility of a common German-Polish action, aiming at the separation of the Soviet Ukraine from Russia. This made the Ukrainians of Galicia forget the floods of blood and the centuries of struggle which are such a barrier between them and Poland. Thus the official paper of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, *Dilo*, wrote in November 1936 on the subject of a Polish-German agreement:

'The Soviets are endangered by the partition. Poland is faced by the following dilemma: She must either be a passive observer of the play of forces which work for the bringing about of a change of balance in the east of Europe, or she must associate with those who aspire to establish a new balance. As for us other Ukrainians, we are proved and intransigent revisionists. We only wish for an international agreement which would eliminate the Soviets.'

Moscow realized clearly that the German-Polish agreement of 1934 was based on ambitions directed towards the Soviet Ukraine. Henceforth the policy of the U.S.S.R. aimed at detaching the Ukrainians of Galicia from their chiefs, who had become pro-Polish and

000 pro-German, in order to raise a Ukrainian movement in Poland which could have the support of the Soviet Ukraine. This question was openly discussed by the Soviet Press and even by the VIIIth Congress of the Communist International in August 1935.

On the German side one also did not make any mystery of the real aims of the German-Polish agreement. Thus a book which was especially recommended by the Ministry of Propaganda at Berlin, and whose author was Hermann Stegemann, contains this remarkable sentence:

'Thanks to this agreement, Poland has obtained a greater liberty of political action in the east. As for Germany, she is at present able to inaugurate a mutual movement towards the east and south-east. This perspective is of great importance.'

German writers, such as Paul Richter, have already published books devoted to the 'Enlarged Third Reich,' which groups around it and under its rule a federated Central Europe. According to M. Richter, the eastern frontier of this 'Mittel Europa' would begin at the Lake of Ladoga, east of St. Petersburg, would descend towards the south, then a little to the west of Moscow, and would then go on towards the south-east, to finish at the mouth of the Don. The whole of White Russia, enlarged up to Smolensk and, naturally, the whole Ukraine, would thus be included in the German 'living space.'

Even such a considered thinker as M. Schacht has spoken semi-openly of the division of the Ukraine between Poland and Germany as a natural and imminent thing, during his negotiations at Basle in November 1936.

We will cite two statements made fifteen years ago, one in the review *Deutsche Politik* of 19 April 1918: 'Agricultural Ukraine can become an excellent adjunct to the highly developed industry of the central empires,' 000 and the other in August 1933 in *Volk und Reich*: 'If one admits that the idea of the decomposition of the giant empire of the Tsars is of profit to Germany, one must pursue this idea to the end and dismember Eastern Europe in accordance with its ethnic elements.' These two extracts serve to illustrate the German point of view on the Ukrainian problem very clearly. The hostility of the Ukrainian people to the Soviet regime, which was imposed against their will and by force on the one hand, as well as the impossibility of intervention by the Soviet Government as permanent protector of the Russian people from the German attack, for military and social reasons, as had been the case under the Tsars, on the other hand favour the hopes of the Reich of becoming the master of the Ukrainian movement and of directing it in its own interests. Germany favours the idea of a Great Ukraine, from the Caucasus to Hungary, allied with her in economic and military matters.

The attitude of Poland to the Ukrainian problem was far more complex than that of Germany. Since 1920 Poland became a big State, placed between the Russian and the German worlds, and could not, despite its promise and international treaties, give autonomy to her minorities which represented more than 30 per cent of her population, of whom 6,500,000 were Ukrainians. Praiseworthy though Polish national sentiment may be, as also its military and civic virtues and its heroic past, the role of a great power is beyond the strength of this brave nation. Poland could not retain the minorities within her frontier without applying a police regime of repression in their territories, which absorbed a part of her national energy, whose real aims ought to have been economic restoration and the resistance to German pressure.

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If the Polish State at the beginning of its existence had supported the Ukrainian movement of Russian origin (Petlioura), it was only in order to assure an ally against Russia and to establish the path which would lead to the creation of the Great Poland within the frontiers which applied before the first partition of 1772.

As a result of the rigid centralization of the Polish State, and of the continual suppression, cultural and religious, of the Ukrainian people, as well as a result of the historic atavism which prevented the cohabitation of Ukrainians and Poles (as long as the world is the world, a Pole will not be brother to a Ukrainian, the chronicler already said in the sixteenth century), the tolerance which was shown from time to time in the Polish policy in Galicia could change nothing in the general state of affairs.

In 1935, under pressure of the Reich, the coalition of a Ukrainian parliamentary block composed of members of the 'U.N.D.O.' (Ukrainian Popular Democratic Union), a moderate party, and of the Polish National Party called the 'Party of the Colonels,' was brought about in tune with the principle of the complete loyalty of the Ukrainians within the framework of the Polish State.

Nevertheless this coalition did not last long as the popular Ukrainian masses did not agree to any loyal collaboration with the secular oppressors. It is especially interesting to note that as soon as the regime of oppression exercised with regard to the Ukrainian population was slightly slackened, the ethnical frontier between the Ukrainians and the Poles in mixed regions[1] (as, for example, the region of Kholm) immediately moved towards the west and cut into the Polish part.

The Munich agreements, the accentuation of the

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[1] See Map No. 4.

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German menace as well as the rapid depolonization of the mixed regions, forced the Polish Government to return to the policy of repressions. This time, applied with an unheard-of violence, it was not only directed against the Ukrainian organizations but equally against the Orthodox Church and even the Uniats.

The military authorities of the frontier guard (KOP) everywhere took precedence over the civil administration of the eastern regions of Poland, the most moderate representatives of which were obliged to resign, as for example the *voievode* of Volynia, Jozefski, who had exerted himself during many years in establishing confident co-operation between the native population and the Polish State.

At the same time, by an agreement signed with the Vatican on 20 June 1938 and ratified on 6 July of the same year, the Polish Government made a present of 12,000 hectares of agricultural land and of an undefined number of churches belonging to Orthodox religious communities to the Catholic Church of the Latin rite. This mass expropriation was legally only aimed at the churches which had once belonged to the Latin Church. But the protest formulated last summer by the Russian deputies of the Polish Parliament has established beyond doubt that not less than ninety-eight Orthodox churches, expropriated according to this agreement, were never formerly dedicated to the Latin cult.

On the other hand, while expropriating a great number of Orthodox churches, the Polish authorities also started to demolish others. According to the protest of the Russian deputies mentioned above, not less than a hundred Orthodox churches were thus demolished by the Polish authorities in Western Ukraine during the course of June 1938. These demolitions were sometimes undertaken under the pretext that an ‘ excessively

000 large' number of buildings of the Orthodox Church were said to exist. In other cases the churches were destroyed without any pretext. To sum up, the Orthodox population of the palatinate of Lioublin did not keep more than 54 churches of the 340 which it had previously possessed. The Orthodox priests were imprisoned or condemned to fines for no other reason than that they had preached in Russian or in Ukrainian (instead of Polish).

But let us allow the Polish Press to speak for itself. After having accomplished a journey of study in the Polish Ukraine, Mme Emzet tells us the following in the *Kurjer Powszechny :*

'I have returned morally shattered. If someone would have told me a few years ago that such things could happen in Poland, I should have treated him as a despicable slanderer. We have returned to a far-away past. The trials of dissenters (non-Catholics), which one thought had been buried for ever, are about to be revived. Those who ought to be most concerned about the welfare of the Polish Republic are raising two enemies against each other within these frontiers. . . . The civic peace of our State depends at this moment on the maturity and the moderation of the Orthodox agriculturalist. You can only imagine what will happen when this almost illiterate peasant will repay with the same coin for the " good " which one has done for him.'

This is also the opinion of M. Cat-Mackewicz, the director of the daily Ultra-Nationalist Polish *Slovo* (of Vilna). He shows that, apart from the official demolishing of Orthodox churches, a certain number of them were destroyed by dynamite by 'unknown persons' who have never been found. He has himself visited the district in which one of these 'incidents' took place. This was at Molodetchno where an Orthodox chapel had been destroyed during the night. 'On leaving for Molodetchno,' he writes, 'I was convinced that this was the work of a Bolshevik rascal. My indignation and shame were deep when I heard the inhabitants of Molodetchno say, with a strange smile: "No, these were certainly not Bolsheviks. . . . For nearly a year there has been much talk of depriving the Orthodox of this chapel."' 000

The indignation of the population and of the clergy which was provoked by the closing of the Orthodox parish schools, by the destruction with dynamite of the Orthodox churches, and by the mass arrests of the Ukrainian clergy, spread over the whole country.

Even a Uniat-Orthodox block was formed against this Polish policy.

Monsignor Szepticki, Uniat Archbishop of Galicia, has published a circular which was later confiscated by the Polish authorities, against the religious repressions undertaken by the Polish Government.

The U.N.D.O. was eager to denounce collaboration with the Polish Government party, but it could no longer regain its old authority in the eyes of the population, which made the position of the extremist parties stronger, among them the 'U.N.O.,' all under German direction.

Disturbances spread over the whole Galician territory and especially to Lvov, where a state of siege was proclaimed. Troops were massed in the frontier regions. The situation remained tense.

Thus, unfortunately, Polish duplicity in the Ukrainian question, a duplicity which was manifested by the violent repression of everything Ukrainian in Poland and by the support of the Ukrainian movement in Russia, characterized Polish policy during twenty years.

Since the annexation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by

7:Bregy & Obolensky A1-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

000 Hungary and the suppression of the artificial 'Ukrainian Piedmont,' there is no longer a Ukrainian problem in Hungary. As for Rumania, the Ukrainian problem is only a simple one of minorities, much less important than that of the Hungarian and above all the Russian minorities. The Russian question is at the same time that of Bessarabia, which is in no way linked with Rumania and which is a simple province of the New Russia and the indisputable patrimony of the Russian State.

Poland was a natural and declared enemy of the independence of the Ukraine, and if she supported the Ukrainian movement beyond her frontiers it was with the aim of preparing the possibility of establishing herself, at a suitable moment, on the right bank of the Dnieper and of giving herself an outlet on the Black Sea. This outlet could have been a counterweight to the instability of her possessions on the shores of the Baltic, coveted by the Germans.

Ukrainian politicians who look for German or Polish support in the realization of Ukrainian independence cannot be sure of serving the interests of their country.

The Ukrainian movement does not exist in Polish Galicia as a national movement, although it is clearly justified there by reason of the unbearable oppression of religion, culture, and dignity to which the Ukrainian people were subjected. The new Poland will be stronger without this thorn in its side.

. . . .

To conclude let us glance at the various Ukrainian groups which exist to-day. There are very many, in Galicia and especially among Ukrainian *émigrés* 'conscious of their nationality.' And the relations between these various groups leave much to be desired.

It is the U.N.O., the National Ukrainian Organization, OUN already mentioned several times, which is distinguished among the others by its pronounced fighting spirit. It sprang in about 1925 from *émigré* circles which originally hoped for an active struggle against Soviet Communism. Colonel Konovaletz, who re-grouped these activist circles and became their chief, gradually gave them another objective and one which was essentially anti-Polish. Galicia became the special preserve of this new activity of the U.N.O., which was only able to exist illegally on Polish territory. The greater part of the terrorist attempts executed by Ukrainians against Polish political personalities in Galicia were its work. From the beginning the U.N.O. was inspired by Fascist ideas and long before 1933 it was looking for German support. After the advent of Hitler to power the U.N.O. derived great advantage from the new political situation. It was this organization which played the decisive role in the ill-founded 'Sub-Carpathian Ukraine.' And when the Reich authorities were in search of a 'Fuehrer' for the Ukrainians living in Germany, it was this organization which again succeeded in bringing about the choice of one of its members by the Germans. It was M. Souchko who, since, has the official privilege of controlling his compatriots by police methods.

The U.N.O., an organization of Fascist tendencies, is fiercely hostile to the 'Monarchists' who group themselves round the Hetman Skoropadsky and more especially round his son, the young 'Hetmanytch' Danilo, whose political role is becoming increasingly more active. The U.N.O. and the partisans of the Hetmanate are competing for the favours of the German Government which, while supporting the U.N.O., had not dropped Skoropadsky in the summer of 1939. The 'Ukrainian Monarchist movement,' which had no real

000 adherents abroad before 1933, enjoys to-day a noticeable success among Ukrainian emigrants. The journey which the 'Hetmanytch' Danilo had undertaken last year to Canada and the United States, as well as recent visits to other countries, seem to have secured him a certain amount of help among Ukrainians in America who, mostly emigrated from Galicia long before the war, form numerous and prosperous colonies in that country.

An ugly story had, however, harmed the reputation of M. Skoropadsky outside Germany. Those who have read the law reports in London in 1935 will remember the trial which took place in connection with an English philanthropist, Mr. Tufnell, against Mr. Korostovetz, who, coming from Berlin, made propaganda in London in the name and for the benefit of the Hetman. It concerned the question of a big enterprise which aimed at the collection of the necessary funds for the deliverance of the Ukraine—an enterprise of which Mr. Tufnell became a leading champion and which, in 1933 and 1934, gave, it is believed, not less than £30,000. The trial apparently resulted from an inquiry which, so it seems, Mr. Tufnell had instituted in Berlin in order to make sure of the purpose for which the money was used and which seemed to have led to further steps in court against Messrs. Skoropadsky and Korostovetz at the instance of some creditors. No verdict was, however, given, as the case was withdrawn during the course of the trial and a settlement was reached out of court.

Apart from the Ukrainian opinion of the right, represented by the U.N.O. and the 'Hetmanists,' there still exist a large number of Ukrainian groups of more or less democratic tendencies. They are particularly strong among Ukrainian organizations which functioned legally in Galicia. Generally the democratic tendency originated with Petlioura and his Directorate, whose relations with Poland we have already noted. Although having been strongly compromised by these tactics, the members of the Directorate have continued to be politically active in the emigration. After the death of Petlioura, who was assassinated in Paris by a Jew, Schwartzbord, who wanted to avenge the pogroms of 1919, the presidency of what remained of the Directorate passed to M. Lewitzky, who settled in Poland and continued to look for Polish support against Russia.

In Paris the remaining parts of the Directorate are represented by the group of the monthly journal *Trizoub*, as well as by the dissident group of M. Alexander Choulguine (the group of the monthly journal *Promethee*, published in French).

The semi-official German monthly journal *Osteuropa*, which is valued among those best informed on East European questions, published, in its issue of December 1938, interesting details about the character of these groups. According to *Osteuropa* the Polish Government had never ceased to finance the circles, and especially the *Promethee*, in the hope of preparing a sufficient number of propagandists capable of supporting the aims of the dismemberment of Russia. *Osteuropa*, which (in December 1938) considered this policy sound and as being the 'only possible one' from the Polish point of view, underlined, moreover, the role played by a Polish publicist, M. Baczkowski, whose anti-Russian activities were the specific link between the entourage of Colonel Beck and the Ukrainian *émigrés*.

One can understand that during the German-Polish flirtation Germany could safely rely on the various Ukrainians in the service of Poland. The position of the latter now became decidedly more complicated and

000 more delicate in so far as German-Polish relations were becoming strained and Poland had commenced a *rapprochement* with the U.S.S.R., while abandoning for the moment at least the plans of the partition of Russia.

Despite all the different points of view and the internal quarrels the pro-German and pro-Polish Ukrainian politicians are united in a strong hate of Russia and in an exaggerated and extravagant idea of their own national possibilities. Far beyond the limits of the Great Ukraine, such as we have defined it in Chapter I, the territory of which already includes the six to seven non-Ukrainian minorities, this ultra-nationalist propaganda claims the greater part of the Northern Caucasus (where, in reality, there exists only a Ukrainian minority in the sole region of the Kuban) for the future Ukraine, as well as an outlet to the Caspian Sea in the Crimea and the Great Russian territories of Koursk, Voronej, the lower Volga, and finally colonies in the Far East. Thus we come to the idea of a Ukrainian State extending over some 800,000 square kilometres and having 80,000,000 or 90,000,000 inhabitants.

In order to find an historic justification for the complete rupture with Russia, this propaganda produces arguments of which the least one can say is that they are absolutely fantastic inventions. One goes so far as to say that St. Vladimir called himself Prince of the Ukraine, that the Great Russians are not Slavs, but Tartars or Ugro-Finns, having stolen the old name of 'Rous',' and that their own language is, unlike Ukrainian, an Asiatic language. Finally we were able to read, not long ago, in an article published by a French review, that at the time of Peter the Great, when the Ukraine had already been Christian for many centuries, Muscovite Great Russia still continued in the darkness of paganism.

. . . We only mention these absurdities to show where one can be led to if one allows oneself to be carried away by one's own passions or by deception. 000

In December 1938 a statement was made in the Press of the world that a vast enterprise was being prepared in Germany with the aim of allowing the Head of the Imperial House of Russia, the young Grand Duke Vladimir, who had inherited the legitimate rights to the Imperial Throne of Russia from his father, the Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirowitch, to ascend the throne of an independent Ukraine. This misleading statement, which resulted from a journey of the young Grand Duke for family reasons, was immediately contradicted by him with great energy and precision.

After having personally expressed his 'astonishment o see his name linked with the question of German negotiations in connection with Ukrainian problems' on the wireless, the Grand Duke Vladimir published a declaration through his Chancellery which stated that neither directly nor indirectly had any person asked him to give his name to a political enterprise whose object was the dismemberment of the Russian Empire and that he would never give his consent to plans of this nature.'

This attempt to determine which way the wind was blowing, for such it was, and not simply a sensational scoop of an unemployed journalist, remained without consequences. But in any case it shows what can sometimes be expected in connection with the Ukrainian question which has been so tremendously extended and poisoned by propaganda which has no longer anything in common with the real interests of the Ukrainian people.

It would, however, be wrong to pretend that all those outside the frontier of the U.S.S.R. who call themselves

000 Ukrainians, want to fight Russia at any price with the help of any external adversary, be he German or Pole. Decidedly the opposite is true. We already know that the popular masses in Galicia are traditionally anti-Polish. And it is this that strongly influences the attitude of very numerous Galician emigrants in the United States and in Canada.

Despite the slight success which the 'Hetmanytch' Danilo Skoropadsky had had during his propaganda tour in the New World, it remains true that the great majority of the Galicians of America, influenced though they are by Ukrainian nationalism, of which Galicia is the cradle as well as the principal base, remain openly hostile to Poland and more or less distrustful of Germany. The independence of the Ukraine is certainly a dogma to them which could not be easily upset, but in everyday life a close and confident collaboration is always easily established between the cultural and economic organizations of the Ukrainians in America on the one part and the Russian organizations on the other.

Many Ukrainian nationalists ask themselves inwardly if a federation with Russia would not be worth more than Polish domination, the consequences of which can be noted in Galicia, or to a German protectorate, of which one had had some experience in 1918.

It is just twenty years ago that the Directorate of the Ukrainian Republic plotted, with the utmost secrecy, the cession of Western Ukraine to Poland. The agent of the Ukrainian autonomous Government of Eastern Galicia at the Peace Conference, M. B. Paneyko, wrote on 28 August 1919:

'Two days ago the head of the Russian office of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me, in the presence of another high official, the following: I cannot understand your Ukrainian policy. You ally 000 yourselves with secondary States such as Poland and Rumania, you pay them with such valuable provinces as Galicia, the territory of Kholm, Volynia, and Bessarabia when, alternatively, by joining the Russian federation you could keep all your provinces.'

While agreeing completely with the truth of this argument, M. Paneyko continued:

'Galicia will therefore be handed over to Polish discretion. If our malicious compatriots think that after having created the Ukraine with Polish assistance they will be able, later on, to take Galicia from Poland by force, they are childishly mistaken. Such a Ukraine, fearing Russia with her 100,000,000 inhabitants, will always be dependent on Poland and will receive nothing from her.' And Paneyko concludes in underlining the necessity for creating a 'large Russian federation in which all the Ukrainian lands, including Galicia, would be re-united. Such a federation would give the Ukrainians the same position in world politics which Hungary had formerly enjoyed in the Austro-Hungarian federation. This federation would not only preserve Galicia for the Ukraine, but also the Ukrainian colonies of Asia and would allow the Ukrainian people to develop their spiritual and material forces in peace.'

And it was undoubtedly a similar argument which induced the Ukrainian Army in Galicia, some weeks later, to link its fate with that of the Russian Volunteer Army.

After twenty years, and at the height of Polish repressions in Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Press of Galicia thought it a convenient moment for reopening the door to the Russians and to make, for the moment, an allusion to the possibility of reconsidering that anti-Russian dogma which it usually so readily underlined.

000 Thus, in January 1938, the *Lvivski Visti* of Lvov, published under the heading of news, but nevertheless published, a most curious article in which, amongst other things, we read :

'It is now time to stop renouncing Gogol, Potapenko, and Korolenko and the large number of scientists, poets, writers, statesmen, and military leaders, only because they wrote in Russian instead of Ukrainian. Despite all that, they did not become Great Russians and we, the Ukrainians, are not yet rich enough to transfer their civilizing work solely to the account of Moscow.

'The White Russian and Ukrainian separatisms are, on the one hand, the result of external influences and, on the other hand, that of the Great Russian rule in Russia—a rule which hindered the manifestation of the Russian spirit in its Ukrainian and White Russian forms. It is clear that we have the right and the duty to fight the Great Russian element if it tends to destroy our own existence as Ukrainians. But for this we must practise free competition and not desert the field of activity common to all the Russians. In detaching ourselves from the Pan-Russian soil we are obliged to use all our forces in the struggle for our national existence. We know that the West does not recognize and does not notice our hopes as they are still too weak. The West, however, is itself interested in exporting its own values. On the other hand the Great Russian east forcibly rejects all that which, among us, bears the sinister mark of the negation of Russia.'

It is true that soon afterwards the allusions to a possibility of collaboration between Ukrainians and Great Russians in the Ukrainian Press of Galicia were again swept away by a flood of anti-Russian propaganda, this time caused by hopes which were founded on Germany and on the creation of a Sub-Carpathian

Ukraine. But these pro-German hopes, let us repeat it, 000 never failed and do not fail to provoke the energetic protests of numerous Ukrainian nationalists who tend neither towards Poland nor towards Germany.

The solution of the Ukrainian problem on the path of the federation with Russia, a solution which has never ceased to be considered, openly or otherwise, by certain Ukrainian nationalist circles, who were at least compromised by intrigues with opposing forces, seemed realizable at a given moment within the already existing system of the Soviet federation. The largely federal Constitution of the U.S.S.R., as it was promulgated in 1923, attracted a certain number of Ukrainian nationalists, even abroad, who believed to find there the guarantees of a free development of their people. Ukrainian politicians who were very far from being Marxists, such as M. Paneyko, whose opinion of the Russo-Ukrainian problem we had already mentioned, and even M. Vinnitchenko who had formerly presided, before Petlioura, over the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, supported this pro-Soviet movement.

Yet their hopes were destroyed by the external evolution of the Soviet Union. The federal system, such as it exists to-day according to the letter of the Constitution, could never have been applied, as the whole of Russia was in reality subjected to the Dictatorship of the Communist Party, which in turn had become the personal Dictatorship of Stalin. The persecutions of the peasants and the miseries of the collectivization which had descended upon the Ukraine, could only alienate the sympathies which already seemed acquired, The religious intolerance, and the militant atheism which shocks the most sacred and the most deeply rooted feelings of the Ukrainian popular masses, could only bring about similar results. Abroad the pro-

000 Soviet movement among the Ukrainian intellectuals was almost completely eclipsed.

But it would be childish to deny that amongst the peasantry of the Polish Ukraine the pro-Soviet sympathies are still of considerable force. As always in the course of Ukrainian history, the bad economic position and the national oppression coexisted. The peasants are pro-Russian because they are Communists, and they are Communists because they are pro-Russian. (In Sub-Carpathian Russia even more than in Galicia, this confusion of ideas sometimes takes on quite comic forms ; whole villages become converted to Orthodoxy and at the same time begin to give a 100 per cent vote for Communism, Orthodoxy being Russian and Communism also.)

And, if the Dictatorship of Stalin, authoritarian and centralist in extreme forms, could not actually support the dream of a free federation of brotherly peoples, it is also certain that very Liberal tendencies exist in Soviet Russia, especially in that privileged layer which administers the country to-day and determines its destinies. One day the revolution will come to an end and then it will be necessary to pass from an internal state of siege to more human forms of existence. During the past two or three years, in displaying before the eyes of the people Liberal reforms such as the 'most Liberal Constitution in the world,' which, for the moment, are but mirages, Stalin nevertheless shows that they are the real popular aspirations. One day it will be necessary to satisfy these aspirations in practice. It will be necessary to give more freedom in all spheres of life and it will be necessary to democratize and to decentralize. Such, without doubt, are the ideas of a number of Soviet leaders, who, while submitting to the Dictatorship of the moment, see a little further than to-morrow.

And then federalism, which is to-day only a dead letter, 000
could easily pass into the sphere of realities.

These same ideas, which have yet no means of free expression in the U.S.S.R., become more and more manifested by certain currents of opinion among Russian *émigrés*. Here a new conception of the Russian Empire is forming, a conception which seems to come near to Ukrainian federalist ideas.

The Young Russians, while remaining attached to the formula of a Monarchist State, are inspired by a modernism which is not of a type to please the Russian Conservatives of the pre-Great War period, declare themselves partisans of a Federal Empire whose principle, although definitely Russian, would in many ways approach that of the British Empire. The hereditary Crown would become the symbol of Imperial Unity and would, in the political sphere, become transformed into those moral links which unite the different federated States and the different peoples who are members of the Empire. The interlinking of economic ties on the whole immense extent of the Eurasian plains and the common interests of national defence, gives each nationality the feeling that it is in its own interest not to become detached from the Empire. On the contrary, all the liberties for developing their own national characteristics, promised but not realized by the Soviet Constitution, will be effectively guaranteed after the elimination of the present Dictatorship. In a truly democratic Monarchy all the organisms of self-government, which are subjected to-day by the omnipotence of the Communist Party and its Secretary-General, will have freedom of development. This will assure the Ukraine, as well as any other part of the Empire, the means of organizing according to their own tastes on their own traditional territory everything that concerns

000 them, without losing the enormous advantages which flow from the fact of belonging to one of the largest and most important empires of the world.

The Great Ukraine would thus become a reality within the framework of the Russian Empire, and the federal solution would save her the necessity of spreading and maintaining her national forces with a great effort to protect herself from one side against Great Russia, with whom her north-eastern frontier is extremely long and difficult to defend, and on the other side from the dangers which threaten her from the west, dangers which would be dispersed by the united forces of the Empire. And, while assuring her free national development, the Ukraine, like Great Russia, would always dispose of immense territories for colonization in Asia which are a vital necessity to her.

It is clearly understood that the equality of rights of all the nationalities would be the main principle of the Federal Empire. But, putting aside formal statutes, there is nevertheless an organic difference between the national territory of, say, a people of Central Asia, less numerous and backward and living in a dry semi-desert, and the Ukraine, the old land of Russian culture, prosperous and thickly populated. The Dictatorship of Stalin itself has been forced to recognize that the Russian people are the 'first among equals' in the Soviet federation. With the Great Russian people its brother, the Russian people of the Ukraine, is the second largest force within this commonwealth in which all the other members cannot be compared with it in importance.

The Young Russians thus insist upon the fact that the Ukrainian people, different though it is from the Great Russian people, is nevertheless a Russian people and thus has the right to a certain degree of primacy on the whole territory of the federation. "We recognize the rights of the nationality which inhabits the ancient OOO Russia Minor, the cradle of our Empire, the present-day Ukraine, as we also recognize the rights of all the nationalities of the Empire," declared last March the leader of the Young Russian Party, M. Alexander Kasem-Beg. " But there is a difference between all these nationalities and the Ukrainian people. The Ukraine is inhabited by one of the three branches of the great Eastern Slavonic trunk. Russia Minor, which became the Ukraine, is the cradle of all that which makes our character, our destinies, and our power. Among the peoples of our Empire the Ukraine has not only an equality of rights, but she also has as many duties as the Great Russian people."

And also: " The adventures of Konowaletz have nothing in common with the reality of the Ukraine, no more than the plans of foreign centres of espionage. Ukrainian separatism has been educated and instructed by the enemies of the Great Ukraine. . . . We can only oppose unconditionally every separatism in our empire, and every attempt of detaching the Ukraine as well as every attempt of forcing Great Russia to renounce the duties which fell to her in the Imperial organism. But this opposition does not mean in the least that we are disposed to deny the right of nationalities to self-government. Just on the contrary, in opposing separatism, we also oppose as much all forms of centralization in our huge country. . . . Far from bargaining with Ukrainian nationalism, Russian nationalism is destined to give it most effective support. In acting in the name of Imperial Unity, Russian nationalism must accept as its own all the claims of the Ukrainian people and must struggle with them for the realization of its aspirations."

Federalist ideas similar to those which we have just described become more and more evident, even among

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

000 Russian intellectual circles of pre-Great War Liberals, who generally do not seem to be particularly predisposed to them. It is curious to note that the old Russian intelligentsia was almost as centralist as the Imperial Government. Inflamed by social problems and by the struggle against the autocracy, it attached little importance to the problem of the nationalities of the Empire and took very little interest in it. The national consciousness, whether Russian or Ukrainian, was never a factor of the first importance to these moderate Socialists and these rather cosmopolitan Liberals. At the utmost it happened that if the Russian Social Democracy considered it necessary, it would maintain a branch in the Ukrainian language, but only in order to facilitate its own revolutionary propaganda and not in order to support the 'awakening of the nationalities.' In the enormous literary production of these intellectual circles there was, before the Revolution, nothing, or almost nothing, that could assist a solution or even a study of the problem of nationalities and of the Ukrainian problem in particular. There was the question of the development of the Revolution, of the new political and social order, but the solutions one had in mind were always based on the same class of ideas of high centralization, and the majority of these intellectuals had never thought that there was a Ukrainian question which was even capable of compromising the existence of the Russian State.

Nevertheless, since the Revolution, and especially since the German menace has become so obvious, these Liberal circles, Socialist revolutionaries, and former Constitutional Democrats who have become Republican Democrats of the new Milioukov direction, now also tend more and more towards a federalist solution.

Professor P. N. Milioukov himself, a former Minister

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of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government and certainly the biggest figure of moderate Liberalism in pre-Great War Russia and who, while representing the centralist imperialism of the Russian upper middle classes, was never distinguished by an excessive liking for autonomist movements, seems to have modified his point of view noticeably with regard to this subject. At least he writes, in a series of articles published in February and March 1939 in his newspaper *Latest News* (in Paris):

'The Ukrainians are a special people with a national type, a language and a history which are their own. With this we must agree. But this is not a particular privilege of the Ukrainians. Statements of this kind have a sense when one opposes them with the negation: there are no special Ukrainian people, no language, and no Ukrainian history. To-day only the uninformed or perhaps the "patriots" of a special type could deny this. Consequently there is no need to affirm things which are self-evident, if one did not accompany them with exaggerations "*ad majorem gloriam* of Ukrainian intellectuals" conscious of their nationality.'

And M. Milioukov continues:

'The terminology of the supporters of the Ukrainian idea is not new, we know it well. It has not changed since the time of Tsarism. Then as now it does not favour an honest understanding on the subject of "federation." Then we were not ready by a long way to accept this formula; to-day the Ukrainians seem to have gone far beyond it. The realization of the epoch of Ukrainization seems only to have brought about the rebirth of separatism in its old form. The Ukrainians must find a way out of this vicious circle. As for us, we should like to see a solution that would be as painless as possible and that might guarantee for the future the

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000 maintenance of stable and durable relations between the two parties.'

Thus, contrary to all that has been said before the Revolution, M. Milioukov and the section of Russian opinion which follows him are also to-day quite willing to accept the federal formula, though in a narrower sense than that which is put forward by the Young Russians.

On the contrary the old moderate Russian Right, that which included the members of former Governments, both Tsarist and those of Denikine and of Wrangel, and which remained 'pro-ally,' always refused to recognize the existence of the Ukraine under any form whatever and kept strictly to the principles of the 'one and indivisible' Russia. The weakness of its position, which was nevertheless quite sincere, lay in the fact that despite the enormous changes which have taken place since the Revolution in Russia and in the whole world, the Right perseveres in its dreams of the past and even applies them to the future.

In other circles of the Russian Right, in so-called 'Fascist' circles, those which M. Milioukov describes as 'ignoramuses' and as 'patriots of a special type,' foreign aims, and more especially German ones, concerning the Ukraine, and a hate of certain layers of the population within the Soviet Ukraine, have brought about the hope of delivering the whole of Russia from the Bolshevik yoke with the assistance of a foreign intervention, of which the most probable seems to be a German action in the Ukraine.

These circles see involuntary allies in the Ukrainian separatists, and especially in the 'Hetmanists,' capable of initiating a German intervention against the Soviet regime in the name of an independent Ukraine. As to the Ukrainian question as such, they see it almost from the same point of view as the Russian Right.

Thus they would even be willing to admit a separation 000 of the Ukraine which, in their opinion, would not last long and would only be a stage towards the establishment, on the heritage of the Soviet regime, of the New Peasant Russia, totalitarian, anti-semitic, and anti-democratic in the European sense of the word. They are anxious to instal themselves on Russian territory in order to create a base for the struggle with the Soviets.

If they doubt the sincerity of the anti-Communist ideology of Hitler Germany they also cannot imagine the new independent Ukraine, delivered from Soviet power thanks to her intervention, other than as a new 'Hetmanate' of 1918 which actually favoured, as we know, the counter-revolutionary Russian movement, the leaders of which were of an openly Russian orientation.

Briefly these circles, which one calls 'defeatists,' would admit the possibility of a provisional separation of the Ukraine, but do not see in this a great danger for the future of Russia and they affirm that in no case will the Ukraine remain detached from Russia when the latter has established a national power. In support of this the Press of these circles cites two examples: Finland and Hungary. One was freed from Bolshevism by the German intervention and the other by allied troops, yet both countries have not become dependent on anyone and have remained quite free.

To sum up, the Ukrainian question, despite its obvious importance, only occupies a secondary place in Russian *émigré* circles after that of the Communist Dictatorship, the actual master of the destinies of their country.

. . . . .

How can the problem be solved? An independent Ukraine? The independence of the Ukraine is not

000 justified in itself and is contrary to the interests and the aspirations of her people. It cannot be realized without the help of the Germans—an eventuality which ought never to be wished for by any Ukrainian who loves his country. The re-attachment of Galicia to Russia? That has taken place. As offensive as the Polish domination may have been to the Ukrainians, are they glad to exchange it for Soviet oppression?

In order that the Ukraine may live and may enjoy her riches, her culture, and her genius, and in order that she may not become a prey to German imperialism and that the Ukrainian problem ceases to be an international problem, it would be necessary that Poland should become a nationally homogeneous country, strong in her unity which has been so often proved. It would be necessary that she should cease to play the ungrateful role of a bastion against Bolshevism in order to become the advance post of the Slavonic world against Germanism and that she should dispose of her minorities, with whom she is incapable of finding a *modus vivendi*.

It would be necessary that Russia should be endowed with a national regime, capable of assuring to all the Russian countries, including the Ukraine, economic well-being, and cultural and religious liberty, and that she should re-unite these countries and thus resume her place of honour—to be the fortress against German expansion and the guarantee of equilibrium and peace in Eastern Europe.

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